Learning how to fine-tune the expression of cultural pride.

[ personal history ] My parents are Iranian. My father left Iran when he was 16 years old to study in the United Kingdom. My mother left when she was 18 to study in France. As fate would have it, they both returned to Iran during the turbulent years of the Revolution and fell in love. They envisaged a new life in Iran, a postrevolutionary bliss in which young hopes and desires would be manifested in a utopian society, only for the establishment to dash their hopes in an era of tyranny, oppression, and despair. And so they decided to flee their motherland and build a new life elsewhere, along with millions of other Iranians who represent one of the largest brain drains anywhere in the world. Having already established a life in the U.K., my father chose to return along with my mother to rebuild their lives in a stable and tolerant community. On the last day of 1987, my mother gave birth to me.

My childhood was no different from many others -- stable and loving upbringing, clever enough to complete my secondary education at a grammar school, played sports, had good friends. During the times when self-perception was less important to me than playing with my friends, I viewed myself as just another British child and assumed that the cultural diversity of my household was common. It just never occurred to me that my parents were different from British parents and my heritage so vastly different from theirs. I celebrated both the Gregorian New Year and the Iranian New Year. I ate fish and chips for lunch and then ghormeh sabzi, the traditional Persian spice-laden stew, for dinner. I spoke English to my friends at school and then Farsi to my parents at home. Why should it be different for anyone else?

Of course, it was up to others to identify me as foreign. I grew up in a city that boasts one of the whitest populations in the country, so it was inevitable that my self-perception would be questioned. At primary school, I brushed aside the odd comment about my difference as a misconception. Yet as I grew older and my understanding of the world around me deepened, I reached a point where I had to fundamentally redefine myself as a person. On the one hand, I could become a conformist and embrace the British identity, while acknowledging my heritage as secondary. On the other hand, I could embrace my heritage and, instead of cowering, proudly boast that I was Iranian. I saw little middle ground between the two alternatives. And so I chose the latter.

Myself: Redefined

I'm typical of a large community of second-generation children whose parents moved to the U.K. from distant lands. My standard response to "So, tell me about yourself!" is to explain that I am an Iranian who, due to circumstances outside of my control, has been brought up in a foreign land. I explain that my British upbringing is only one chapter of my life and does not define my identity. I explain that as much as I am thankful and appreciative of the British, I will always uphold my heritage. Then, expecting the usual backlash, I explain that no, I am not a terrorist and no, I am not planning the vengeful downfall of the U.K. I am merely expressing myself in the same manner that I would like to be viewed by others.

I spent a lot of time trying to affirm this expression of identity and heritage. I tried hanging the Iranian flag in my room, but to no avail, given the private circumstances. I wore an Iranian flag on the lapel of my school blazer, which also proved unsuccessful as I was viewed with suspicion. Then one day, my mother returned from Iran with a handful of small, golden necklaces that sparkled and glimmered like nothing I'd seen before. I cautiously asked her what they were, wary of sounding a little too excited about jewelry. She replied that on each necklace hung a faravahar -- the ancient Zoroastrian winged disk that has come to represent the Iranian nation, culture, and pride all at once. It was subtle, it was full of meaning, and it was an expression of nationality that went beyond religion...it was perfect! I grabbed one for myself and it has not left my neck since.

My aim in this essay is to reach a richer understanding of the concept of identity and explore the ways in which people express themselves, with a particular focus on nationality and acculturation. Today, the traditional constructs of identity, such as race, social class, and occupation, play a diminished role in the formation of identity. A wide variety of factors -- including immigration, globalization, and the belief in equality (Peñazola, 1994; Üstüner and Holt, 2007) -- have meant that simply being different is not enough; one must express that difference through consumption. Furthermore, our consumption behavior is no longer primarily determined by quality or function. Instead, we look to buy products or services that are symbolic in nature and reflect the identity we want to portray to others (Firat and Venkatesh, 1995). With those notions in mind, I hope to offer some worthwhile insight into my experiences as a British-born Iranian.

Nationality and acculturation

Jafari and Goulding (2008) propose that the concept of nationality is increasingly dependent on political dynamics and determined by two types of narratives, the natural narrative and the invented narrative. The former is constituted by a nation's history, literature, media, and popular culture, while the latter takes the form of imposed rituals, through which a state seeks to reinvent values and norms by repetition. They use the example of the Islamic Revolution to demonstrate their analogy.

From my own perspective, the point where I felt I had to redefine myself was a point where the two types of narratives overlapped. What was I to believe? In my mind, the British narrative, which I had experienced as natural for so many years, suddenly felt detached and artificial. It morphed into an invented narrative that I felt was being imposed on me. At the same time, my Iranian narrative felt incomplete because I was born and bred in a different country. My perception of nationality became very obscure; I could no longer identify myself as British or Iranian. Jafari and Goulding call this phenomenon the "torn self." (Jafari and Goulding use the "torn self" to describe the structural paradoxes that young Iranians face when they escape to the UK, namely the conflict between individualism in the West and conformism in Islamic traditions. I have interpreted the term slightly differently in my case.)

As I mentioned above, I saw little middle ground between the two choices. Peñaloza, in a study of Mexican immigrants in the United States, examined four methods of acculturation: assimilation, maintenance, resistance, and segregation. Assimilation, in which one wholly adopts a new identity at the expense of their heritage, was one option for me (and a common choice for many second-generation Brits I know). My alternative option was resistance, in which one prioritizes their heritage. The other two choices, maintenance (a balance between the two identities) and segregation (physically withdrawing from the new identity), were out of the question. The seeming impossibility of maintenance I attribute to the passion and dominance of the Iranian culture -- I was unable to balance the two identities as they are so imbalanced by nature. I also could not segregate myself from my British identity as it had already dominated so much of my life. So I chose to resist and embrace my heritage. Acculturation, of course, is not usually as rigid as assumed by Peñaloza's analysis. In reality, I do not consistently resist; I have a fluid identity that can adapt to the various situation I encounter, basically making life a little simpler. Oswald (1999) terms this approach "culture swapping"; Üstüner and Holt term it "hybrid identities."

How to manage resistance

Jafari and Goulding discuss the notion of being Iranian in the U.K. They studied a sample of affluent Iranian youth who had escaped to the country for various reasons, all of whom felt that they were cast in the roles of Muslim extremists and terrorist sympathizers. My own experiences confirm this. Once, I was approached by a large group of white, British men who felt it was necessary to share their views with me. They called me a "Paki" and explained that I and my religion were not welcome in their country (I am not religious at all). I replied, "Actually I'm not from Pakistan, I'm from Iran." Looking bemused and slightly taken aback, one of the men pondered for a moment and then replied, "Whatever mate! Go back to your country you fucking Turk." Obviously, my attempt to differentiate between Pakistan and Iran made absolutely no difference. What this incident, along with many other, has taught me, is that expressing national identity bluntly -- saying I am Iranian or wearing an Iranian flag on my lapel -- is not necessarily beneficial for my well-being. Instead, by wearing the faravahar necklace, I can use it as a way of disseminating my cultural values and establishing a dialogue with others, in order to create a positive image of my country and people. This more subtle approach makes it easier for people to respond to and question my nationality with curiosity rather than suspicion.

Developing the work of Peñaloza and others, Ahuvia (2005) attempts to categorize the reconciliation of identity conflicts into three solutions: demarcating, compromising, and synthesizing. My consumption of the necklace would fall under the category of a demarcating solution. He argues that this act of consumption is not just about expressing an identity to others, but also reflects the greater conflict that occurs within oneself. Furthermore, he argues, "it is often the products that consumers reject that say the most about the consumers' desired self." These rejected products are a manifestation of rejected identities. Essentially, my necklace symbolizes both who I am (or who I want to be) and, no less, who I am not (or who I do not want to be).

In conclusion

In sharing these thoughts, I acknowledge the limitations on my perspective imposed by my particular circumstances: I am well educated, I am not religious, I am financially secure, and I am well traveled. Mehta and Belk, as well as Jafari and Goulding, assert that acculturation varies significantly depending on such characteristics. In general, the construction of identity differs from person to person and depends on an infinite set of variables that cannot be fully rationalized. Another consideration is that my parents have played an important role in the development of my identity, and their views have influenced mine to an uncertain degree.

I have spent a long time trying to define my identity. The paradigm in which I lived for many years gradually faded and left me with a blank canvas to paint my new identity upon. As I have described, I chose to embrace my heritage and literally wear it on my neck. I made this decision because I wanted to be closer to my family, because of the attitudes of those around me, and because of a general interest in Iranian history and politics. In essence, one could call it an identity of convenience rather than obligation. And this convenience, this blank canvas, is the paradigm that I have learned to comprehend, in which reality is no longer singular but individually constructed, in which consumption is as much symbolic as functional and few social boundaries exist to restrict expression. Firat and Venkatesh name this paradigm "postmodernism." I call it my life.

Photos: Author's grandparents (above); Iranian pop diva Googoosh in London before the 1979 revolution (homepage).

References

Ahuvia, Aaron C. (2005). "Beyond the Extended Self: Loved Objects and Consumers' Identity Narratives," Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 32, pp. 171-84.

Jafari, Aliakbar, and Christina Goulding (2008). "'We Are Not Terrorists!' UK-Based Iranians, Consumption Practices and the 'Torn Self,'"' Consumption Markets & Culture, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 73-91.

Mehta, Raj, and Russell W. Belk (1991). "Artifacts, Identity, and Transition: Favourite Possessions of Indians and Indian Immigrants to the United States," Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 17, pp. 398-411.

Oswald, Laura R. (1999). "Culture Swapping: Consumption and the Ethnogenesis of Middle-Class Haitian Immigrants," Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 303-18.

Peñazola, Lisa (1994). "Atravesando Frontera/Border Crossings: A Critical Ethnographic Exploration of the Consumer Acculturation of Mexican Immigrants," Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 32-54.

Üstüner, Tuba, and Douglas B. Holt (2007). "Dominated Consumer Acculturation: The Social Construction of Poor Migrant Women's Consumer Identity Projects in a Turkish Squatter," Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 34, pp. 41-56.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

In land where homosexuality can yield death sentence, little hope that regime will heed a recent U.N. appeal.

[ comment ] It has always been hard to be gay in the Middle East, even more so in Iran, where a hardline regime, with ultimate power in the hands of the clergy, has been in power since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. But gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered persons in Iran were given the tiniest glimmer of hope in November when the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland, released its latest recommendations on how the Iranian government can improve the human rights of its citizens, including for the first time GLBTs.

"The Committee is concerned that members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community face harassment, persecution, cruel punishment and even the death penalty. It is also concerned that these persons face discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation, including with respect to access to employment, housing, education and health care, as well as social exclusion within the community," said the report of the committee's 103d session, held October 17 to November 4.

The report continued,

The State party should repeal or amend all legislation which provides for or could result in the discrimination, prosecution and punishment of people because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. It should ensure that anyone held solely on account of freely and mutually agreed sexual activities or sexual orientation should be released immediately and unconditionally. The State party should also take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to eliminate and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, including with respect to access to employment, housing, education and health care, and to ensure that individuals of different sexual orientation or gender identity are protected from violence and social exclusion within the community.

Iran is not alone in this respect. Over the past few years, a growing number of countries at the U.N., especially members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the African Union, have said they are opposed to any discussion of the LGBT issue in the framework of human rights, arguing that homosexuality is irrelevant to their cultural and religious values. "Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have used their cultural relativism argument to walk away from their responsibilities in regard to LGBT human rights," explained Alizadeh.

"Although the Human Rights Committee does not have an enforcement mechanism, their frequent reference to LGBT rights and their repeated emphasis on states' responsibilities to respect the human rights of consenting individuals who engage in same sex practices can in the long term serve as a source for international standards in addressing LGBT rights violations."

Iran's penal code incorporates severe punishments, including the death penalty, for men charged with engaging in lavat, or sodomy, and for women charged with mosahegheh, or lesbian sex acts. For two men to be charged with sodomy, under Islamic law, there needs to be four adult male witnesses who actually observed the act of penetration. Since in practice this is almost impossible to come by, Iranian police regularly employ torture to extract confessions. Women convicted of lesbianism are sentenced to 100 lashes for each of the first three offenses, according to Human Rights Watch. The death penalty is applied once a woman is convicted of mosahegheh for the fourth time.

The number of gay Iranian men executed for homosexuality appears to have risen sharply in the past few years, causing outrage in gay communities around the globe. This has prompted the Iranian government to order state media to give less publicity to such cases, which in turn has made it harder for international human rights groups -- already effectively barred from entering Iran and interviewing victims of violence and discrimination -- to compile relevant data. Iranian authorities also routinely charge those they execute for sodomy with other crimes such as drug trafficking or rape, making it harder for researchers to ascertain the real reasons for many executions.

"One of the issues that has been frequently raised by various U.N. bodies, [and by] U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, are the extremely high number of executions in Iran in the past year," said Alizadeh. "There have been cases of executions for sodomy, including three cases in September 2011 in Ahwaz, a city in the southwest of Iran, that is populated mainly by ethnic Arabs. Although later, we had reports indicating that those executed in Ahwaz were political activists and the sodomy charges brought by the government were bogus."

Human Rights Watch issued a detailed report in December 2010 on the mistreatment of Iranian gay men and lesbians, "We Are a Buried Generation: Discrimination and Violence against Sexual Minorities in Iran." The report, which took five years of interviews with people in Iran and abroad to compile, details how most Iranian families view homosexuality in their children as an illness and take them to psychologists to be "cured"; how police regularly raid gay parties and arrest gay-looking men on the streets; how gay men have to go through many procedures to get exemptions from military service for alleged "sexual deviancy"; and how gay men are regularly entrapped through gay chat rooms on the Internet.

One would think that in countries, such as Iran, that are heavily gender segregated, it would be easier for same-sex couples to spend time and even live together. But the fact remains that most apartment owners are reluctant to rent to unmarried men and women, forcing most gay Iranians to live at home with their parents, who keep a constant eye on them.

"Gay men can rent a room with their partners without raising any suspicions. But at the same time, this free-style bachelor life has a limit: There is no legal protection in case people find out about the true nature of the relationship between the 'roommates,' and so they live in constant fear of being discovered," explained Alizadeh. "If LGBT individuals choose to hide their identity and live their entire life in the shadows, they may be safe. But this is not what we as human rights activists advocate for. No one should be forced into hiding and become invisible just because of their sexual orientation and gender identity."

Many observers of Iran and the Muslim world have noted the fissure between the discourse of Western human rights groups, which are progressive and activist, and Muslim nations that feel LGBT rights are a Western and therefore "foreign" concept. This has led some gay Muslims in the West to form support and advocacy groups, such as Al-Fatiha in the United States and Canada, to try and reach an accommodation between their Islamic faith and sexual orientation.

"There is a disconnect between Muslim societies and the global human rights discourse, since there are many who question the compatibility of human rights principles with Islam," admits Alizadeh. "That's why LGBT activists in many Muslim countries prefer to work in coalition with other human rights activists, including feminists and those advocating for individual rights and freedoms."

In Iran, the chance of any sort of dialogue between the clerical and LGBT communities seems nil, even though there has been a group of more liberally minded imams who have issued religious verdicts (fatwas) on a range of social issues, according to Alizadeh.

"Over the past few years, there have been a number of progressive Shiite clergymen, both in Iran and in places such as Lebanon, who have written revolutionary fatwas regarding gender equality, human rights, rights to privacy, and sexual offenses," said Alizadeh. "These fatwas have been used in courts by lawyers with various degrees of success. Although the ruling establishment remains untouched by those progressive views, they can't simply dismiss them as Western and have to take them into consideration as part of the court hearing process."

Mehdi Khalaji, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who trained for many years at seminaries in Qom, does not believe that there is any school of thought in Shiism that takes a nonhostile attitude to homosexuality.

Regarding the recommendations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, Khalaji said in an interview that he was doubtful the Iranian government would take any notice: "Pressure through human rights themselves would not change Iran's behavior, unless Iran felt that suspending some of its juridical verdicts would decrease the political and economic pressure on Iran."

Rasheed Abou-Alsamh is a Saudi American journalist who lives in Brazil and blogs at rasheedsworld.com. He is a regular contributor to Al-Ahram Weekly and Brazil's O Globo. Photos: From the film "Circumstance" (above); homepage via BeLikeOthers.com.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Three decades seen through the changing wares of a black-market home-entertainment provider.

[ comment ] Asghar Agha is a happy man. The Iranian government is losing the information and cultural war against its own people, while he just keeps on thriving.

Over the past three decades, the regime has tried to crush the Iranian people's taste for the Western and non-Islamic Iranian music, TV shows, and films available through the thousands of satellite dishes that line the rooftops of residential buildings around the country. It is failing because of the entertainment black market.

The regime has been engaged in this cultural conflict, which it itself has termed a "war," since early in the revolutionary era. Under former President Mohammad Khatami, the conflict abated to a degree. During his two terms, some pop music was allowed, musical instruments appeared again on TV, more books were published -- steps toward a ceasefire.

In recent years, however, forces loyal to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have reversed those modest steps. Concerts have again become rare, good music is hard to find, and books are subjected to very strict censorship. And ultraconservatives push for still more restrictions.

However, because of a thriving entertainment black market, there is only so far they can go. Behind closed doors, people watch satellite TV, have parties, listen to pop tunes, and actively use social media more than ever before. As a result, Asghar Agha and those like him who help ordinary citizens satisfy their hunger for the sort of entertainment of which the state disapproves are extremely pleased with current market conditions.

During the Shah's era, despite tight controls on most politically related speech, the entertainment industry flourished in Iran. Packed cinemas featured the latest Hollywood productions and film-farsis. Stage shows and pop music concerts drew large audiences, and there was an active nightlife scene.

Prior to the Revolution, the Lalehzar district was the heart of Tehran. Home to at least 15 cinemas and many theaters, clubs, and bars, it was Iran's entertainment and nightlife nexus. Many who are old enough to remember those days recall their adventures on Lalehzar Street with nostalgia and, now, melancholy.

The street was planned by the Qajar king Nasereldin Shah after his visit to Farang, as Europe was once known to Persians. His vision was that it would become the Iranian Champs-Elysees. Among its most famous sites was the Grand Hotel, venue for the concerts of popular artists such as Aref and Eshghi. When the Islamic Revolution began in 1979, the Lalehzar District quickly withered away.

Along with the sudden disappearance of Iranian nightlife, theaters were closed, concerts were banned, and entertainers fled the country, many for Los Angeles.

The cinemas were confiscated by the state. Those that remained open showed only films either made according to the new regime's strict censorship codes or of foreign origin and heavily redacted. State-run TV and radio followed suit; even cartoons were frowned upon.

I was born in the early 1980s, part of the so-called Third Generation, amid a war that had devastated the country and a severe clampdown on social freedoms. In those days, the typical Iranian worked long, arduous hours for dismal pay and relied heavily on government subsidies and coupons.

In the early postrevolutionary era, given the lack of commercial entertainment coupled with the hard conditions of everyday life, people sought alternative ways of having fun. I remember there were a lot of family gatherings. People even took advantage of the Iraqi bombing raids; hiding in bomb shelters was a social event -- as this animated YouTube film illustrates nicely:

After the war, video cassette recorders and tapes became our arms against government oppression. VCRs were banned but many families had them and there was a flourishing black market for cassettes served by a plethora of underground rental and distribution services. A copy of a film, a cartoon, or an episode from a TV series was smuggled in and many thousands of illegal duplicates were made and distributed.

Our supplier was Asghar Agha. Every month, he would come by with a list of the latest cassettes available and our parents would make a selection. Early on, there were the Tom and Jerry cartoons and few episodes of the Flintstones, as well as the occasional Disney picture. Later came Transformers and superhero cartoons.

In school, we were all involved in the high-risk activity of VHS trading; we hid the tapes under an item of clothing and discretely placed it in the swapping partner's bag. Despite all my experience at these furtive transactions, I was caught once and suspended.

Comic books were also highly sought after. We were always hoping to come across a top-notch item, like a vintage Tintin comic published before the Revolution, or Sinbad or Superman. Any kid who'd recently made such a find was the most popular in school.

By the mid-1990s, a new, more powerful weapon became available for the homes of open-minded Iranians: analog satellite. The first time I experienced it was at my aunt's house. They had just installed the dish, and now we could watch a few channels broadcast out of India. My parents bought us a set one year later, and I spent my afternoons watching Cartoon Network or Hollywood classics on TNT (to which I owe my knowledge of the English language).

The government claimed that satellite TV amounted to an assault against the Revolution and that it was nothing more than the West's latest gambit to infiltrate Iranian homes after literature, music, and the VCR. For its part in this "war," the authorities started raiding houses to confiscate the satellite dishes and receivers, levying heavy fines on those who disobeyed.

But despite the crackdown, satellite dishes flourished. With the advent of digital satellite and the increasing availability of entertainment channels, the popularity of satellite TV has soared. The government now officially accepts that 60 percent of Iranians watch satellite TV, but the true percentage is much higher.

And with the satellite boom came independent Farsi channels. The first, broadcast out of Los Angeles, mostly revolved around low-quality entertainment programs; a few, more political, were run by long-forgotten opposition figures.

In recent years, however, there has been significant growth in higher-quality programming aimed at Iran. In the forefront was MBC Persia, operated by the Arab-held MBC Group. BBC Persian TV, an outgrowth of the BBC Persian radio service, soon followed. Then came Farsi1 and Manoto TV, which are dedicated to entertainment.

The authorities soon discovered that the raids and fines did nothing to quell the popularity of satellite TV, so they employed a new tactic, disrupting the satellite signals with interference-generating devices. This seems to be more successful at preventing people from enjoying their favorite programs, yet more and more Iranians want their dish. So the occasional raids still continue.

Asghar Agha, who used to bring us our VHS tapes, has evolved with the times and technology. Now he's our satellite guy. Every once a while, he comes over and adjusts our dish, adds a few channels, and gives us advice on how to deal with the government-created noise. He also provides the latest pirated DVDs and video games.

Before the advent of the Internet, every old market had a dodgy corner or two with a shop selling books or electronics. If the shopkeeper trusted you, he would also sell you underground music or banned literature. I frequented these joints a lot, looking for hidden treasures, be it Boof-e Kur by Sadegh Hedayat or the latest Metallica album.

Emerging in Iran within the context of the broader cultural war, Internet usage did not at first compete with comic books and videotapes as a back-alley entertainment medium. For a long time, the regime kept Internet speeds so slow that it was good only for transmitting information, not compelling entertainment.

As the Internet became more popular and speeds increased (though they are still very slow compared to other countries), it became increasingly important to the lives of ordinary Iranians, not only as a source of entertainment but as a means of resistance against government censorship and domination of the news flow.

With the regime's extensive filtering of the Internet, VPNs and anti-filtering software have become the latest black market commodities. So if you need a decent VPN in order to catch the latest episode of Parazit, the Iranian Daily Show, on Facebook, Asghar Agha will be more than delighted to set you up.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

In its present form, VOA's Persian service is a waste of U.S. tax dollars.

[ media ] Whatever policy the United States adopts toward Iran, it will need to communicate it to the Iranian people. This will not be easy. Iranians are subject to heavy anti-American propaganda from the Islamic government. Not only are there no diplomatic relations, Tehran even creates many problems for people-to-people exchanges like student scholarship programs. The main tool of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran is generous government funding of Voice of America's Persian TV (Persian News Network, or PNN) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Persian program (Radio Farda). While radio is a useful complement, TV is the best medium to reach ordinary people in Iran, so PNN is the more important of the two.

Along with a few Iran experts with backgrounds in journalism, I monitored PNN for a year. We found that PNN was consistently ignoring the professional rules of TV production. Its programs are generally poor both in format and content. The problem is that PNN is run like a government agency, not like a news organization.

America has successful models for how to run public broadcasting: the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, National Public Radio, and the many public TV stations. These are not run as government agencies.

It is no accident that the most successful foreign television news broadcasts to Iran are produced by an independent government-supported entity, the BBC. While the BBC's foreign services are funded by the British government, the BBC is not a government agency. The majority of those who have satellite in Iran indisputably watch BBC Persian TV. According to the most recent surveys, BBC Persian has at least twice as many viewers as PNN. BBC Persian was launched in 2008, years after PNN started broadcasting to Iran. BBC Persian has almost the same annual budget as PNN (more than $20 million). BBC uses the money to gather news, with many more correspondents around the world than PNN. By contrast, PNN has a much larger staff at headquarters than BBC Persian -- just what you would expect from a government agency.

PNN uses formats that are out-of-date and boring. Rarely are there outside shots of correspondents -- for instance, in front of Congress or the White House -- much less reporting by PNN foreign correspondents. Just on presentation alone, PNN cannot capture the attention of Iranian youth. The content is also editorially incoherent. The selection of topics covered is weak. BBC Persian, not PNN, often has special coverage of top stories from the United States, such as Obama's inaugural. PNN rarely interviews the experts about Iran who appear on U.S. television networks. There are few, if any, editorial guidelines.

PNN has to compete with the Iranian regime's dozens of TV stations. Although Iranian state media is highly ideological and shamelessly spreads lies, its propaganda machinery is professionally run. It is exciting to watch; PNN is not. The regime's TV stations have an impact on a large portion of Iranian society.

For entertainment, millions of Iranian who have access to satellite TV watch private broadcasts from abroad, especially Manoto and Farsi One. But these are largely or entirely entertainment networks, with little if any news. They shy away from socio-political entertainment. To its credit, PNN has put on an excellent satirical show, Parazit, which gets many more viewers than other PNN shows. As you would expect from a government agency, rather than build on Parazit's success by developing other entertaining shows, PNN has not put into Parazit the resources necessary to hire good writers, develop a strong support team, or to encourage continuing innovations. In other words, whatever extra funds devoted to Parazit, it has not been targeted at professionalizing it. As a result, Parazit viewership has dropped significantly.

PNN is run like a government agency. The PNN director is required to have a security clearance, so selection of the director is heavily influenced by factors other than experience in journalism. Poorly qualified TV producers were recruited at high salaries and now in practice cannot be dismissed. While the average age of VOA employees is 64, the age of average Iranians is 32.

In order to solve the problem, it seems that the only option is to convert PNN from a government agency, transforming it to a public media that follows the most successful examples in American public broadcasting like National Public Radio. A public PNN would be able to receive funds from the government and also from non-government sources and advertising. Without government bureaucratic impediments, an independent public TV or radio station would be in a much stronger position to hire the most qualified journalists, producers and editors. In its present structure, PNN is unable to communicate effectively with Iranians and a waste of American tax payers' money.

In September 2010, when President Barack Obama wanted to talk with Iranians, he chose BBC Persian over its own Voice of America Farsi station. Policymakers should think about how they can make Voice of America so credible and trustworthy that when American officials want to communicate with other nations they would not have to resort to the media of another country.

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He previously worked as a producer and broadcaster at BBC and Radio Free Europe.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

We're reevaluating our Press Roundup section and may phase it out. Please email the editor with any questions or comments: editor [at] tehranbureau [dot] com. In the meantime, you may want to follow us on Twitter for breaking news stories.

Considering the real costs and benefits of military engagement and the courage of restraint.

[ opinion ] The nuclear conundrum in Iran has taken center stage in the United States presidential campaign. Republicans are relentlessly hounding President Obama, as GOP candidates offer solutions of bold leadership, military action, and unwavering loyalty to a hardline position. Despite heated political discourse, the administration's national security team has pursued an effective course of action to date. Both sides, however, have failed to promote a dialogue that frames security concerns for those outside the maelstrom of electoral politics while providing the substantive clarity that the situation demands.

Direct use

The concern most frequently raised is the potential for Iran to engage in direct use of a nuclear weapon on another nation-state. Inflammatory rhetoric by Iranian leaders, shrouded in the cloth of religious fanaticism, creates an aura of dread. Some analysts have implied that Iran would strike the United States in an overt or covert manner. Others believe Ahmadinejad has the power and intent to wipe Israel off the map. Would Tehran use nuclear weapons on another state, or specifically the United States and its allies in the Middle East?

Iran would be highly unlikely to pursue such a course of action. The level of global condemnation would be unprecedented. The subsequent retaliation would wipe out the heart of modern Iran and invaluable elements of the Persian heritage. Any leader minimally sensitive to costs would implicitly understand these tangible ramifications; the likelihood of such an action is therefore almost zero, barring the implementation of counterproductive Western policy options. A massive invasion aimed at regime change ironically represents the most likely scenario under which the Supreme National Security Council might discuss threatening to go beyond conventional warfare under the justification of self-defense and preservation.

The leadership in Tehran is of the worst sort, but this does not mean that it does not comprise rational strategists. In the post-World War II age, vigorous and contentious leaders have held control of nuclear weapons for deterrence without seeking their use. During the Cold War, America balanced against a much larger and more serious power on every level. That a regime like Iran is able to create similar levels of anxiety does not accurately represent the degree of its threat to vital U.S. interests. If states respect the deterrence factor at play, the concern of direct use should be assuaged.

Indirect use

Would Tehran pass along nuclear technology or weapons to a terrorist organization? Iran is well known for its active support of Hezbollah and alliance with Hamas. Both have repeatedly engaged Israeli and U.S. forces since the 1980s, and in the post-9/11 world security experts and ordinary citizens share a vivid nightmare: a nuclear explosion in a crowded city. Whether or not Iran would seek to destabilize the United States and its allies through such a measure is a legitimate question, but deeper exploration of the issue, or specifically how Iran strategically utilizes external organizations, suggest that the danger (and concomitant fear) may not be as significant as some maintain.

Hezbollah is not al-Qaeda. According to field experts, there are stark operational differences between these organizations in command structure and tactics. Policy makers must be careful to discern the nuances that distinguish them, as one group can be identified as an extension of state policy (even if covert) and the other as completely independent of any authority. Hezbollah operates under the umbrella of Iran and can be tied to state control, as a proxy force, while al-Qaeda is accountable to no one. This may be difficult to distinguish in conventional or asymmetrical operations, but in regard to nuclear material there exists a direct line that can be traced to the state of origin through forensic science and the cooperation of nuclear allies. Iran would be unable to evade detection and the unbearable mantle of responsibility.

A nuclear state has no interest in giving weapons to an autonomous group. It has never happened in the history of the nuclear age and is highly unlikely to occur given the implementation of proper safeguards. Losing direct control of nuclear material is not in the interest of Tehran, as the state would be held responsible, leaving itself open to either conventional or nuclear retaliation. Rational and pragmatic leadership would seek to avoid these astronomical burdens as demonstrated by even the most basic cost-benefit analysis.

Militant fascism

A nuclear-armed Iran could be emboldened by its new defensive and offensive capabilities, exacerbating hegemonic tendencies that already exist in the Persian Gulf. It has an active security role in the Strait of Hormuz and its influence is heavily felt along the rim. Though Iran has not sought direct territorial expansion, it has had a strong social and political impact. Inhabitants of Lebanon, southern Iraq, and western Afghanistan look to Iran for leadership and Tehran has proven time and again to be responsive. Would nuclear weapons embolden Iran to engage in activities that more openly challenge the Arab states and Israel?

Possibly, but there are methods for containing these activities, or restricting them to current levels. The ability of the United States to project overwhelming power in the Gulf suggests Iranian territorial expansion is unfeasible in the conventional sense, and the best inroads Iran could hope for are political and social gains that do not rely on military conflict. Whether or not Iran acquires a nuclear capability seems to be a moot point. Iran has demonstrated it can succeed with its "soft power" endeavors and nuclear weapons are neither required nor likely to ratchet up these efforts. Iran is effectively contained by competing states in the region, and when backed by U.S. military power in the Persian Gulf, could be met with superior force within minutes.

Domestic upheaval

In 2009, Iran had a contentious presidential election that many called the beginning of a revolution. Yet the Iranian government retained central authority and suffocated any serious opposition, effectively neutralizing the possibility of armed dissidents. With its Machiavellian system of governance, supported by the dominant Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and militia enforcement mechanisms, there is no maneuvering room for the sort of ideologically driven, violent opposition movement that many would fear in a nuclear state.

Even if there was a significant change in leadership, it would be safe to assume new leaders would also be rational, sensitive to cost, and unlikely to pursue the direct or indirect use of nuclear weapons. Anyone capable of seizing power in Iran would be pragmatic enough to recognize the dangers of using nuclear weapons, especially if they are intent on maintaining power within territorial Iran. They would not be interested in jeopardizing that goal by inviting outside military action. Furthermore, any new leadership would seek international recognition and ties to the global community, possibly requesting assistance to ensure political, social, and economic stability. Indeed, such an opening (as in the case of Ukraine) could provide serious incentive for disarmament and reengagement.

Proliferation

Another major concern is the prospect of a regional nuclear arms race. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel will ramp up its arsenal and Arab states would look to balance. Even ignoring the tremendous amount of investment and technology required for such an endeavor, it is very possible to stave off widespread proliferation in the region if individual solutions are applied on a case-by-case basis.

Egypt does not have the resources to initiate and develop a nuclear program. It already struggles to buy conventional arms and maintain an effective security force; of course, there is also the massive government transformation currently under way. Additional budgetary demands are presently unrealistic and not likely to change dramatically in the next decade. Turkey, while perhaps capable of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, has other conditions that limit proliferation. It enjoys the protection and membership of NATO, aspires to join the European Union, and already hosts a sizable contingent of U.S. armed forces.

Saudi Arabia represents the most likely state to begin a nuclear program in response to developments in Iran. Riyadh may not feel that a U.S. alliance is adequate enough defense on its own accord. With significant pressure from allies and increased security reassurances, these anxieties can be dealt with through political and economic policies. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and given substantial investment in the United States of Saudi assets, it seems reasonable that strategic alliances and guarantees would be adequate to keep nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia.

Israel is likely to seek expansion of its own arsenal and increased second-strike capability to ensure effective deterrence and operational ability. A large expansion could be mitigated through security guarantees with the United States and potentially (granted tenuously plausible) assurance from Tehran that the Iranian arsenal would not expand beyond a small, but effectively deterring size. The region would arrive at a balancing of the most serious nature. It worked for more than a half century for two superpowers and has continued to keep a stable peace among the contemporary Great Powers. Israel is not a large state and a minimal deterrent figure could thus meet any potential scenario.

Restrain and balance

A nuclear arsenal in Iran remains undesirable and preferably avoided at serious cost, but the overt use of military force would not be successful in its application -- it would invite a disproportionate response directed at U.S. targets and deliver a dramatic shock to fragile global markets still trying to overcome stagnant conditions. Nonproliferation efforts currently under way should continue so long as they prove successful in limiting breakout potential. Solutions that do not involve significant military action can be pursued on multiple fronts. Aerial and naval strikes should be avoided absent an unequivocal, imminent threat to vital interests. Summarily, the United States and its allies possess more than enough influence to contain a nuclear-armed Iran.

Restraint in the face of overwhelming temptation defines a courage displayed throughout decisive moments in American history. Clarity fused with purpose and direction can plot a course around the dangers of a nuclear Iran -- and hopefully the dangers of electoral politics. A renewed sense of practical idealism would not only resonate with American greatness at home, it would also strengthen responsible democratic governance around the world.

Michael Miner is a teaching fellow at Harvard University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and International Society for Iranian Studies, and author of "The Coming Revolution: An Improbable Possibility."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

There are ways of measuring the impact of these artistic efforts. Some will measure them by their originality (whose measuring rod is almost exclusively not local), some by their relevance. And of course they will also be measured by the art market: how many paintings make it to international auctions, how much certain painters sell, at what prices, who is doing the buying. I am, however, more interested in what these channeled energies are expressing. For now, at least, I'm interested in what they reflect.

If there are more paintings being produced, it is partly because more paintings are being bought. It's a function of the growing stability of a wealthy class in North Tehran, willing to invest in the arts, and painting is the most investable art form. To that end, the inexplicably active art market in neighboring Dubai has also helped. There is also the relative reopening of Iran's actual and virtual borders: more artists can travel to the West, and, since the Internet, we do not have to wait for smuggled, expensive art books and catalogues to see the new trends. There are plenty of styles out there waiting to be applied to Iranian subjects, and there are plenty of painters willing to apply them.

None of these factors, however, can fully explain the creative force that runs through the young paintings I see in Iran. There is more to the picture than the market and international exposure -- it has, I think, something to do with what the painters see and with the possibilities of painting as a language.

In cities everywhere, public life is foremost a visual experience. The metropolis provides endless situations we can watch up close, situations that rise out of lives not so dissimilar to our own. Example: a fight between two taxi drivers, one old and one young. Example: a couple hiding in the darkest shadows of a coffee shop, speaking conspiratorially, haloed by the smoke from their cigarettes that catches the light they avoid.

But we cannot touch these compact dramas, we cannot interact with them. If we approach, they shiver and transform: The combative taxi drivers will stop their argument and attack you as a team. The couple in the coffee shop will stop their conversation and look you up and down like an anomaly.

Tehran is the same way, but its public experience is heightened because what you see often demands a conversation from you, because it houses contradictions: A middle-aged mother in the long black Islamic veil, the chador, and her colorfully dressed daughter who holds a guitar case -- the mother walking the daughter to her music lessons. In an old street, barely wide enough for a single car to pass, a five-story building has risen up, and a few meters away a second building is on the rise. A playground full of young married couples, none of whom have children.

In more extreme cases -- not rare -- the demand is more immediate: when a screaming young woman is being taken away by the police. The very image of women, particularly modern, working women, is a source of dissonance. Any law enforcement agency gives rise to contradictory feelings; so does any religious or educational institution.

The experiences require a conversation, but the vocabulary for this conversation is yet to be fleshed out. And then, what tone of voice would be appropriate? Emphatic, sympathetic, enraged? For many of us, in many situations, it is not even clear who we should be speaking with. Is it even our place to speak?

Painting uses the visual language of experience to begin a dialogue that cannot yet be verbalized. First, it assures the painter and the viewer that they are not alone in seeing the contradictions. Second, it infuses the images with feeling (something that is more difficult for photography to accomplish); it acknowledges that what we feel is not separate from what is occurring in society. Third, in the freedom of the canvas the painter creates new contradictions that, even if painful, hint at new possibilities.

There is no society that does not contain conflict. The question is to what extent are a people sensitive to these contradictions. Those Iranians who fight, complain, become depressed, drink too heavily, theorize, or organize -- they have become embroiled in social conflicts. Some see the conflicts more clearly, some merely experience them.

This is another reason why photography cannot serve the same function as painting. In a society where people are desensitized to contradictions, photography can highlight the existing conflicts. (I imagine a prosperous European society, past its major transitions, with the poor and immigrants sequestered in their own neighborhoods.) But in a society where people are bombarded by images that demand a conversation because history has sped up, the surface reality that photography captures can too easily approach the mundane. Whatever contradiction it might quote, chances are the viewers have already noticed in their daily lives. The successful photograph in today's Iran, rather, is one that can portray a consistency -- these being so rare, so abnormal.

The attention that the photograph pays to a scene is momentary (except in the case of posed photographs and collages), whereas painting implies sustained attention, struggle with the subject matter. As images turn into paintings, they present the subconscious of the painter and of the image, as well, which has inspired this sustained attention and effort.

Here, for example, the painting by Javad Modarresi (b. 1979). Part of a series, it's titled after a neighborhood in central Tehran. My brother still lives there. The building portrayed exemplifies the place perfectly. Everything here is intentional: the soot-covered walls, the broken windows, the water stains. It's a building from the period just before the Revolution...and already decrepit. To this scene the painter has drawn the lives of people who define its desolation. The bride and the groom, abandoned, considering the scene of their possible future. The store to the bottom left is a bookstore; according to the sign it is supposed to carry books on the law and political science. It is closed on a weekday, probably permanently (we know it's a weekday because the woman on the roof is wearing her work or school clothing and carrying a briefcase). Over the narrow entrance the painter has hung an out-of-place traffic sign: Danger Ahead! This is the type of danger that has brought the woman to the edge.

The central contradiction of the painting is embodied in the white plane. No photograph, of course, could have captured it. The plane is flying too close to the ground. The sky it navigates bends like a cup to contain its flight. There is no clear way to talk about what it represents. One should know something about the role that the possibility of emigration plays in the Iranian mind. One should know something about the paradox of its dream: the more you enter the social life of your country, the more you think about leaving it altogether. Emigration is precisely the type of ever-present contradiction that has yet to find its honest, eloquent dialogue. Any talk of emigration signals the end of another conversation: It comes up as the last resort, as a way out of confronting the problem, the hokey hope of the hopeless.

The first place where the dialogue disintegrates is between those who dream of emigrating and those who have done it -- the expats. Hokey hope is hard to dismantle, but even harder if you come to the conversation with a shield you have constructed after years of alienating and humiliating experiences, or with a vision of your own success that has nothing to do with the problems at hand. And it's not just between expats and nationals that communication about the issue fails. The conversation falls apart within the individual mind, because it concerns the nature of the problems we perceive in our own lives. Thus the plane in the painting could not help but be perfectly white, perfectly poised to leave the space of the canvas -- which it never will. A perfectly abstract airplane that did not rise from any runway and will never land at any airport.

It's a rich painting, and there is more to point out. The briefcase in the woman's hand, for example, intrigues and disturbs me. The painter is right to place her where he has: What will she do next? What will the new generation of working women do, perched to fly and with seemingly nowhere to go? To truly talk about it, we will need to reassess our own interests, as men and women, in traditions, in the new urbanized economics; we won't be able to do it with borrowed vocabulary or borrowed values, and we won't be able to do it in the isolation of our respective social enclaves. The conversation must be as local as this painting, set in the midst of its own depression. Unlike this painting, however, the conversation must be approached with the clear faith that another option is possible.

As a people, we Iranians have two choices in regard to our conflicts. Either we become desensitized to them, accept them as the natural order of things, cover them up with the smaller dramas of our private lives or television, and forget them -- in which case, Iranian painting will lose its imperative and become, finally, entirely decorative. Or we will manage to give clear voice to our problems and enter the long-awaited dialogue between our many groups and classes. In that case, literature and political thought, which are for now dormant, will attract the artistic energies of the young generation.

In either case, this moment of painting is short-lived. We should enter it while we can.

Houman Harouni has written for Iranian Studies, Connect, and Harvard Educational Review, among other publications. His "Bīstoon Chronicles" appear regularly on Tehran Bureau. He currently lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Painting: "Darvazeh Dowlat" (2010), by Javad Modarresi.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

The Barin Ski Resort, however, may change all that. Built in 2011 by Ryra Design, this modern nine-story jewel not far from the steep slopes of Shemshak has the power to transform.

According to its profile, Ryra was founded about a decade earlier to create "unique spaces" with an "artistic view" as a key element in the process. "Modifying the relation between architecture and nature without blindly repeating vernacular models or copying imported historical styles," was another. Snow-covered landscapes, the fluid lines of the Aloborz mountains, and even igloos, were noted as inspirations.

But if you can't get to Iran this year, there may be another option: Chalet Shemshak... in Courchevel, if you can afford it.

Photographs by Persia Photography Centre

Copyright © 2011

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Standard Time (IRST), GMT+3:30

7:30 a.m., 1 Dey/December 22 Some reports indicate that the five Iranian engineers kidnapped in Syria may be members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They were working in Homs, a center of anti-government activities. The Syrian opposition has accused Iran of aiding the efforts by the regime of Bashar al-Assad to violently put down the rebellion. According to initial reports, eight Iranians were kidnapped, but apparently there were three victims who were not from Iran.

Brigadier General Hossein Hamadani, who was just replaced as commander of the Guards' Mohammad Rasoulallah Corps, responsible for the defense of greater Tehran, has been individually sanctioned by both the United States and European Union and the recent changes in the Guards' command structure appears to be motivated in part by the increasingly comprehensive international sanctions. His replacement, Brigadier General Mohsen Kazemeini, is close to top Guard commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari. Before his appointment as deputy Guard commander for operations in July 2009, Kazemeini was the commander of the Vali Asr Corps in oil-rich Khuzestan province. He also spent a stint in Lebanon, beginning in 1982.

2:35 a.m., 1 Dey/December 22 Thirty-eight major Iranian political prisoners issued a statement calling on the reformists and supporters of the Green Movement not to run or vote in the Majles elections next March. In their statement, the prisoners said that the upcoming vote bears no similarity to free elections in other nations. In addition, they declared that the country is unofficially run by the military and intelligence forces, and experience has shown that elections that are supervised by such forces are simply for show. They added that participating in such elections only helps consolidate the hardliners' rule and undermines democracy, respect for human rights, and the key goals of the Revolution, namely, independence and freedom. The signatories include journalists Bahman Ahmadi Amooee, Masoud Bastani, Eisa Sahatkhiz, Mohammad Davari, Dr. Alireza Rajaei, Keyvan Samimi, and Mehdi Mahmoudian; university activists Hassan Asadi Zeidabadi, Saeed Jalalifar, Ali Jamali, Zia Nabavi, Abdollah Momeni, Ali Malihi, and Fashad Ghorbanpour; major reformist figures Dr. Davood Soleimani, Javad Emam, former Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Mohsen Aminzadeh, Mir Hossein Mousavi's aide Seyyed Alireza Beheshti Shirazi, former Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh, former Deputy Prime Minister Behzad Nabavi, Abolfazl Ghadiani (Iran's oldest political prisoner) and Feyzollah Arabsorkhi; nationalist-religious figures Emad Bahavar, Amir Khorram, and Amir Khosrow Dalirsani; attorneys Mohammad Seifzadeh and Ghasem Sholeh Saadi; and several others.

The same group of people previously issued a statement that analyzed the current state of affairs in Iran. They called the Ahmadinejad administration "the most corrupt government in Iran's history" and declared that the current Majles is similar to the puppet parliament in Egypt during the rule of Hosni Mubarak. They were placed under heavy pressure by the security and intelligence forces to retract the statement, but refused. Tehran prosecutor Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi responded by ordering a ban on visits by the prisoners' family members.

The Coordination Council for the Green Path of Hope, the temporary Green Movement leadership council while Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi are under house arrest, has also issued a statement that declares the impending Majles elections illegal. The statement said that the planned vote does not meet any of the usual standards for free and fair elections. It declared that, after extensive discussions, and particularly after becoming aware of the views of the two movement leaders, the council believes that taking part in the elections is against the nation's interests. The statement reiterated the conditions that Mousavi, Karroubi, and former President Mohammad Khatami have set for participation in the elections -- the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners, complete freedom for the press and political groups, elimination of the Guardian Council's power to vet and reject candidates, and an end to the interference of the security and military forces in affairs of the state.

The coordination committee of the reformist groups has also called for the boycott of the elections. Khatami has also said that, because his conditions for the elections have not been satisfied, he opposes participation in the elections and supports the committee's position.

Questions for Ahmadinejad

Ten Majles deputies have submitted a series of questions to the parliament's leadership and demanded a response from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. They want the following issues to be addressed:

* The reason for the government's refusal to provide the necessary foreign currency for Tehran's subway system to continue its expansion.

* The reason for the delay in introducing the minister of sports and youth affairs after the law authorizing the ministry's establishment was approved.

* The low rate of economic development in 2010 -- 3 percent according to the International Monetary Fund and as low as 1 percent according to other estimates, versus the 8 percent that was projected.

* The way the 2010 budget for the promotion and elevation of culture was spent.

* Why the government is trying to implement the laws for the elimination of subsidies in under two years, whereas the laws stipulate that the process should be executed over a five-year period.

* Why Ahmadinejad resisted Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's order to reinstate Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi for 11 days.

* Why former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was fired while on an official visit to Senegal.

* What the president's goal was when he said that the Majles is no longer at the helm of national affairs (contrary to what Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini famously declared).

* Why the president, in a nationally televised television program, criticized those who enforce the law mandating hejab and said that executing the law is not the government's responsibility.

* Why the president has advocated an "Iranian school of thought" as opposed to an "Islamic school of thought" in defiance of criticism from major religious figures in the country.

Poor health of political prisoners

Reports indicate that journalist Masoud Bastani, who is imprisoned in Rajaei Shahr Prison near Karaj, west of Tehran, is in very poor health, but that prison officials refuse to take action. Bastani has a serious blood disease that he contracted in jail. Sentenced to six years of incarceration, he has spent over 30 months in jail.

In related news, Mrs. Fatemeh Adinehvand, wife of imprisoned university activist Abdollah Momeni, reported that her husband is in poor condition, as well. As reported by Tehran Bureau, Momeni wrote a letter to Khamenei in which he recounted the torture to which he has been subjected, as well as describing the general conditions of the prison. According to Adinehvand, since writing the letter, her husband has developed severe problems with his ears, which were injured as a result of beatings and other forms of torture.

Admitting responsibility for the death of Haleh Sahabi

Majles deputy Ali Motahari revealed new information about the death of human rights activist Haleh Sahabi, who passed away during the funeral of her father, nationalist-religious leader Ezatollah Sahabi. Speaking at the University of Tehran, Motahari said that he asked Intelligence Minister Moslehi about the cause of her death. According to Motahari, Moslehi responded that the ministry's agents "did not want her to die, and what happened was the result of lack of attention by the agents." Previously, the government had claimed that Sahabi died of natural causes.

Revolutionary Guard appointment

Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the top commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has appointed Brigadier General Mohsen Kazemeini as commander of the Mohammad Rasoulallah Corps, whose main mission is to defend greater Tehran. Kazemeini was previously deputy commander for Guard operations. The Tehran corps was previously commanded by Brigadier General Hossein Hamadani.

New position for Ali Akbar Javanfekr

Ahmadinejad has appointed Ali Akbar Javanfekr, the controversial director of IRNA, Iran's official news agency, as his representative to the council that oversees the operation of the national radio and television network. As reported by Tehran Bureau, in recent interviews Javanfekr, a strong supporter of Ahmadinejad, has rebuked the president's critics. The judiciary tried to detain him, but was blocked by Khamenei. He has been sentenced to one year of imprisonment, which is under appeal.

Board of trustees of Islamic Azad University

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected chairman of Islamic Azad University's board of trustees. As has been reported by Tehran Bureau, the university has been the subject of fierce contention between Ahmadinejad and his supporters and the camp arpund Rafsanjani, who was one of the university's founders in 1982. The board is supposed to select a new university president to replace the long-time officeholder, Abdollah Jasbi, who is close to Rafsanjani.

Devaluation of rial

The rate of exchange between both the U.S. dollar and the euro and Iran's rial has greatly increased. Although the official rate is about one dollar for 11,000 rials, the unofficial rate has increased dramatically to around 15,500-16,000 rials. Many believe that the Ahmadinejad administration has intentionally increased the unofficial rate of exchange by withdrawing large sums of dollars and euros from the market to make huge profits that can be spent on the upcoming Majles elections. This is a tactic that has been used repeatedly in the past.

Restricting cash handouts

Gholam Reza Mesbahi Moghaddam, head of the Majles's Special Commission on Economic Innovation, said that the number of people who receive government cash handouts in lieu of subsidies must be reduced, because many recipients do not need the aid. He added that if that happens, 20 million people will be eliminated from the roster that receives the handout.

Warnings about Ahmadinejad's supporters

Two leading Majles deputies warned that if Ahmadinejad's supporters are victorious in the upcoming Majles elections, the Islamic Republic will be gravely harmed. Ahmad Tavakoli, a leading critic of Ahmadinejad, said, "If the list [of candidates] by Jebheh Paaydaari-e Enghlelab-e Eslami [Durability Front of the Islamic Revolution] gets voted into the Majles, it will greatly hurt the country." The JPEE was founded last summer by the reactionary cleric Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi. Sadegh Mahsouli, Ahmadinejad's close friend and former interior minister, who is known as the "billionaire minister," provides the financial resources for the JPEE. The group has been unwilling to enter into a coalition with other conservatives and hardliners.

Separately, Ali Motahari, another harsh critic of Ahmadinejad, said that if the type of people that support the president and the JPEE are elected to the Majles, "the political system and Revolution will be destroyed a short while after."

Meanwhile, the formation of another pro-Ahmadinejad political group, Jebheh-e Hamian-e Dolat-e Eslami (Front of Supporters of the Islamic Government), has been announced. This is the third political group that has declared its support for the president, after the JPEE and Kanoon-e Daneshgahian-e Iran-e Eslami (Society of Islamic Iranian Academics), whose founding was announced in October.

Syria, the Arab Spring, and Iran

In a speech at the University of Tehran, former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki admitted that the spread of the Arab Spring is partly responsible for what is going on in Syria. This is contrary to Iran's official position that the demonstrations in Syria are mostly the work of foreign agents. Mottaki said that the people of Syria do have legitimate demands and aspirations that the Syrian government must address. He did repeat the claim that foreign agents have had a role in provoking demonstrations in Syria, accusing Saudi Arabia and the West of interference in Syria's internal affairs.

Iranian engineers kidnapped in Syria

Five Iranian engineers working in Syria have been kidnapped by unknown captors. They were working at one or more electrical power stations. Iran's Damascus embassy has confirmed the report.

Saudi Arabia ready to negotiate with Tehran

Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, said in a press conference that his country is ready to negotiate with Tehran to reduce the tension in the region "at any level that Iran is prepared to do." He added that Iranian Intelligence Minister Moslehi's recent trip to Saudi Arabia to meet with the crown prince and interior minister indicates Iran's readiness for negotiations.

Timeline for Iranian nuclear bomb

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said that Iran "will not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon." In an interview with CBS News, Panetta claimed that despite the efforts to disrupt the country's nuclear program, Iran has reached a point where it can assemble a bomb in a year or potentially even quicker. A short time later, however, Pentagon spokesman George Little retreated from the claim, telling the New York Times that Panetta's estimate "was based on a highly aggressive timeline and a series of actions that Iran has not yet taken," adding that inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency are in Iran and have "good access to Iran's continuing production of low-enriched uranium." Therefore, if Iran decides to "break out" -- use the low-enriched uranium to produce weapons-grade highly enriched uranium -- the inspectors will detect it.

Camp Ashraf will not be closed

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced that the deadline for closing Camp Ashraf, where over 3,000 members of the Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organization (MKO) reside, has been extended by six months. The camp was supposed to be closed by the end of December. Al-Maliki said that United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the U.S. government had asked him to postpone the camp's closing, and he has agreed. At the same time, the United States has asked the MKO's leaders to "act realistically" and agree with its proposal to transfer the camp's residents to a former American military base near Baghdad's airport. The MKO leadership has apparently agreed with the U.S. proposal, on the condition that certain guarantees are met.

Strongly worded GCC statement against Iran

The [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council issued a strongly worded statement in which it demanded that Iran stop meddling in the internal affairs of its member states. "Stop these policies and practices...and stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Gulf nations," said the statement issued at the end of the annual GCC summit in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The statement also called on Iran to "fully cooperate" with the International Atomic Energy Agency and work to resolve regional conflicts "peacefully," adding that GCC nations were still committed to a Middle East "free of weapons of mass destruction."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

[ dispatch ] The school bell rang early one morning at the International Center for Persian Studies, the renowned go-to institution for foreigners wishing to learn Farsi in Iran. An unsmiling teacher in her early 30s ushered her motley group of unsuspecting elementary-level students into the auditorium. At the conclusion of an eight-week course, in which they had learned basic sentences and the mysteries of the Farsi alphabet, the students were required to attend an elaborate graduation ceremony. Aside from student presentations and self-praising speeches by the administration, the one-hour program featured a malfunctioning film that began with the national anthem, climaxed with shots of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, and finished with bucolic scenes showcasing Iranian landscapes and various other sources of nationalist pride.

Pupils reacted to the festivities with disparate degrees of complacency and cynicism. Some quietly sipped cheap Sundis juices from the boxed snacks they were handed upon arrival. Others clapped dutifully, apparently moved by their classmates' ability to pass an intensive language course. The beginners were, without fail, utterly confused, as they could not make sense of a single sentence. Upstairs on the school terrace, a truant advanced-level student scowled and lit up a Bahman-e-kouchak cigarette. "This place is such a bubble," he said.

The daily life of a typical student at the ICPS (better known as simply Dehkhoda after the famous linguist) takes place inside a microcosm. From the instant a public shuttle chugs up to their mountainside dormitory to the moment they finish their homework after lunching at the school canteen, pupils cease to be aspiring engineers, executives, embassy workers and PhD candidates. Instead, they become pliable schoolchildren, needy of initiation into an officially prescribed Iranian language and culture.

The universe of Dehkhoda deviates from the reality outside its gates. As students soon learn from taxi drivers inquisitive about why any foreigner would voluntarily choose to live in such a God-forsaken country, Iran, with its esoteric charm, does not abide by the catechisms they recite from textbooks. The greengrocer across the street mouths off in a language different from the proper Persian they are taught. After work, the schoolmarms transform into vibrant, intellectual women dreaming of life abroad. The rigidness of officially prescribed social norms gives way to a world in which everyone searches for a way to break the rules.

At times, the pupils, most of them students and young professionals aged 20-35, internalize this duality in striking ways, particularly regarding choice of dress. Some wholeheartedly embrace the conservatism -- one female student from the Balkans did this by coming to class each day in an elaborately embroidered chador. Others succumb to the folkloric: A Swedish doctorate student once shocked the lunch crowd in a brand-new set of wide, richly colored pants he'd purchased on his travels through Kurdistan. Another time, a leather-clad linguist waltzed into the building in a traditional Qashkai felt hat.

Such reactions, though not always this extreme, can be seen as manifestations of the novices' struggle to cope with an unchartered reality. The Dehkhoda student body has a diverse and transient demographic: There is an ever-present mass of Chinese technicians and engineers sent to work here on various infrastructure, as well as a smaller group of Russian-speaking women with new Iranian husbands. Academics from West Europe come here to enhance their degrees in Islamic and Middle East studies. On occasion, there is also an ambiguous all-male group of young Lebanese who receive private instruction. Advanced levels are typically dominated by foreign-raised Iranians who come here to become literate in their mother tongue.

Ironically, it is the latter group that is most sheltered from "real" Iranian life, protected as they are by anxious relatives. "This is the most fun I have all day," a 25-year-old Iranian-American once complained during break time. "When I am at my aunt's house, all I do is drink tea and eat fruit. They don't allow me to go out by myself at all." Even unsupervised students often lead isolated existences. At one time, I befriended a Turkish sociologist who spent the entire term napping, smoking cigarettes and ruminating about the little she saw of Tehran life through her window, which faced directly into a mountain.

When language skills are limited, it takes nerve -- and, in some cases, sheer recklessness -- to face the chaos of the city. If they have no other connections in Iran, Dehkhoda students are usually accommodated at a Shahid Beheshti University dormitory for researchers, located in the northernmost points of Tehran. Here, they live surrounded by pedantic academics and monitored by doormen who keep track not only of their passports, but also of their comings and goings. On some, the strict oversight has an exhilarating effect: One resident, a thirty-year-old lawyer, would slip out of the dormitory each weekend to attend late-night drinking parties or meet her boyfriend. Much to the affront of the patriarchal doormen, she would come back in the wee hours, giggling like a schoolgirl.

While three hours of the day are taken up by class-time, plenty of time remains to explore Iran. Students hike, ski and travel extensively to places outside of the typical tourist triangle of Esfahan, Yazd and Shiraz. On weekday afternoons, they visit cafes, bazaars and museums. They make local friends and one-up each other with insights into Persian culture. One student even braved the pitfalls of local traffic by purchasing a motorbike. He spent the term taxiing squealing female classmates around the city and throwing parties at a flat he rented in a conservative middle-class neighborhood.

The line between boldness and recklessness is thin, however, and most cross it at least once. While most pragmatically choose to stay oblivious to intermittent rises in Tehran's political temperature, there are those who view the occasional demonstration as yet another tourist attraction. A European student once told me he'd gotten arrested in the middle of a protest, and was only released because he held a passport from an Arab country. More eyebrow-raising was the claim of an Iranian-American who said he attended a demonstration disguised as a Basiji. "I could see that people were really scared of me," he told his classmates.

Meanwhile, daily lessons continue to follow their internal order, and the world of Dehkhoda remains oblivious to its pupils' extracurricular activities. Despite many inconsistencies in teaching style, the immersive, "Farsi in Farsi" approach allows persevering students to learn the language at breakneck speed. As they progress, pupils are filmed for national TV or invited to weekly radio shows. (Good PR, after all, is one of the pillars of the institute's existence.) At the conclusion of each term, when a majority of students return to their respective countries, the center puts on an identical graduation ceremony. Many of those who receive diplomas have not yet fully grasped the language. Most have progressed significantly, however, and some make plans to come back. With any luck, they have all had enough time to look outside the bubble.

Photo by Wendy Marijnissen. Two beauticians and a housewife take English lessons in a private class. Tehran, Iran, 2007

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

[ comment ] Can a movie tell a story set in contemporary Iran without being seen as a "portrait of Iranian society"?

In re A Separation's Oscar dreams, should the Academy Awards be considered an arm of the U.S. State Department?

If cinema is dead, why do Iranian censors continue to pay it so much damned attention?

A few of the questions that linger from the conference "Cinema in Iran: Circulation, Censorship, and Cultural Production," held this past week in Berlin under the aegis of the Annenberg School for Communication's Iran Media Program. The two-day event drew scholars -- many of Iranian birth or heritage, many young and in midpursuit of doctorates -- based around the United States and Europe, as well as Israel, India, Australia, and Brazil.

By the very nature of its national focus, such a conference promotes readings of an ethnographic bent, but several presentations made clear the risks in taking individual films primarily as social portraiture, as Iranian movies often appear to be received in the West -- and, among films aimed at the foreign festival and arthouse market, often seem intended for such reception. Norma Claire Moruzzi of the University of Illinois at Chicago warned of what she called the "romanticization of Iran as a dystopia," routine in such internationally intended pictures. An apt caveat, though time pressures thwarted an exploration of the particular strokes employed in that sort of portraiture -- an important consideration, as regular festival attendance could similarly convince a credulous film lover that London is the lake of fire and Paris, perdition.

What of films that focus on a very specific aspect of the society in which they are set? Baharak Darougari of the University of Strasbourg looked at the different narrative strategies employed by three films -- Leila, directed by Dariush Mehrjui; Shokaran, directed by Behruz Afkhami; and Chaharshanbe-soori, directed by Asghar Farhadi -- to problematize the conventional treatment of polygamy. But whether arthouse or mainstream, like the films to which this trio stand less or more in opposition, can films consciously concerned with a sharply defined social problem do much to honestly inform the viewer about a culture when their topical program tends to flatten the social context?

The presentation by Orly Rahimiyan of Ben-Gurion University and the Ben Zvi University, who examined the image of Jews in Iranian cinema, raised a parallel set of questions. Does the inclusion of Jewish characters, a rarity, make a film more representative of Iranian society? Or less, given that Jewish people are themselves such a rarity in Iran? How are the answers affected when we consider, as Rahimiyan noted, that such roles are performed, virtually without exception, by non-Jewish actors? The presentation of Jews without reliance on stereotype sounds like the approach that would yield the most accurate portrait; but if, let us say, Jews were universally stereotyped in every other form of public culture, would not conformity with that practice convey the more instructive truth?

Throughout history, portraits have been created whose primary objective is to glorify their subjects, a tradition whose contemporary form would surely be recognized by the war veterans interviewed by Narges Bajoghli of New York University. She described how the men with whom she spoke all consciously distinguished between the official version of the Iran-Iraq War -- whose authorized onscreen depictions are just part of a vast exercise in cultural (re)construction -- and the "real" version of the conflict they lived firsthand. She reported a growing belief among filmmakers who focus on the domestically popular topics of the war and its combatants that they must "move away from creating superhero characters and depict soldiers as ordinary men." Western audiences, even the self-selected elite that seek out cinema from the globe's more outré corners, have scant access to such films; still, the trend does raise another interesting question for portrait hunters: What more clearly distinguishes any particular society -- its notion of the superhero or its notion of the "ordinary man"? How very different, in other words, is John Q. Public from 'Dash Ali?

Not much at all, perhaps, as indicated by John Limbert, who teaches Middle Eastern Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy. He also demonstrated that, undertaken with clear purpose, the explicit or implicit presentation of a film as a social portrait can have a salutary effect. In his class on Iran (where, as a member of the American diplomatic corps, he was held hostage for 14 months during the embassy takeover of 1979-81), Limbert challenges the prejudices of his students at the beginning of each semester by screening The Candidate, directed by Mohammad Shirvani. The short film depicts the efforts of a mother to find a bride for her son, to which end she sweetly accosts female strangers on the street. Limbert observed that the women depicted are "very smart and very practical," belying notions of Iranian femininity held by many in the West. He said the screening almost invariably achieves its purpose: "Some student generally says, 'They're just like us.' Then the course can begin...."

Still, comprehension suffers when every film, as the University of Sao Paulo's Ferdinando Martins put it, is "seen as a portrait of Iran" and its fictional aspects disregarded. Speaking on a panel devoted to the topic of cinema's relationship to public policy and public diplomacy, he echoed -- or rather, by the real-world chronology of the conference, presaged -- Moruzzi's observation about dystopic aesthetics, finding that those Iranian films which gain distribution outside the Middle East tend "to paint the devil worse than he is." In the view of Javad Asgharirad of the Free University of Berlin, those movies as a corpus create an impression that Iranians suffer from a low standard of living, little freedom, and great social stratification (as well as, by way of partial counterbalance, enjoying strong family ties).

Asgharirad did not take up the question of whether that impression is really worse than the reality or not, but rather focused on the tension between those films and the objectives of state entities such as the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization and Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, which look to use cinema to promote cultural ties with other nations and present an appealing image of Iran abroad -- mostly through religious-themed films circulated regionally, particularly to Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, as well as via the Internet.

Their work is most of what remains of a broader national film policy launched soon after the 1979 Revolution. Agnes DeVictor of the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne described how Iran was one of just four countries to successfully "resist Hollywood destruction of national cinema industries in the 1980s and '90s via public policy," making the Islamic Republic part of one of the more unlikely quartets in international cultural history, accompanied as it was by France, South Korea, and Burkina Faso.

Those state entities are the primary, but far from only, venues for what Northwestern University's Hamid Naficy, the conference's plenary speaker, characterized as the Islamic Republic's "instrumentalization" of culture and media. He presented a broad survey of the new public diplomacy scene that, involving a wide variety of channels more accessible than ever before to ordinary citizens, he said was at the same time both "potentially more democratic and empowering" and "more insidious, more susceptible to manipulation." Considering Iranian-American relations in what he insisted on calling the "mediatic" realm, he identified four sets of "public diplomacy players," distinguishable by both interests and means:

* The U.S. government

* The IRI government

* Iranian exiles and diaspora population

* Iranian internal public and dissidents

This structure is helpful insofar as it addresses the problem articulated by Asgharirad: that "most of the misunderstandings come when Iran is considered a monolithic entity -- not just internationally, but internally, as well." But yet it frames the United States as just such a monolithic entity, under guidance by its political institutions. Is that quite right?

Along with government-backed satellite TV and radio stations and the direct or indirect funding of exile media, government media, and NGOs, Naficy called out the "global distribution of U.S. pop culture" as channel 1 of his first item. However much we may be appalled by the leveling of aesthetics around the world that results from each step of that insipid mammoth, is the beast really being invited into Iranian hearts, minds, and smartphones because the U.S. government would have it so or because ordinary people just can't get enough? And as for how those virgin souls fell victim to false consciousness, let's dare call it conspiracy, but let's not comfort ourselves by imagining the perpetrators are a few Beltway egotists and their apparatchik cocoon. The minders of the Matrix lie beyond the stars.

Turn now from the cosmic dread evoked by the paramount percent to considerations more mundane: A Separation, already the most celebrated Iranian film of the West's infant millennium and with more accolades likely to come. Is the New York Film Festival, where Farhadi's film had its American debut, an agent of the U.S. government? How about the Village Voice, whose 98 critical polltakers just ranked it the second best film of all 2011? The Golden Globes, which made it the first Iranian movie ever to receive a nomination? And with the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences preparing to weigh in with its nominations a month from now, A Separation is on all the Oscar prognosticators' shortlists. These are all choices, with their attendant promotional effects, that fall within the rubric of public diplomacy, broadly construed. And who is determining that this particular example of Iran's cultural output shall be brought to the attention of Americans (however few, however influential)? Not Mr. Obama and Ms. Clinton, one can presume. The monolith looms, to be sure, but it hasn't incorporated everything just yet.

As Naficy observed, and critic and filmmaker Parviz Jahed described in greater detail in his look at Iran's underground cinema, while the Internet and digital video facilitate new, more democratic media outlets -- such as Zanan TV, a new online channel devoted to the Iranian women's movement, introduced by contributor and activist Maryam Ommy -- creeping authoritarianism, which theocratic or military or corporate or monstrously hybrid in form, effectively restricts more mature and widely distributed modes. Cultural analysts are familiar with how financial motivations impose censorship burdens, uncodified but unavoidable, in the hypercapitalistic West; DeVictor noted how, with the cutting of much of the state funds that used to subsidize filmmaking in Iran, the domestic market is now dominated by generic "romances that are effectively TV on film."

But just because the private sector is so proficient at denuding cinema of its potential power, doesn't mean that official censors in a state such as the Islamic Republic don't still take an interest. In Iran, those in the artistic professions must navigate both a strict, if ever-shifting, moral code and a host of political flashpoints. And if artists are like everyone else in the country in this regard, only moreso, moreso still are Iran's filmmakers.

One student, in the course of describing the recent trend of Iranian film stars -- including A Separation's Peyman Moadi -- taking to the stage, explained how there is substantially less censorship of theater than of motion pictures in the Islamic Republic. Cinematic censorship operates so intensely on so many levels that it has prompted the evolution of onscreen codes so intricate and comprehensive and yet clearly definable that in sum they can be construed as a novel, near-formal language; that was the conclusion this conference attendee drew from the fascinating presentation by Asal Bagheri Griffaton of Paris Descartes University at the Sorbonne.

In the West, the observation that cinema is dead has already matriculated from cliché provocation to melancholy truism. So what exactly is going on "over there"? Is cinema still somehow alive in Iran, or are they merely afraid of ghosts?

Well: Is cinema really dead? Pick your horizon. Yes, the sun set on cinema in the West on May 26, 1983, when a day after its ineluctable smashing of all opening-day records, word of mouth did not prevent a charmless, aggressively redundant, and cringingly schmaltzy children's movie called Return of the Jedi from having the biggest second day at the box office in movie history. But just like the Force, the West is all in our head. We can occupy ourselves with other things -- indeed, we often don't have a choice.

Iradj Ghouchani of Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich declared in his presentation on "The Effect of State Power on Cinematic Language," that in Iranian cinema, "everything has been sublimated." And as that great Westerner Sigmund Freud observed, sublimation is the very spice of psychic life. Since the day cinema fell on its light saber, countless great movies have been made, not least -- very far from least -- within the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Cinema is alive then, there and everywhere in the minds of those with the will to find their way into what Moruzzi referred to as "internal diaspora." She used the term specifically to refer to those artists who strive for independent expression within a realm under repressive, authoritarian rule. But it's a notion worth taking deeper, into the private mind of the artist. The University of Sao Paulo's Daniel De Sousa quoted director Jafar Panahi:

Sometimes self-censorship or social censorship is worse than actual censorship, so when I make a film I don't think about what is allowed and not allowed.

That's precisely the sort of internal diaspora within reach of every artist worthy of the name, from the Hollywood Hills to the shadows of the Alborz.

Dan Geist is a critic and senior editor at Tehran Bureau. Photo: Director Asghar Farhadi.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

An attack could be exactly what the Islamic Republic's rulers are looking for.

[ opinion ] The possibility of a military strike against Iran has become a focal point of U.S. foreign policy debates. As the hawkish voices intensify, we as members of a generation born in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War cannot help but remember the tragedy of those eight years of bloodshed that are so ingrained in our memories.

We want to highlight the images that both haunt our generation and capture the ways that the regime in Iran used the war as a tool to strengthen its control over the country. Although many socioeconomic and political factors are different today, we believe that, if attacked, the Iranian regime will use the same tactics to crush dissent and once again secure its authority over the people.

Both born in 1985, we vividly recall the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath. We remember the cacophonous sound of air strikes in and around Tehran and the nights of taking refuge in neighborhood public shelters. We recall the worried faces of our parents as the sound of alarm sirens -- deafening to our young ears -- ripped through the air. We remember standing on our balconies and watching a parade of coffins go by, as mourning mothers broke down and said their last goodbyes to dead sons.

One of the first heroes introduced to us in elementary school was a 13-year-old boy named Hossein Fahmideh. We learned all about his story and his heroic act, done in the name of Iran and the Islamic Revolution. We were told that he was among the many young boys who took up the call for martyrdom. For defending the Islamic land, the ruling clergy promised him a place in heaven. Martyr Fahmideh, as he was known to us, had tied grenades to his waist and threw himself under an Iraqi tank to stop it from advancing toward Iranian territory. We grew up hearing constant reminders of Fahmideh's bravery and of the many others like him who sacrificed their lives in defense of our "Islamic land."

As young girls, we were asked to guard our veils so as not to disappoint Martyr Fahmideh, who would be watching his Iranian Muslim sisters from heaven. As young boys, we were instructed to carry on his legacy by unswervingly defending our land against the imperialist West and other threats to the Islamic Republic.

Today, as our generation in Iran experiences grave social and political injustices, many find themselves jaded and cynical about the revolutionary ideals that were never delivered upon. We regularly stay in touch with family and friends inside the country, and their reports indicate a strong sense of mistrust and resentment toward the authorities. Today we wonder whether Fahmideh, if he were alive, would have been a member of the Green Movement. Would he be a factory worker fighting for labor rights? Would he, just like us, be a part of the country's enormous brain drain, studying at some Western university? Or perhaps he would simply be among the host of college-educated, unemployed adults who watch, silent and disappointed, as the Islamic Republic destroy the nation's prospects in the name of his, and every other veteran's and martyr's, bravery.

Our generation is quite familiar with the tactics that the Islamic Republic utilized during the years of the Iran-Iraq War and the decades that followed. The regime used the conflict as an excuse to keep the nation repressed and fearful of losing land to enemies -- perhaps the most sustainable way to secure and stabilize its rule. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni, the Revolution's paramount leader, declared when the conflict began, "War is a divine blessing, a gift bestowed upon us by God. The cannon's thunder rejuvenates the soul." The regime mastered the art of repression during the 1980s. Anybody who dared to speak out against the government was considered the enemy of Islam and the divine rule of the Islamic Republic, a legacy carried forth into the postwar era.

In the months following the 2009 presidential elections, the regime's repressive tactics seemed to have finally lost their effectiveness as millions of young men and women peacefully marched in the streets. They loudly demanded the freedoms promised to them by their leaders, freedoms for which the martyrs of the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War had supposedly sacrificed their lives. Ever since those unprecedented demonstrations, the Islamic Republic has ramped up its use of force and violence. Yet for all of its repressive efforts, it is not able to put an end to the people's escalating frustrations and dissatisfaction.

During the past two years, fearful of losing their grip on power, Iran's rulers have cracked down with increasing severity on social and political freedoms. Although the popular opposition movement seems to be contained, it is not dead. A generation of young activists are picking up the mantle of responsibility and carrying on the struggle for reform. Throughout the country, university students have prevented government officials from delivering speeches on campus or even entering their schools. By writing open letters against the regime's policies and staging strikes and protests, the students have kept the call for change and freedom alive.

Any military action against Iran will derail the process of peaceful political transition and reform in the country. Given the domestic turbulences, we fear that a military strike against the Islamic Republic is a desirable outcome for the regime. We fear that even the threat of such an attack only helps the regime to regain some of its lost legitimacy and mobilize the people in defense of their homeland.

With the recent talk of possible war, the regime's leadership is preparing the nation for a large-scale conflict. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), recently insisted that the armed forces are ready for military engagement. According to Fars News, the semiofficial news agency close to the Guards, he stated, "Complete and full scale preparedness of the military forces, including the IRGC, Basij, and people was the reason why the enemies did not go beyond just threatening Iran and the reason why we are witnessing their retreat from their threatening remarks now."

Even if quite weakened internally, a regime like Iran's benefits from an imminent threat posed by a foreign enemy -- it binds the people more tightly to a central power that can defend the national borders. Despite the differences between the Iran of today and during the years of the war with Iraq, a military strike would almost certainly awaken the patriotic sentiments of the people, leading them to set aside domestic political considerations in defense of their land against the external adversary. With war, we fear that the peaceful demonstrators of the Green Movement will be forced to pick up arms against foreign invaders instead of continuing their arduous path of demanding reform.

Thus, as members of the generation of a bloody war, we worry that a military strike by Israel or the United States against Iran would be the golden opportunity that the overlords of the Islamic Republic expediently await.

Reza H. Akbari is a research associate at the Century Foundation and a graduate student at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, majoring in Middle East studies. He is based in Washington, D.C.

Azadeh Pourzand is a recent graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Nijenrode Business Universiteit in the Netherlands. Her research and consultancy work focuses on youth, women, and civil society in Muslim contexts.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Standard Time (IRST), GMT+3:30

10:00 p.m., 8 Dey/December 29 Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's first vice president, threatened that if the West imposes further sanctions on Iran's oil and gas industries, the Islamic Republic will block the Strait of Hormuz and not allow "even one drop of oil" to reach international markets from the Persian Gulf. He added, "The enemy will stop its plots against us only when we put them in their place with power." Iran's naval chief, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, amplified the threat on Wednesday when he said, "Closing the Strait of Hormuz for Iran's armed forces is really easy, or as Iranians say, it will be easier than drinking a glass of water. Iran has comprehensive control over the strategic waterway. But right now, we don't need to shut it." Most analysts believe that closing the strait -- where the Iranian Navy is in the midst of ten days of exercises -- would not be easy and that, even if it succeeded, would do as much harm to Iran as any other nation.

In response, Pentagon spokesman George Little said, "This is not just an important issue for security and stability in the region, but is an economic lifeline for countries in the Gulf, to include Iran. Interference with the transit or passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz will not be tolerated." The U.S. 5th Fleet, whose headquarters are in Bahrain, issued a statement on Wednesday saying that it would not allow any disruption of traffic in the strait: "Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; any disruption will not be tolerated." A spokeswoman for the 5th Fleet added that the U.S. Navy is "always ready to counter malevolent actions to ensure freedom of navigation."
Separately, France called on Iran Wednesday to respect freedom of navigation in international waters and straits. A spokesman for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "The Hormuz strait is an international strait. Therefore, all ships...have a right of transit passage, in conformity with the United Nations convention on sea laws." As a result of Iran's threat, the price of oil in New York market climbed to more than $100 a barrel.

Trial of alleged CIA spy

The trial of Amir Mirzaei Hekmati, the Iranian American accused of being a CIA spy assigned to penetrate Iran's Ministry of Intelligence, has begun. The prosecutor spoke about Hekmati's trip to the U.S. military base in Bagram, Afghanistan, and his access to classified information, and then his trip from Afghanistan to Iran. He also declared that Hekmati has "confessed." Hekmati reportedly repeated his confessions before the court, saying, "The CIA told me to go to Bagram to collect information and then go to Iran and give it to the ministry and receive money for it. 'After you return [to Washington], we will give you another mission.'" The statement is odd, given that any information Hekmati might have collected at Bagram could have been given to him directly by the CIA. Behnaz Hekmati, his mother, said that her son had gone to Iran to visit his grandmothers and has confessed only under pressure. The government has refused to allow diplomats from the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Iran, to visit with Hekmati. The United States has demanded his release.

Karroubi calls for boycott of Majles elections

Fatemeh Karroubi, wife of Mehdi Karroubi, said that, regarding the Majles elections next March 3, her husband told her,

I heard the views of the secretary-general of the Guardian Council [hardline cleric Ahmad Jannati], the minister of intelligence, and other officials on national television. They believe that the Revolution's enemies want to take advantage of the elections and disturb the security of the country. My impression is that these gentlemen are well aware of the continuing dissatisfaction of the people and wish to hold sham elections, and -- by rejecting the qualifications of some [candidates, through the Guardian Council's vetting power], nullifying votes in some districts, and filling up the ballot boxes in other places, and then by arresting some and creating a terrifying security environment -- repeat the elections of 2009, and ask the candidates to disown "the sedition current" [the Green Movement] and the "perverted group" [the inner circle of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad's chief of staff and close confidant]. Needless to say, linking the "perverted group" to the Green Movement is a worn-out scenario, and I believe that people are well aware of this.

He then suggested that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appoint the Majles deputies via a hand-picked commission, rather than stage meaningless elections.

Outspoken reformist Mostafa Tajzadeh, deputy interior minister during the first Khatami administration, who has been in jail since soon after the June 2009 vote, has also called for a boycott, saying, "I do not take part in sham, undemocratic elections."

Harsh criticisms of hardliners

Seyyed Fazel Mousavi, secretary-general of the Majles's Article 90 Commission, which investigates citizens' complaints against the government, said that Ahmadinejad's foreign policy positions have provoked the imposition of more severe economic sanctions on Iran. He said, "The Holocaust problem had been forgotten, but your position [on the issue] pushed forward by ten years the sanctions against our country. Do you know the consequences of calling the sanctions a piece of paper?" He continued, "If normal conditions prevail in the nation, 65-70 percent of the people will support groups other than the ruling group." (Most analysts believe that the percentage will be much higher.) Regarding the continuing detention of Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Majles deputy said, "The judiciary must think of a way to [end] the house arrest. It should act legally. Should it not tell [the accused] what their charges are?" Concerning the giant South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf that Iran shares with Qatar, Mousavi said, "Has the government thought of a way [to counter] the $1.4 trillion [worth of natural gas] that Qatar has obtained from South Pars? Can the government not do something to use this vast wealth of the nation to address the unemployment problem? Are you aware that our neighbors are looting Iran's huge natural resources?" Mousavi's speech was repeatedly interrupted by hardliners' shouts of "Death to the opposition to Velaayat-e Faghih" (guardianship of the Islamic jurist, as represented by Khamenei), but was also met with cries of "Well done, well done" from the reformists and some of Ahmadinejad's critics in the parliament.

Reformist deputy Masoud Pezeshkian, who served as health minister under Khatami, also said recently that if Mousavi and Karroubi have commited any offense, they should be put on trial in a fair and independent court.

Intelligence agents kidnapped in Syria?

A spokesman for the Syrian opposition claimed that the five Iranians who have been kidnapped by the opposition are computer experts who were dispatched to Syria to work with Assad regime's security forces. He added that they are no longer in Homs, a hotbed of anti-government activities, and have been transferred elsewhere. The total number of kidnapped Iranians, whom the Islamic Republic says are electrical engineers, appears to be seven, but the spokesman talked about only five. It is not clear who kidnapped the other two. A complete list of the kidnapped Iranians has been released.

Majles commission accuses Khatami

The report by the Article 90 Commission on the Green Movement and what happened in the aftermath of the presidential election of June 2009 was presented to the Majles, a summary of which was read by hardline deputy Hossein Fadaei. The report, which reads more like what the hardline newspaper Kayhan publishes than what might be expected from a parliamentary body accused former President Mohammad Khatami of playing a leading role in the "sedition" -- the name given to the Green Movement by Khamenei and adopted by the hardliners. The report accused the United States of planning for the "sedition" since 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected for his first term. It claimed that Khatami's trips abroad from that point forward were undertaken for the purpose of convincing the West that Mousavi was a suitable presidential candidate who would make "fundamental changes in the power structure" in Iran. It also claimed that foreign agents made repeated trips to Iran to obtain more information about Mousavi, and that the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Organization of Islamic Revolution Mojahedin -- the two leading reformist parties, which were outlawed after the election -- played lead roles in the scheme for a "soft toppling" of the regime via elections and street demonstrations. Fadaei did not explain why if what he has claimed are true, Khatami, Mousavi, and Karroubi have not been put on trial.

After the summary of the report was read, a group of 20 reformist deputies wrote a letter of protest to Majles Speaker Ali Larijani in which they declared that the report lacks any legal basis.

Khamanei ordered arrests in 2009

Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi, former Kayhan editor and minister of culture and Islamic guidance in the first Ahmadinejad administration, strongly implied that it was Khamenei who ordered the arrest of 3,000 people in the aftermath of the June 2009 elections, "90 percent of whom have been released and the rest...put on trial and currently in jail." He added that the government did not believe that Mousavi and Karroubi were controlling the demonstrators, but that "the view of his Agha [his Excellency, Khamenei] was that we must discover the communication network of the 'sedition' with the outside world." He claimed that although the reformists have declared that they will boycott the Majles elections, "in their meetings they say that we must make a comeback" and that they will in fact participate.

Ten million people to be cut from cash handout rolls

In a speech in the western city of Ilam, Ahmadinejad said that the cash handouts to ten million Iranians, which the government pays in lieu of erstwhile subsidies for many basic food items and energy, should be eliminated because it makes no difference to them. He said that he will personally write a letter to them, asking them not to accept the payment. He claimed that if his subsidy elimination plan is implemented completely, "I guarantee that there will be no poor anywhere in Iran." According to him, the government has classified the populace in ten income groups, with the top two needing no cash handouts. Separately, Mohammad Reza Farzin, spokesman for the commission that oversees the subsidy elimination plan, said that on the president's order ten million people will no longer receive the cash handouts. Ali Agha Mohammadi, deputy to First Vice President Rahimi, similarly declared that those for whom the cash handouts have represented 5-10 percent of their income will no longer receive the payments.

Revolutionary Guards and the Majles

Reflecting the hardliners' concerns that Ahmadinejad's supporters may take control of the Majles in the upcoming elections, Ali Saeedi, Khamenei's representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said that the Guards' commanders should seek office. He claimed that legally they can do so, provided that they resign from the corps. This is contrary to the firm position of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was always opposed to the military's involvement in politics. Since the 2004 parliamentary elections of 2004, many former Guard commanders have become Majles deputies.

Ahmadinejad can resign

Former Guard commander Mojtaba Zolnour, an ex-deputy of Saeedi's, said that Khamenei told Ahmadinejad that he can resign. During a debate with Mostafa Kavakebian, the conservative reformist Majles deputy, Zolnour said, "Ahmadinejad asked the Supreme Leader whether he could resign if he could not work with [Minister of Intelligence] Heydar Moslehi [whom he unsuccessfully attempted to force out of office], and Khamenei responded that he could resign." He also said that Khatami had also threatened to resign from the presidency when the hardliners were pressuring him to fire his minister of culture and Islamic Guidance ,Ataollah Mohejerani, who was instrumental in lifting restrictions on the Iranian press during the first three years of his administration.

President ready to reveal "secrets"?

Ruhollah Ahmadzadeh, head of the Organization of Tourism and Cultural Heritage, said that Ahmadinejad and Mashaei are prepared to "reveal the secrets that are hidden in the 'chest' of the head of the tenth administration [Ahmadinejad]." He accused the president's adversaries of "weakening national security, weakening social stability and people's interests, and weakening the power and authority of the Islamic Republic in the international arena." Ahmadinejad's supporters have repeatedly threatened that he will reveal secrets about corruption among his opposition.

Ninety percent of Tehran Guard strength devoted to "soft war"

Brigadier General Hossein Hamadini, who was recently removed from his post as chief of the Mohammad Rasoulallah Corps, whose mission is to defend the greater Tehran area, said that 90 percent of the Guards' strength in the capital region is involved in what the hardliners call the "soft war" -- a supposed campaign to topple the regime through Internet activity and demonstrations. He claimed that it was he who suggested that Guard head Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari replace him as head of the Rasoulallah Corps on the basis that "an old commander like me is no longer useful.... It needs a young, good-looking, and energetic commander."

Attack on British Embassy "illegal"

The Mashregh News website, which is linked to the Revolutionary Guards, said that the attack on the British Embassy in Tehran was illegal and has had numerous negative consequences for the nation. Beside forcing Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi to promise that such an event will never happen again, making the British government happy, and taking away the initiative from the Islamic Republic, it asked, "What have been the achievements of the attack?" The website's commentary continued, "This attack was neither wise, nor legal.... If one day we are to set the record straight with Britain, it would be in the Persian Gulf, not in Tehran, where the British Navy will be the target of our people's revolutionary anger."

Meanwhile, cleric Abbas Nabavi, a lecturer with the Imam Khomeini Education Institute -- the clerical organization controlled by the reactionary Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi -- said that Khamenei viewed the attack on the embassy as a bad thing and that he believed that it was not the work of his supporters among university students, as state and regime-aligned media had widely reported. He accused British agents of staging the embassy invasion.

Prison terms for political figures

Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran, was sentenced to eight years of incarceration and a five-year ban on social and political activities. Yazdi, 80, who suffers from prostate cancer and other illnesses, did not defend himself, declaring that he does not recognize the legitimacy of the court. He was charged with "founding of the LMI" and other "offenses." The LMI was founded in 1961 by Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Yadollah Sahabi, and Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Taleghani. Mohammad Tavasoli, head of the organization's political directorate, has also been arrested, as have his son-in-law Farid Taheri and Emad Bahavar, head of the group's youth division.

Abolfazl Ghadiani, senior member of the Organization of Islamic Revolution Mojahedin who, at 67, is Iran's oldest political prisoner, has been given a three-year jail sentence for "insulting the Leader." Last year, he was sentenced to one year of incarceration for "insulting the president" after calling him a liar, dictator, and law breaker. Now, as that sentence ends, the new one will be imposed. Ghadiani, who was imprisoned for his political activity in opposition to the Shah before the 1979 Revolution, is also in poor health.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

[ critique ] "A Separation," director Asghar Farhadi's fifth feature, debuted in Iran in March to great critical acclaim and commercial success. It was hailed almost universally within the Iranian film industry, though many in the field were concerned that it would not be put forward as the country's official candidate for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film because competing movies were presumed to enjoy greater political pull. As it turned out, the film was in fact selected for Oscar consideration.

At the Berlin Film Festival earlier this year, "A Separation" won the Golden Bear for best film and two Silver Bears -- the top acting prizes -- for the male and female performers in its ensemble. It has won Best Foreign Language Film awards from multiple critics' organizations, including the New York Film Critics Circle and the National Board of Review. In three of the most comprehensive critics' polls of 2011 cinema, it ranked highly: second in the "Sight & Sound" ballot; fourth in the "Film Comment" survey; and second again in the "Village Voice" vote. In mid-December, it received a Golden Globe nomination, the first ever for an Iranian film. The Oscar nominations will be announced on January 24; if "A Separation" is one of the five nominees, it will be only the second Iranian film so recognized (the sole precedent is Majid Majidi's "Children of Heaven" [1997]). If it succeeds in winning the Oscar -- the award ceremony takes place on February 26 -- it will be the first film from Iran ever to be so honored.

In early October, "A Separation" had its U.S. premiere at the New York Film Festival. In his review, Tehran Bureau senior editor and arts critic Dan Geist praised its "performances' remarkable vitality and wealth of detail," which carry the viewer along the "wave of emotional nuances and moral quandaries" the film builds. Examining how the film deals with class tensions and the metaphorical significance of the lead character's enfeebled father, he also observed that Farhadi must "play several games to ensure that [his work] can both be made and seen in Iran." The picture goes into U.S. commercial release on Friday, opening in New York and Los Angeles. Here is another look at it by one of Tehran Bureau's regular contributors. -- The Editors.

I read the review by Dan Geist here of Asghar Farhadi's A Separation. It is a fine review in all aspects but one -- it does not address the contradiction that the movie produces between itself and its story. By itself, I mean its own conception, production, and marketing. I will describe and examine that contradiction, which may actually be a clever ploy, after I discuss a few of the things that brought me to my view.

I write this as if speaking to a friend who has already seen the film; given the coverage it has received, both here and elsewhere, I will not go into detail about its plot. If you have not yet seen it, good, this piece may help you be on guard when you get the chance. If you have, and if like most viewers you have been beguiled, this may help you shake off the trance it induces. The movie is that powerful -- at least on the surface, like shock and awe. But then the reality sinks in. I hope I can help with the latter stage.

The first thing that popped into my mind after watching A Separation twice in 24 hours was Crowned Cannibals, the book by Reza Baraheni about the era before the Revolution. I recalled it not so much for its description of the Shah's atrocities, but the proposition that unlike in Greek mythology where children almost unfailingly destroy their parents, in Iranian narratives it is the parents who devour their children, from Rostam killing his son Afrasiab, albeit unknowingly, to Shirin falling victim to her elders' machinations.

It seems like Farhadi is trapped by the same lame proposition, or that it has guided him at least subconsciously, which I suspect has helped his film resonated positively with Western audiences. Self-deprecation is the first rule of Third World cinema if it wants success with mass audiences -- yes, "those immoral patriarchal societies deserve it all."

The truth is that this having to sacrifice left and right is the human condition. Thousands of parents of the inheritors of the Greek worldview -- that is, Westerners by heritage -- continue after being stricken by Alzheimer's to be cared for by their loving children, whose lives are thereby daily turned upside down. Many have sacrificed as much as Nader, giving up their lives and often their life savings. Must we construe all such behavior as parents cannibalizing their children's lives? No. It is nature that endlessly destroys human beings, giving us these bundles of molecules worth $2.36 at the close of the commodities market at the Chicago Board of Trade today, giving us as well these emotional ties to other bundles of molecules that also have somehow received consciousness and thus suffer for who knows what. The Greeks and the Iranians and everyone else wants to survive. Sometimes children sacrifice, sometimes parents. No cannibalism, but love.

So the projection of the dementia-crippled father destroying Nader's life unknowingly, like Rostam, onto the respective daughters of Nader and Simin and of Razieh and Hodjat is just as empty as the original proposition. Nader and Simin are portrayed as fundamentally Western, in the lineage of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, believing that we are born as tabula rasa, whom life then sets out to corrupt. Religions thrive on similar charades that are emotionally easy to swallow, especially when presented amid the artfully designed stage set of mosque, temple, or church. Here many audiences seem to have swallowed the screen version without question. But maybe when confronted with this fantastic subliminal smoke-and-mirror show, it is unavoidable. Frankly, I was trapped for the first third or so of the movie, until I realized I was almost swallowing the hook. I had to watch it a second time to wash off the grime I felt accumulating on my own beliefs.

First, as children we are as smart as adults. We are born with survival instincts. I have a lot of experience with children through my wife's care center and know how children as young as two lie and otherwise deceive to get attention, from false crying to framing their fellows for things they have done themselves. We understand perfectly well as children that there are circumstances in which it is necessary to distort the truth to make it to the next day. None of us can claim that we have not done so at some point. I find it odd then that we tend to accept the Platonic candy that sweetly says otherwise onscreen.

In fact, we see this lack of innocence perfectly in the exchange of glances between Nader and Termeh, his daughter, when it become clear that Razieh, the houseworker, may have not been telling the truth after all, justifying Nader's lies in defensive reaction. It suggests that Termeh has suddenly turned into an 11-year-old adult. No, she knew that buying time is imperative to uncover the truth, more so than putting yourself in prison for sake of some shaky principle, eliminating any chance of finding the truth on your own. Perhaps the suggestion is that God will expose the truth. And that suggestion is probably how Farhadi got the permit to make this movie aboveground. Nonetheless, in this exchange, despite the fantastic performances and flawless editing, Termeh's expression still conveys "Ya, I knew it all along," not "Oh Dad, I see that you were telling the truth."

Earlier, there is the court scene in which, without being coached to testify that her father was unaware of Razieh's pregnancy when he accosted her, Termeh utters a white lie: "I told him that Razieh was pregnant" -- which doesn't contravene the fact that he already was aware. Termeh plays just as cleverly with the truth as her father. She, like he, wants to survive. The doubt about Razieh's version of the truth, despite her deeply religious righteousness, is pervasive. Termeh risks a guilty conscience for another day of survival. No need to devour your father for a poor reason. No one is destroying the children or corrupting them. No need to feel guilty as adults. Children are not tabula rasa.

Children's expedient tricks are occasions for boasting by all Iranian parents, 100 percent, full stop. They love it when their kids trick, or pull a kallak, on their siblings, friends, relatives, and even teachers. Kallak is different from cheating. It's about taking advantage of circumstances to check the opponent's own kallak, or to find out if they have any kallak in the works. Just as we don't call chess ploys cheating, but merely gambits, kallak is rather innocent. So parents hug and love their kids for it -- after some fake, wink-wink admonishments -- and they give the little trickster a saffron candy, or I suppose some Smarties or M&Ms these days. A kid who can't kallak is considered a fool, even retarded.

Simin's departure is also a kallak, or as she has told Termeh, "allakie," a ploy, and Nader is fully aware of it. By pretending to leave Nader, Simin is trying to extract some concessions to realize her vision of a better marriage. Thus Termeh is already in on the games of survival and their attendant need for kallak. When Simin finds out that Nader knows of her ploy, she asks Termeh if she has told her father, again suggesting that the child is a pawn who is being corrupted by both sides. But a child in such a circumstance does whatever is needed to survive: hold the marriage together if that is better for her, or if it is a poisonous union, let it fall apart and take her chances with one parent or the other.

Thus Termeh's desperate and thorny moments, beautifully acted, of her worries over her father's possible lying are themselves dishonest vignettes, especially given the context of the movie and its premise. Is Farhadi saying that fooling the audience is just as necessary as Nader's twisting of the truth for his own and his daughter's survival? These contradictions make the movie interesting, not the story it encompasses. Farhadi seems to believe that he, no less than his characters, is entitled to twist the truth. And so he builds a Russian nesting doll of kallaks.

Of course, the acting, lighting, rapid cuts, and background sonic landscape of the city are so perfectly executed that the film can pull the wool over anyone's eyes. It can kallak even the canniest audiences into an idealistic emotional state that even Mother Teresa or the most ardent passion play orator would envy.

At the same time, there is one person in all of this who can't handle herself. She jumbles everything up due to her deep religious convictions, which are nothing but a pack of strange superstitions. She swears to God and the saints and the Holy Qur'an. She substitutes her superstitions for rationality and logic. So it is telling that there is no swearing on the book in the courtroom. Swearing on the Qur'an is a device used only privately to intimidate the opposition. And even that intimidation is not religious but social. If you swear to and lie on that few hundred pages of fantastic tales, you are not honest, socially. That is the power of this storytelling tool and Farhadi has used it without falling prey to the censors. Although it might be expected that most viewers would see through this, it appears that they accept whichever character seems to be religiously disposed as the moral one. Farhadi probably basks in this masterful kallak.

In other words, people look past that folk American notion of swearing on the holy book everywhere but in the movies. Even though no such ritual exists in European courts, still people there seem to trust a hand on a stack of ink-covered cellulose between two pieces of cardboard when presented on film. Of course, other than Razieh, no one seems to believe it within the movie either. They all pretend to piety, like the arbiters gathered to witness Nader's blood-money payment who cede to his demand that Razieh swear to his culpability on the book. It turns out that Nader, who knows how superstitious Razieh is, has employed this gambit as a means of intimidation. We then discover that the some of the arbiters also happen to be usurers.

In yet another scene, Nader swears on the book, as Hodjat, Razieh's destitute husband, looks at him in disbelief, knowing that he is not being fully truthful -- just as anyone might see another person's eyes twitch slightly or their voice falter for a moment amid telling a lie, be it in Tehran, Milan, or Kansas City. Law enforcement has access to mechanical devices to detect such evasions, but human eyes and ears are still much better, although their results are not admissible in courts of law. We all are equipped to notice such things in most circumstances, and the actors in this movie are particularly adept at enacting the tics, hesitations, and other mannerisms of the liar. Certainly the editing enhances their visually rich performances. I wonder how many takes must have been shot of each scene to pull it off.

Societies could not survive without moral schemata, but is it true that they can be triggered only by religion? I believe not. Morality is an evolutionary constraint developed to protect us from destroying our own societies. Aside from the false suggestion that morality comes from religion, the survival instinct is sadly demeaned in the movie, although it is the most wonderful trait with which humans have been endowed by evolution. People who have no religious beliefs don't tell lies because deep down they sense it is wrong. It is really because it is not helpful to the survival of our societies in the long run, meaning over the course of our own lives and the foreseeable generations to come. This has been demonstrated in the many studies that show how criminals subconsciously leave clues that will eventually bring a stop to their "immoral" acts. Religion simply gives this evolutionary mechanism an otherworldly gloss off of whose shine priests, mullahs, and rabbis can make a good living, and which audiences will pay to watch in passion plays like this one.

Moral dilemmas and survival are at the heart of Farhadi's previous film, About Elly (2009), far more existential and honest, but no box-office hit. Its core themes have now been repackaged in a different story for this year's sleek commercial fare. Maybe it is Farhadi's kallak, based on a belief that artistic survival demands commercial success.

Although I felt I had almost fallen for a kallak, I still imagine that, for students of cinema, this movie must stand out as a technical tour de force. But unsurpassable technique here holds a vacuous story together, as if beautiful coasts defined the ocean.

The greats of Iranian cinema had something to say and didn't need such technical perfection. But A Separation is so well acted, shot, and assembled that it is capable of concealing the most inane and unrealistic story we have seen from Iran. In fact, it is not an Iranian story at all. It is a dreamland children's tale with enough magic and fairytale notions to warm Walt Disney's heart. A cartoon version would sell tons of Cheerios on a Saturday morning.

Certainly, on a different level one can consider this movie a compilation of 169,728 beautiful pictures presented with a superb audio accompaniment at 24 frames per second. In all likelihood, that will suffice to make most Western audiences regard it as great. The shame is that its technical mastery is kallaking them into buying its storyline.

By comparison, before the Revolution, Abbas Kiarostami produced a series of movies ostensibly for the education of Iran's youth. In these works, he shows a myriad of social interactions that demonstrate the sophistication of children as young as four or five. They understand cheating, lying, tricking, and above all, trust, especially in their own instincts. To children, awareness is as important as being honest, but if need be they can lie to survive.

Many pertinent examples from Kiarostami's oeuvre might be cited, but the most familiar is a film he made after the Revolution, Where Is the Friend's House? (1987). The protagonist, an eight-year-old boy, inadvertently takes the workbook of a friend who is on probation for tardiness and not finishing his assignments. He attempts to return the workbook so his friend can complete his crucial assignment for the next day. Failing to find him despite many hours of searching through neighboring town and villages, he decides to save his friend's skin by completing his assignment for him, in effect cheating. No one blinks an eye and he is deemed a hero. In A Separation, such behavior would be tantamount to capital sin. It is the glitter of the movie's technical brilliance that hoodwinks us into accepting such a premise. It does exactly what its storyline suggests is wrong -- it pulls a kallak.

Some consider A Separation subliminal propaganda for the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is not clear that this is the case, at least intentionally. If it were, much credit would have to be paid to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance for becoming suddenly sharp after decades as a crude and jagged sword. I also discount this notion as Nader's father, unknowingly and unwittingly destroying his son's life, can readily be taken to stand for the fatherland. That obvious metaphor clearly escaped the ministry's stiletto-wielding censors. There is also the blatant use of names as signifiers of the characters' characters.* Weighing finally against this idea is that the character defined as most religious is revealed as fundamentally flawed and caught in her own web of superstitions.

Regardless of motives, Farhadi has pulled off a neat trick, for which his loved ones can now hug him and give him a saffron candy -- though they shouldn't forget the ritual admonishment, perhaps a pantomime slap on the hand. To kallak so many audiences, really he deserves two saffron candies. Could an Oscar be any tastier?

* Here are the meanings of the names of A Separation's main characters (Nader's father is unnamed):

Nader, the father -- rare, unique, hard to find (Arabic, a secular name)

Simin, his wife -- one who shines like silver, porcelain-skinned (Persian, a secular name)

Termeh, their daughter - a sophisticated, supple woven cloth with gold strands and a field of abstract flowers and paisleys (Persian, an uncommon secular name)

Razieh, the domestic -- accepting of one's condition (Arabic, a religious name)

Hodjat, her husband -- authority: one of the dozen traits of each of the dozen Shia Imams (Arabic, a religious name)

Somayeh, their daughter -- mother of a close attendant of the Prophet Muhammad (Arabic, a religious name)

Dan Geist responds:

I've long been fascinated by how one's perceptions of a film change over time, especially in light of how cinema among the narrative arts pivots so preeminentily around what Robert Warshow called the "immediate experience." An individual movie review often reads as if it is capturing the response of a magically well-endowed instant, but like any other literary exercise it translates inescapably temporal processes. The foregoing comment reminds us that our evaluation of a film can alter radically even in the course of watching it. (As Tehran Bureau senior editor, it was my pleasure to edit this piece, notwithstanding its identification of my analytical divot.) In the workaday life of even the deadline critic, significant time can elapse between screening room and composition desk, and then as one writes, time continues to march and so too reflection, if more fitfully.

As the lights came up on A Separation, I was as beguiled as those around me appeared to be. The dubious nature of some of Farhadi's postscreening comments had no conscious effect on my admiration for his work. As I wrote, the way certain sophisticated elisions in the screenplay served to conceal the implausibility of certain of the characters' choices began to niggle at me, but to the practical yield of just one sentence explicitly on point. Then, at the very end of my labors, I felt compelled to make a crucial change. For much of my draftwork, I had bracketed Farhadi with Mohammad Rasoulof and Jafar Panahi as filmmakers "of brilliance and daring." There came a turn within me and I knew it was wrong to place Farhadi so fully in their company; I rewrote the pertinent passage to suggest that he was something rather else, a filmmaker of brilliance and "cunning." To put it another way, a kallak.

Reading and musing on our commentator's piece -- now there's a temporal process -- has helped me to understand in just what fashion. The script of A Separation, the most widely heralded aspect of Farhadi's work, increasingly strikes me as a greater achievement in unadmitted legerdemain than in multivalent drama. I have also had the opportunity and time to reflect on a friend's report of a question-and-answer session with the director after the movie's Paris premiere. My Iranian-born friend questioned its veracity very much along the lines expressed by the commentator above: Do Iranians really get so worked up about lying? she wondered. Farhadi, in an apparent effort to dismiss the point, asked if she'd set foot in Iran since the Revolution. "Are you saying Iranians have become more honest since the Revolution?" she asked. This riposte he did not stoop to counter. But if he wasn't saying that, then what exactly was he saying by bringing the vagaries of individual biography into play? The answer is clear. He was trying to bury the original question -- and the questioner -- in a pile of kallak.

In no way, however, do I mean to suggest that Farhadi or A Separation are at all underserving of Oscar recognition. Indeed, they could hardly have done more to merit it. Since not long after 1910, when D. W. Griffith traversed the corn-gold sea of middle America to discover paradise on the Pacific rim, the name of the sleepy village he claimed for the budding U.S. film industry has been one of our most resplendent synonyms for kallak on the grand scale: that's "Hollywood."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

An erratic alliance viewed optimistically by an isolated regime.

[ analysis ] Iran claims to have forced down a sophisticated U.S. spy drone on December 4. Nine days later, President Obama formally asked for its return, a request that was met with an official sneer from Tehran. Top Iranian military brass made clear that "spoils of war will not be sent back."

The fate of the RQ-170 Sentinel drone has since become firmly entangled in the U.S.-Iranian propaganda struggle, but it has also led to a genuine debate about the usefulness of the drone's sophisticated technology to Iran and Russia, her sometime ally.

The Russians would obviously like to get their hands on one of the U.S. government's most sophisticated intelligence collection tools. Russian defense industries have had great difficulty in developing and producing unmanned vehicles as well as other complex weapons systems along the lines of the Mistral-class amphibious warfare ships that Russia is purchasing from France. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force General Norton A. Schwartz said that "there is the potential for reverse engineering" if the drone comes into the possession of a "sophisticated adversary."

But would Iran willy-nilly give Russia's scientists access to the RQ-170? Not necessarily, and certainly not when considering the totality of the ups and downs in Moscow-Tehran relations in recent years. And if Iran does let the Russians do anything more than peek at the RQ-170, it would in effect admit that the drone's technology is beyond the ability of their military scientists to fathom. That message would not tally with Iran's self-declared mastery of the latest unmanned aerial technologies, as forcefully stated by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a recent television interview. Still, the U.S. drone does have the clear potential to act as a catalyst for improvement in wavering Moscow-Tehran relations.

Those ties have historically been troubled, and have experienced new tensions in recent years. The Iranians have been greatly angered by Moscow's support last summer for a fourth round of U.N. sanctions against the Islamic Republic, by the decision to cancel a contract for the purchase of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and by the continued delays in Russian construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, now more than a decade overdue. And yet, thanks to its isolation, the Iranian regime can't afford to walk away from Russia.

Meanwhile, although Moscow does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons, it does not consider such a threat imminent or inevitable. The Kremlin's main concern is that Iran's nuclear and missile activities are driving NATO countries to support missile defense programs that Russians fear could eventually degrade their own nuclear deterrent. They also count on Iran's continued restraint from supporting Islamist militancy in the Russian Caucasus, and assistance in limiting American influence in Central Asia and the Middle East. They also want to keep their conflicts with Iran over access to the Caspian Sea's natural resources manageable.

Conversely, Russia has economic and diplomatic interests in Iran's continued alienation from the West. Russian firms benefit from the reluctance of Western companies to invest in Iran due to the numerous unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed on its government for its nuclear activities, past support for terrorism, and polices toward Israel, Lebanon, and other countries in the region. These tensions preserve Russian firms as Iran's major economic partners. In their absence, Iran's economy would likely return to its pre-2000s focus on Western trade and direct investment.

Although Russia's overall economic ties with Iran are relatively limited, its influential nuclear and defense sectors profit considerably from Iran's dependence on Russian-made atomic technology and materiel. Meanwhile, Russian energy firms benefit from Iran's difficulties in producing and selling oil and gas on international markets.

Furthermore, Russian diplomats need tolerable ties with Tehran to achieve their goal of positioning Moscow as a mediator between Iran and the West. They can leverage that position to induce NATO governments and Iran to offer Moscow concessions on a variety of issues. Russia might also want to work with Iran to address security threats in Afghanistan following the NATO pullout.

Iranian leaders welcome Russia's occasional support. It is considered self-serving and far from unconditional, but still useful given Iran's alienation from Europe and the United States. Yet influential Iranian political figures have repeatedly made it clear they do not trust Moscow. They fully appreciate that the Russians have an incentive to promote Iran's permanent alienation from the West.

Under such circumstances, many voices in Tehran dismissed the notion that Iran should share the RQ-170 with Moscow. As one academic put it to the Iranian Diplomacy website, to give the drone to the Russians would be "childish" and devoid of any strategic sense. Instead, he suggested that Iran use the drone's capture as an opportunity to initiate negotiations with Washington.

Such sentiments are plentiful in Tehran, but those who harbor any hope for direct negotiations between Iran and the United States are not in the driver's seat at present. Most are associated with the reformist and centrist factions that have been largely sidelined from the decision-making process. The hardliners who are running the show naïvely believe that Russia can still turn into a steady partner. As recently as November, Tehran and Moscow signed a new agreement on "strategic cooperation," and Russia's ambassador to NATO is due to visit Iran in early January to discuss NATO's global antimissile defense system.

Sharing the U.S. drone with Moscow could well be seen as expediting the illusive Iranian-Russian alliance. Such misplaced optimism, however, both reflects the acute sense of isolation that Iran's leaders experience and their willingness to whitewash Russia's long record of duplicity toward the Iranian nation.

Alex Vatanka is a scholar at the Middle East Institute. Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

A long history of quiet influence and power.

[ profile ] "Why don't we kill them? We kill other people who are running terrorist organizations against the United States." This is what retired General John (Jack) Keane, former vice chief of staff of the United States Army, told Congress during his testimony to the Homeland Security Subcommittee on October 26. Who was he talking about? Testifying to the same subcommittee on the same day, the neoconservative Marc Reuel Gerecht, a retired CIA agent who worked in the Middle East for years, made it clear who Keane had primarily in mind:

I don't think that you are going to really intimidate these people, get their attention, unless you shoot somebody. You should hold Qassem Suleimani responsible. Qassem Suleimani travels a lot. He's all over the place. Go get him. Either try to capture him or kill him.

Gerecht was talking about Major General Ghasem Soleimani, long-time commander of the Quds (Jerusalem) Force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite special forces division responsible for operations outside Iran's borders, considered by some to be one of the finest of its kind in the world. The United States has known about Soleimani since at least the 1990s, and while U.S. troops were still in Iraq, they had to deal with the militias that had been armed and trained by the Quds Force.

In fact, the Shiites who came to power in Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion in March 2003 were trained and equipped by the Quds Force for years. The Badr Division (also called the Ninth Badr Corps), the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which played a decisive role after the invasion, was founded in 1984 by Esmail Daghaayeghi, a Guard officer, following the Quds Force's establishment the year before (see below). Daghaayeghi was killed during the Iran-Iraq War on January 18, 1987, during Operation Karbala 5 and posthumously given the rank of major general. During the war, the command centers of both forces were stationed in the Ramazan Garrison in the town of Marivan, Kurdistan, near the Iraqi border. After the war and through the 1990s, the Badr Division trained under the Quds Force.

The reaction in Iran to the statements by Keane and Gerecht was swift and furious. Hardline media outlets lionized Soleimani (see, for example, here, here, here, and here.) According to the hardline website Asr-e Iran, which is close to Tehran mayor and former Guard commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, "Those in Islamic Iran who know [Soleimani] talk about his shyness, humble behavior, and tranquility. And unlike what the Americans say, he is not mysterious." Mashregh News, the website linked with the Guards, published pictures of Soleimani during the war with Iraq that show him bidding farewell to soldiers headed for the front. Jahan News, the website published by Majles deputy and former Guard commander Ali Reza Zakani, stated, "We are all Ghasem Soleimani." Soleimani himself declared, "This is not a threat; it is helping [me] to realize an old, strong desire. In response to those who think that they can impose themselves on us through threats, I say, oh God, make martyrdom in your path at the hands of our enemies our fate."

Who is this Ghasem Soleimani who invokes such emotions in Tehran hardliners? As tensions between the West and Iran increase, the covert war that the United States and Israel are apparently waging on Iran is also heating up. Even before the U.S. forces left Iraq, Soleimani was considered by some as the most powerful figure in that country. With their departure, he becomes even more prominent in any possible confrontation between Iran and the United States and Israel, and in particular in any asymmetric warfare that the Quds Force may wage.

Early life

Ghasem Soleimani -- usually referred to as Haj Ghasem Soleimani by the Iranian media -- was born on March 11, 1957, to a poor peasant family living in the mountainous, sparsely populated village of Rabord near the town of Baft in the southeastern province of Kerman. (Some reports indicate that he was born in 1958.) After completing elementary school, together with his cousin Ahmad Soleimani he left his family and moved to Kerman, the provincial capital. His family was heavily in debt, and the young Soleimani tried to help out by working as a day laborer in the construction industry. After several years, he joined the Water Organization of Kerman as a simple technician.

After the uprising of June 5, 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi outlawed all opposition political groups in Iran. In March 1975, the Shah banned all the political parties that were loyal to him and ordered the establishment of a single party, the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party. The struggle against his regime grew even fiercer. Around this time, the teenaged Soleimani reportedly began his anti-Shah activities.

As the Shah had eliminated all the viable political groups, the clerics who opposed his regime became more influential. One such cleric was Seyyed Reza Kaamyaab (1950-81) from Mashhad, who was well-known in Kerman for his fiery speeches against the Shah. After the 1979 Revolution, Kaamyaab was elected to the first Majles representing Mashhad. He was assassinated by the Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organization (MKO) in July 1981. Soleimani was a religious follower of Kaamyaab. But there is nothing that indicates in what way, or even if, Soleimani participated in the Revolution that toppled the Shah's regime in February 1979, although it is known that Ahmad Soleimani was an organizer of the first anti-Shah demonstrations in Kerman the previous spring.

Joining the Guards

On May 5, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ordered the founding of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to prevent a military coup by the remnants of the Shah's army, elements of which had supported the CIA-sponsored coup of 1953. The Guards quickly set up provincial command centers around the country, including one in Kerman, which Soleimani joined as a "volunteer." He received only six weeks of training (the maximum in that era was two months), but proved to be a fast learner, which opened the path for his rise in the Guards' ranks.

One of the first crises that the Guards had to deal with was the uprising in the Kurdish region in western Iran just a few months after the Revolution. To put down the uprising, the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan dispatched the army and Guard forces. Similar to the Shah's regime, the Bazargan government sent troops from other regions of Iran, so the soldiers would not be bound to the local population. The government forces were led by Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran and Colonel Ali Seyyed Shirazi, who later rose to the rank of lieutenant general, the only one in Iran's military after the Revolution. (Chamran was killed in 1981 in the war with Iraq; Shirazi was assassinated by the MKO in 1999.) Soleimani was part of the force that was dispatched from Kerman to Mahabad in West Azerbaijan province, historically a stronghold of Kurdish dissidents. Little is known of Soleimani's role in the armed forces' brutal suppression of the uprising. Upon his return to Kerman, Soleimani was put in charge of the Guard base there.

Iran-Iraq War

On September 22, 1980, Iraqi forces invaded Iran with the hope of toppling the regime in Tehran. The Guards played a prominent role during the eight-year war that followed, in which young men such as Soleimani found the mission of their lives: defeating Iraq. He was instrumental in training and dispatching to the war front several Guard battalions from Kerman. He was eventually appointed to command the 41st Saarallah Division based in Kerman, which was sent to the front and played a key role in preventing Iraqi forces from overrunning the town of Susangerd in Khuzestan province. According to many accounts, Soleimani took part in practically all the important operations of the war mounted by Iran's military, both successful and unsuccessful. In October 1984, his cousin Ahmad Soleimani was killed in combat.

There are many tales attesting to Soleimani's bravery and tactical skills. My youngest brother, who fought at the front for 28 months -- two years of mandatory service plus four months as a volunteer -- told me that Soleimani was reputed to be one of the "bravest and shrewdest guys" at the front. He told me about Soleimani personally leading operations during which he willingly risked capture by Iraqi forces. Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute calls Soleimani "a war hero and genuine patriot who joined the [Guards] following the revolution, as Iran grappled with the likelihood of civil war and the challenges of Iraq's invasion." Various sources describe many of the operations that Soleimani led, or in which he and the 41st Saarallah Division played important roles (see, for example, here, here, and here.)

Formation of the Quds Force

In the first half of the 1970s, border disputes led to considerable tension between Iran and Iraq. The Shah's regime armed and trained the Iraqi Kurdish forces led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani that were fighting against the central government in Baghdad. (After March 6, 1975, when the Shah and Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers Agreement, Iran cut off aid to Barzani's forces.) Taking a page from the Shah, the Islamic Republic decided to do something very similar. Hence the Quds Force was formed in 1983 to arm and train Iraqi Kurdish forces to combat Hussein's army and to carry out intelligence operations in Iraq. In that era, the Quds Force's Ramazan Garrison headquarters was a command center for irregular warfare, behind-the-front operations, and intelligence collection. There has been some speculation that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was in Kurdistan at the time, played a role in the force's founding, but I could not verify this independently.

The Quds Force was originally affiliated with the Office of Liberation Movements, which was formed after the 1979 Revolution to assist Islamic revolutionary movements in other countries, but it soon became a branch of the Guards, within which it was called the 2nd Quds Corps for quite some time. While the war with Iraq raged, one of the force's primary missions was to collaborate with Kurdish fighters against Hussein's army. After Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and initiated an extended clear occupation of the southern part of the country for a long time, the Quds Force is believed to have played an important role in arming and training those who wanted to resist the occupation. With the official founding of the Lebanese Hezbollah in February 1985, the Quds Force is thought to have trained and equipped its fighters. However, it must be emphasized that the exact nature of the working relationship between the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Quds Force remains shrouded in secrecy, with few hard facts available.

Also contemporaneous with the Iran-Iraq War, Soviet forces were fighting the Afghan Mujahedin, which were supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. An important figure among the Mujahedin was Ahmad Shah Masoud, an ally of Iran whose operations were aided by the Quds Force (see below).

Postwar era

The war with Iraq finally ended in August 1988. The Guard commanders all became commissioned officers of Iran's military. Most of the top commanders were given the rank of brigadier general, like Soleimani, or lieutenant brigadier general. The war had left a lasting impression on the worldviews of men such as Soleimani and current Guard chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari (pictured seated with Soleimani). They have not forgotten that the West, and in particular the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, supported Iraq during the war. A network of these commanders, comprising some of the most hardline Guard officers, was created that now effectively runs Iran. I shall return to this point.

At the end of the war, the 41st Saarallah Division returned to Kerman. For many years afterward, one of the Quds Force's primary responsibilities was the fight against narcotic traffickers using Iran as a conduit for the transfer of drugs from Afghanistan to the rest of the word. The route runs from Afghanistan (as well as Pakistan) to southern Khorasan and Sistan and Baluchistan province and from there to Kerman province on its way to Europe, the Persian Gulf region, and other locations. It is estimated that, over the past two decades, at least 3,000 Iranian military and police personnel have been killed in the war on the traffickers. Soleimani, as commander of the 41st Saarallah Division, played a key role in the fighting in the early and mid-1990s and was praised by many officers, including then Guard chief Major General Mohsen Rezaei.

After Soviet forces withdrew in defeat from Afghanistan in 1989, the leftist Afghan regime hung on for a time. But when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, the government of Mohammad Najibullah also crumpled. Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all competed for influence in Afghanistan. Initially, Iran supported the Hazara Shia group Hezb-e Wahdat (Party of Unity), led by Abdul Ali Mazari. When factional fighting broke out, Ahmad Shah Masoud's forces defeated all of the other militias, except that of the Taliban, who hate Iran and Shiites. From then on, the Quds Force supported Shah Masoud. I shall come back to this shortly.

In the 1990s, the Quds Force was accused of involvement in important operations beyond Iran's borders. For example, much has been said about the force's possible role in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and one Saudi, and injured 372. Though Iran was eventually absolved by Saudi Arabia of any involvement (see also this article by Gareth Porter), U.S. neoconservatives still insist that the Quds Force had a hand in the bombing.

The Quds Force was definitely involved in the war in the Balkans in the first half of the decade. With tacit U.S. approval, it supplied the Muslim combatants with arms to defend themselves against the Serbian forces. Several reports indicate that Soleimani was in command of Quds Force operations in Bosnia.

The Taliban, with Pakistani military backing and financial support from Saudi Arabia, overthrew the Afghan government and took power in Kabul on September 27, 1996. The United States initially considered the development a positive one for the Afghan people.

Glyn Davies, a State Department spokesman, expressed hope that the Taliban would "move quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation nationwide," adding that the United States would send diplomats to Afghanistan to meet with the Taliban to reestablish full diplomatic ties. From then on, a main task of the Quds Force was to supply and support the forces of Ahmad Shah Masoud who, together with Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former pro-Soviet fighter and leader of the Uzbek minority's Jonbesh-e Melli (National Movement), had formed the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, universally known as the Northern Alliance. The supply route went through Persian-speaking Tajikistan.

Domestic politics

During this entire period, while Soleimani did not speak -- and was hardly even seen -- in public, he was deeply involved in all the Quds Force's major operations outside Iran's borders. In early August 1998, Taliban forces attacked the city of Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan, killing thousands of civilians. They specifically targeted Iran's consulate in the city, where they murdered 11 Iranians, including eight diplomats and a journalist, Mahmoud Saremi, who was working for IRNA, Iran's state news agency. The other two dead Iranians were most likely intelligence officers. The two countries almost went to war, as Iran massed 200,000 troops on its Afghan border. But instead of attacking Afghanistan, the Quds Force continued to supply the Northern Alliance. In the fall of 2001, after the United States invaded Afghanistan, it was the Quds Force that supported and trained Northern Alliance fighters, even though Ahmad Shah Masoud had been assassinated on September 9, two days before the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks.

Mohammad Khatami had been elected president of the Islamic Republic by a landslide on May 23, 1997, and begun a cautious program of reform. That September 10, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei abruptly removed Rezaei from his position as Guard chief and appointed Brigadier General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a hardliner, in his place. The move greatly displeased the senior Guard commanders and provided the network of wartime Guard commanders an opportunity to announce its existence. Thirty-three high-ranking Guard officers, including Soleimani, signed a letter that protested Rezaei's dismissal and implicitly blamed Khatami for it.

Rahim Safavi subsequently appointed Soleimani as the commander of the Quds Force and Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani as his deputy. Soleimani's predecessor was Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi (born Ahmad Shah Cheraghi), the current minister of defense. Interestingly, although Soleimani had signed the protest letter, it is known that he had opposed some of Rezaei's decisions during the war against Iraq. This might indicate that the letter was more an expression of the Guard commanders' unhappiness with the election of Khatami than of firm support for Rezaei. Another interesting point is that even though Soleimani and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, commander-in-chief of the armed forces during most of the war, are both from Kerman, the two men never developed a close relationship.

The July 1999 uprising at the dormitories of the University of Tehran shook the foundations of the Islamic Republic. The uprising began when the popular Islamic leftist daily Salaam was banned after it published a series of reports on conservatives' attempts to restrict the press. The students who protested the ban were attacked by the Basij militia and plainclothes agents, which ignited several days of fierce demonstrations around the country. The Guard network responded. Twenty-four top commanders -- including Soleimani and then Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jafari, chief of the Guards' ground forces -- wrote a letter to Khatami threatening that if he did not end the pursuit of his reformist policies, they would be forced to take strong action:

Your Excellency, Mr. Khatami, look at the international media and radio broadcasts. Does the sound of their merriment not reach your ear? Dear Mr. President, if you do not make a revolutionary decision today, and fail to fulfill your Islamic and national duty, tomorrow will be too late and the damage will be more irreversible than can be imagined.... With all due respect, we inform you that our patience is at an end, and we do not think it is possible to tolerate any more if this is not addressed.

Although in another letter to Khatami, a large number of regular army officers and former Guard commanders expressed their firm support for him, the threatening letter from the network of top Guard commanders had a much greater impact. It also marked the first occasion in which Soleimani took a public position regarding a national issue. But that remains an exception. Soleimani has conducted himself almost invariably as a professional soldier who does not interfere in politics nor take public positions regarding issues of state.

Aftermath of U.S. invasion of Iraq

The U.S. and British invasion of Iraq in March 2003 greatly worried the Iranian leadership. There was every sign that the United States intended to establish large, permanent military bases in Iraq. The leadership thus decided to make sure that it was positioned to wield influence over various Iraqi Shia groups, which were already Iran's allies, as well as some Sunni nationalist groups opposed to the invasion and occupation. Thousands of Iranian intelligence agents and Quds Force personnel penetrated Iraq, establishing links with various groups and reportedly distributing vast sums of money.

As resistance to the occupation intensified, the U.S. military began to accuse Iran and the Quds Force specifically of intervening in Iraq and bearing responsibility for some American casualties. In an interview with CBS in February 2006, General John Abizaid, then commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East, said, "At the same time that the government of Iran is talking about stabilizing Iraq, these Revolutionary Guard Qods Force people are supporting the Shia death squads of some of the various splinter [groups]." "So, aren't we already at a war with Iran through its proxies in Iraq?" he was asked. Abizaid responded, "No. We're not at war with Iran through its proxies. We are in a period of making it clear to the Iranians that they need to move to help stabilize Iraq and not destabilize it."

On January 11, 2007, five Iranian diplomats, reportedly members of the Quds Force, were arrested by U.S. troops when they raided the Iranian Liaison Office in Arbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan (the office was reportedly in the process of becoming Iran's consulate). The five men -- Naser Bagheri, Mousa Chegini, Abbas Hatami Kakavand, Hamid Askari Shokouh, and Majid Ghaemi -- were held for more than two years. It is widely believed that the Americans mistakenly thought that Jafari, the Guard chief, was at the office and that the raid was staged to capture him.

Abizaid's claims were followed by the Bush administration's accusations in early 2007 that Iran was helping Shia militias murder American soldiers in Iraq. On February 11, U.S. military officials in Baghdad presented rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, and components for explosives that they said were like those responsible for the deaths of 170 American servicemen over the previous three years; they claimed that such weapons were made available to the insurgents with the approval of Iran's highest authorities. The charges were met with great skepticism, not because they were implausible, but because there was simply no evidence linking the weapons to Iran or the Quds Force.

In March 2007, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1747, which prohibited arms sales to and from Iran because of concerns over its nuclear program. The edict also imposed sanctions against several Guard commanders, including Soleimani. In October that year, the United States imposed additional sanctions on him, accusing him of supporting terrorism and nuclear proliferation activities. To date, however, there is still no evidence linking the Quds Force to Iran's nuclear program that has been made public.

In early 2008, the Mahdi Army of the Iraqi Shia firebrand Moqtada al-Sadr began fighting the forces of the U.S.-backed government. When the situation seemed to be slipping out of control, representatives of the two sides met in Qom with Soleimani and, after intense negotiations, agreed to a ceasefire. This was yet another manifestation of his influence and power.

During the same period, another episode took place that became famous. In the midst of a battle that pitted Iraqi and U.S. army forces against the Mahdi Army, General David Petraeus, then the commander of the American contingent in Iraq, was handed a phone displaying a text message from Soleimani:

General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan. And, indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad [Hassan Kazemi Qomi] is a Quds Force member. The individual who's going to replace him [Hassan Danaeifar] is [also] a Quds Force member.

Soleimani was implying that, as far as the Middle East was concerned, he was the one with whom Petraeus had to deal. The American general, of course, did not need a reminder. This past July, the Guardian quoted Iraq's former national security minister, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, as saying of Soleimani, "He is the most powerful man in Iraq without question. Nothing gets done without him." A senior U.S. official told the Guardian, "He dictates terms then makes things happen and the Iraqis are left managing a situation that they had no input into."

In June, after antigovernment demonstrations in Syria turned bloody, the European Union imposed sanctions on Soleimani. The Syrian opposition has alleged that the Islamic Republic, and in particular the Quds Force, has been helping the Syrian government to crackdown on the demonstrators.

And in October, the United States alleged that the Quds Force was behind a plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Washington and carry out other terrorist operations. Regardless of the accuracy of the allegations, they brought to the fore the key role that Soleimani plays in Iranian operations abroad.

Promotion

On January 24, 2011, Khamenei promoted Soleimani to major general. There are currently only 12 other major generals in Iran's armed forces: Guard chief Jafari; Rahim Safavi, now the Supreme Leader's senior military adviser; Rezaei, now secretary-general of the Expediency Discernment Council; Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hassan Firoozabadi, who is close to Khamenei; his top deputy, Gholam Ali Rashid, who is very popular within the military for his achievements during the war with Iraq, particularly the liberation of the Persian Gulf port of Khorramshahr; Mostafa Izadi, deputy armed forces chief of staff, who is highly respected and the only military man who openly supported the late Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri; Hassani Saadi, deputy armed forces chief of staff for military coordination, who is considered an apolitical soldier; Mohammad Bagheri, Firoozabadi's deputy for operations and intelligence; Ataollah Salehi, commander of Iran's regular armed forces (not including the Guards), who is the only current general to have received his military training prior to the Revolution; Ali Shahbazi, the first chief of the regular armed forces after Khamenei's 1989 appointment as Supreme Leader, and his successor, Mohammad Salimi, both now military advisers to Khamenei; and former Navy commander Ali Shamkhani.

Leave aside Rezaei and Shamkhani, who no longer have active military roles (and are no longer close to Khamenei), and the three who serve as the Supreme Leader's advisers, and Soleimani is effectively one of just eight men now serving at the highest rank in Iran's military structure.

Presidential ambitions

Speculation is rife in Tehran as to who will be the military's candidate in the next presidential election, set for June 2013. Many believe it will be Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf, the former commander of the Guard air force who also ran in 2005, or Saeed Jalili, secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, who is close to the military hardliners. But according to a source with contacts in high places in Tehran, Soleimani may be Khamenei's candidate. The Supreme Leader has publicly praised him, which is extremely rare. There is little information, however, on how close the two men are.

Last spring, in a rare speech to the Majles deputies, Soleimani said, "What has happened in Egypt, and is happening in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain, and will undoubtedly also happen in other Arab nations, are Islamic movements that are influenced by [Iran's] Islamic Revolution. The definitive and true model in the Islamic Revolution that has influenced what is happening is the Sacred Defense [the Iran-Iraq War]." The claim, of course, is false. But it does provide a window on the current thinking of Soleimani, who almost never appears in public outside of commemorations for fallen heroes of the war.

What sort of role will General Ghasem Soleimani play in Iran's future? Only time will tell. But there is no question that, though he has preferred to stay in the shadows, he has long been one of the most powerful figures in the land.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Who will dare mount up and hound the Russians?

[ opinion ] The Arab League's observer mission to Syria has been a disappointment, but that should come as no surprise. After all, look who leads it -- Mustafa Dabi, the head of Sudanese intelligence and a leading supporter of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. If the mission had any integrity, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad probably would not have allowed it inside the country.

Let's face it. Assad has been acting with impunity while biding his time and hiding behind the veto power of his patron state, Russia. The reason for Moscow's unequivocal support of Assad is rarely mentioned in the media. Russia has a naval base in the Syrian coastal city of Tartus, and according to some military analysts it also bolsters a number of unpublicized missile and other military installations around the country. Syria has been a client state since the Cold War, and visitors to Syria will tell you about the Soviet-era hangover in much of the country's architecture and approach to the outside world.

If the global community wants to see a change in Syria, it should focus pressure on Russia. And not just in half-hearted negotiations over what rhetoric to employ against Syria in the U.N. Security Council, as took place over the past month, but with real diplomatic force. On the grassroots level, organizers should also call for demonstrations and sit-ins in front of Russian embassies around the world. It will take a lot to make Russia blush over human rights violations in Syria, but in the absence of Western intervention or a NATO strike, there may be no better solution.

The West lacks the political will to help the Syrian opposition with a NATO action similar to the one in Libya. And perhaps this is a blessing, considering the fact that thousands of unreported civilian casualties might have been incurred as a result. Many Syrians cry with relief that, unlike Libya, their country has no oil and therefore will not prompt an expensive intervention that Syria could not reimburse.

Nor are Syria's Arab neighbors willing to pressure Assad beyond a certain point. Iraq, already flirting with its Persian neighbor, seems immune to the Iranophobia that afflicts some other Arab countries. It has refused to enforce the Arab League's sanctions against Syria and remains friendly with Assad. Jordan, too, has refused to join in, citing the grave consequences to Jordanian businesses if trade were to be disrupted between the two countries.

Meanwhile, at least 35 protesters have been shot dead by security forces across Syria despite the observer mission's presence. Hundreds of thousands have taken to the streets in protest, enduring, according to the opposition, tear gas and the newly introduced "nail bomb." Yet the best the Russians can do is to call the mission "reassuring."

Particularly troubling are the anecdotes of horrendous violence that are starting to emerge. Though difficult to verify independently, there are reports of sectarian bloodshed, rape, abduction, even beheadings, which evoke the eerie beginning of Iraq's bloody civil war. Many Syrians admirably insist that "all Syrians are one people," that their country can and will rise above sectarianism. But quietly, many fear that Syria will not be able to avoid the sectarian violence that has plagued its eastern neighbor Iraq and, for decades, its neighbor to the west, Lebanon.

If the status quo continues, Syria may very well be headed in that direction. The opposition will acquire arms. Many of its supporters already have. Syrian security forces who, thanks to the Russians, are not under an arms embargo will continue to escalate the conflict. And so the vicious circle will turn, and more and more Syrians will be killed.

The United States missed many opportunities to become a major player in this arena. Maybe this is because it rendered itself irrelevant by disengaging from Syria completely during the Bush administration, and barely reengaging during the Obama administration. Or maybe because it was slow to align itself with the opposition in Egypt. Yet it was swift and ultimately successful in pushing for change in Libya. Syria is not such a simple case. And neither the West nor the Syrian opposition want military intervention.

Maybe Barack Obama can exert some influence on Moscow behind closed doors. Maybe it is at last time to hound the Russians.

Views are the author's own.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Oh, the weather outside is frightful...

[ dispatch ] Christmas is not an official holiday in Iran, still it makes its presence known. While Armenians, Assyrians, and other Christian minorities have long celebrated the date, a growing number of non-Christian middle-class families mark it as a joyous occasion, as well. There might not be an exchange of gifts, but there are Christmas parties and decorations in full swing. And yet the gap between poor and rich is hard to ignore even on this happy occasion.

Though predominantly Muslim, Iran is home to a number of Christian communities. Armenians and Assyrians practice traditions dating to the early days of Christianity. There are Greek Orthodox and other denominations, as well. While Assyrians celebrate Christmas on December 25 as in the West, the fact that many other Iranian Christians celebrate it at different times -- the Armenians, for instance, on January 19 -- testifies to their diversity and ancient history. Isfahan and Orumieh have thriving Armenian communities where, although Christmas is sometimes acknowledged by the authorities, it is still not officially celebrated. So people there as elsewhere in the country are left to their own devices to mark the day.

In Tehran, by Christmas Eve the shops on Mirzay-e Shirazi Street, a few blocks from Haft-e Tir Square, had already made a killing selling cards, decorations, and trees. Many products were Chinese imports, but there were also European delicacies and even some items crafted by local artisans.

In a shop owned by two charming middle-aged men, I found dozens of Christmas cards priced around 4,500 rials, or $3 each. There were clay statues of Santa Claus, angels, and stars. A couple of Armenian ladies shopped for decorations. Their conversation began in Farsi. "So how much for this?" said one of the women, holding an arrangement of green branches wrapped in red and white ribbons.

"Thirty thousand tomans," one of the shopkeepers answered. About $25.

Surprised at the high price, the ladies started to bargain in Armenian. My Armenian is minimal, but I fully understood the phrase "Thirty is too much!"

A store on the opposite side of the street had set up a nativity scene in its window. Three men were offering baby Jesus, resting in the arms of Mary, their gifts. Here no one has forgotten that one of the three wise men was from Persia. In a park a few hundred yards away stands a marble statue of St. Mary. On the park's opposite side there is St. Sarkis Cathedral, where Armenians worship. The story of Jesus's birth and Mary's ordeal are told again and again in the Qur'an and the masterpieces of classical Persian literature.

Christians aside, many European- and American-educated Iranians and urban middle-class youth use Christmas as an excuse to get together. The shopping malls around Tajrish Square are a hub for those who seek fancy holiday decorations. Shops in the Qaem bazaar had windows full of Christmas ornaments, little trees, stars, and Santas in every size and style.

A young shopkeeper told me, "You are late, we are already sold out." His windows were half empty. A girl in her early 20s entered and asked for elf hats.

"All out. I have none left," the manager said.

"Do you know if someone else has any?" the disappointed shopper asked.

"No, I am the only one who had them."

The proud shopkeeper informed me, "Every year I handpick Christmas items, and I am always sold out by Christmas Eve."

The holiday inventory is not cheap. Another store offered me one of its last plastic Christmas trees. "This is the last one that's good," said the proprietor. "I sold them for 81,000 tomans [$70]. I give this one to you for 70,000 tomans [$62]."

Smiling, I asked, "How is business?"

"Good, but I took down my Christmas items for three days." Pointed at a store a few steps away, he explained, "They closed that one down for selling Barbie dolls. I got worried." As usual, shopkeepers have to walk a fine line of caution.

Young people were going store to store buying red crystal balls and Santa dolls. Girls giggled and talked of the parties to which they were headed. Most were well-dressed, and many sported high-heel boots and name-brand handbags. Boys played with their iPhones -- around $950 a pop in Tehran -- and eyeballed the girls as they talked among themselves. The sample I encountered might not have been representative, still it seemed to me that Christmas among non-Christian Iranians was a festivity for the affluent, trying to catch up with global trends.

North of Tajrish Square, outside the Tandis shopping center, children begged those in the passing crowd to buy their cards. One sat on his knees beneath a lamppost, his little hands pushed firmly into his pockets. He shivered in the chill breeze. Inside the mall, shoppers navigated around a large Christmas tree into the United Colors of Benetton store, where prices were particularly extravagant.

It's hardly a Christmas story without a matchstick girl. Near the entrance to the Tajrish bazaar, a young lady sold woolen socks in different colors. She had arranged them on a box, and herself sat on a smaller box. Wearing glasses and a clean dark headscarf, she seemed too intelligent to be selling socks. Calmly, quietly, she read a book. There was an immense sense of dignity about her that commanded respect. A passerby saw her and grabbed his camera to take a snapshot. Then he hesitated, lowered his camera, and instead bought a pair of socks.

Afterward, I approached her, bearing a brace of red-and-brown socks, and asked, "How much for a pair of these?"

"Four thousand tomans. They are very warm, sir," she said.

I looked into her eyes. They were calm, warm, resigned, and yet determined. From a store nearby I heard,

Oh, the weather outside is frightful,

But the fire is so delightful,

And since we've no place to go,

Let it snow! Let it snow! Let it snow!

Photos: Tehran 2010. More here.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Standard Time (IRST), GMT+3:30

8:30 a.m., 12 Dey/January 2 Our columnist Muhammad Sahimi provides an update on the report that Iran has completed the first successful test of a nuclear fuel rod produced within the country:

ISNA, the Iranian Students News Agency, reported that the fabricated fuel rod contains natural uranium: "The fuel rod has so far been radiated for 1500 MW hours, has successfully passed the preliminary neutron test for the level of its radioactivity, as well as the test for non-deposition of nuclear materials in the reactor at several different strengths, and is currently in the core of the Tehran Research Reactor [TRR] and is being radiated for long-term tests."

The announcement implies that Iran has overcome two important hurdles in its pursuit of the ability to produce its own nuclear fuel: removing the contaminants from the fuel materials, as well as manufacturing the fuel rods. Given sufficient natural uranium resources, Iran will be able to produce fuel for the TRR, the full-scale Bushehr reactor, and a reactor with a capacity of about one third of Bushehr's that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin in the province of Khuzestan, which is now in the design stage.

Meanwhile, in a speech on Saturday to members of the Iranian diplomatic corps, Saeed Jalili, the country's chief nuclear negotiator and secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council, said that Iran has informed the 5+1 group -- the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany -- that it is ready to resume nuclear negotiations.

6 a.m., 12 Dey/January 2 According to a statement on the website of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and state media reports, Iran has produced its first nuclear fuel rod. The rod -- which contains the pellets of enriched uranium that constitute a nuclear reactor's fuel -- was reportedly loaded into the core of the Tehran Nuclear Reactor in a successful test. According to the Tehran Times, Iran will now likely move forward to

convert fuel rods into fuel plates to power the Tehran research reactor, which produces radioisotopes for cancer treatment.

Iran has constructed an advanced plant at the Isfahan nuclear facility for manufacturing nuclear fuel plates. With the construction of the plant, Iran is now among the few countries that can manufacture both nuclear fuel rods and plates.

The nuclear plant for converting enriched nuclear fuel into fuel rods was inaugurated in Isfahan in early spring 2009.

Iranian officials had previously said that the technology for producing nuclear fuel plates does not differ greatly from the technology for producing nuclear fuel rods.

An Associated Press report on the story described the rod's production as "another step" in the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities

despite United Nations sanctions and measures by the United States and others to stop the nation's atomic work and shut down any possible pathways to weapons production. Iran has long said it is forced to seek a way to manufacture the fuel rods on its own, since the sanctions ban it from buying them on foreign markets.

Another Tehran Times item declared, "This great achievement will perplex the West."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

[ quote, unquote ] The first meaningful votes in the 2012 presidential race will be cast Tuesday when Iowa holds its Republican Party caucus. Although economic issues dominate the race, foreign policy is also playing an important role. The Republican candidates perceive the latter as generally a strong suit for President Barack Obama, because of what are considered his numerous successes, such as ending the Iraq war, ratcheting up the Afghanistan war as he promised during the 2008 campaign, killing Osama bin Laden, and intervening in Libya without putting U.S. soldiers on the ground. The primary exception is the president's Iran policy, which the Republicans claim to be "weak." Thus the rhetoric about Iran and its nuclear program, which in turn brings in the subject of support for Israel, has been fierce.

Minnesota Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann

After Britain closed the Islamic Republic's embassy in London in response to the attack on its Tehran embassy, Bachmann applauded the move, saying that if she were president, "That's exactly what I would do. We would not have an embassy in Iran. I would not allow that to be there." Recall that President Jimmy Carter cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. Since then, there has not been any U.S. embassy in Tehran, where the Swiss legation represents American interests. Bachmann's campaign denied that she had committed a gaffe and claimed that she meant to say "if the U.S. had an embassy in Tehran."

In an interview on February 23, 2007, Bachmann discussed the situation in Iraq, claiming,

Iran is the trouble maker, trying to tip over apple carts all over Baghdad right now because they want America to pull out. And do you know why? It's because they've already decided that they're going to partition Iraq. And half of Iraq, the western, northern portion of Iraq, is going to be called the "Iraq State of Islam," something like that. And I'm sorry, I don't have the official name, but it's meant to be the training ground for the terrorists. There's already an agreement made. They are going to get half of Iraq and that is going to be a terrorist safe haven zone where they can go ahead and bring about more terrorist attacks in the Middle East region and then to come against the United States because we are their avowed enemy.

She did not explain how she became aware of this "agreement."

In another interview, Bachmann explained her views on Iran thus: "What do we do? What I would do about that is I would put every option on the table. Every option. And make sure they never ever obtain that weapon. So what I would do is make available to Israel the ability to be able to defend herself. I would be willing to sell them the refueling tankers they need [to bomb Iran], the jet aircraft they need." In fact, Israel already has one of the most modern air forces in the world. Arrogating the power to determine what the sovereign nation of Egypt would do, she said, "We would have the ability to move Patriot ballistic missiles and Egypt's ballistic missiles in the Gulf region. We could have a blockade of the ports." The latter move, of course, constitutes a declaration of war. She continued,

Today we have no meaningful economic sanctions on Iran. As president I would need to work with our allies to make sure we have those meaningful sanctions. We need to have a war plan established at the Pentagon. Only a fool wants war, but the best way to prevent war is to be prepared for one. And we need to make sure Iran's central bank doesn't have the economic wherewithal to be able to continue to function. Iran obtains its money through oil and through the sale of oil. And if we can enlist allies to boycott those oil sales or boycott refined shipments of oil going into Iran we will go a long way to stopping that process.

On November 22, in a CNN-sponsored foreign policy debate in Washington, Bachmann claimed, "They've stated, as recently as August just before President [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad came...to the U.N. General Assembly. He said that he wanted to eradicate Israel from the face of the Earth. He has said that if he has a nuclear weapon he will use it to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth. He will use it against the United States of America."

And, during a debate sponsored by Fox News on December 15, Bachmann said, "We know without a shadow of a doubt Iran will take a nuclear weapon, they will use it to wipe our ally Israel off the face of the map. And they've stated that they will use it against the United States of America."

Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich

On July 17, 2006, amid the military conflict between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah, Gingrich released a statement discussing the prospects for another world war:

Like you, I spent the past week viewing the events in the Middle East with growing concern. In the 13 weeks that I have been bringing you my thoughts in Winning the Future, I have shared with you directly many challenges facing us. But no challenge confronting America is greater than the one I am writing about today. And no challenge requires us to be more candid and more direct about what victory will require.... I am now firmly convinced that the world confronts a situation that is frighteningly similar to a Third World War, one every bit as serious and dangerous as the two great conflicts of the 20th Century.

The recent attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel -- with the active political, financial and military support of Iran and Syria -- are just the latest acts in this war. It is a war that pits civilization and the rule of law against the dictatorships of Iran and Syria and the terrorist groups of Hezbollah and Hamas that they support. It is also a war that pits civilized nations against Islamic terrorist groups around the world, including, most significantly (but not exclusively), the al-Qaeda network. The nature of the threat -- with Iran at the epicenter -- is at its core ideological. The threat to the United States is an ideological wing of Islam that is irreconcilable to modern civilization as we know it throughout most of the world. The United States and her allies face a long war with this irreconcilable wing of Islam.

Two months later, Gingrich said, "The American people are very prepared to believe we face extraordinary threats from a nuclear North Korea and an Iranian regime actively seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Any actions in Iraq need to be recast in terms of their impact on Iran. A weak America in Iraq will be unable to stop Iran. Stopping Iran is potentially literally a matter of life and death."

In November 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), reflecting the consensus judgment of the U.S. intelligence community's 16 agencies, on Iran's nuclear program was released; it stated that if Iran ever had a nuclear weapons program, it had ceased in 2003. In response, Gingrich declared, "A handful of highly partisan State Department bureaucrats wrote a document that is so professionally unworthy, so intellectually indefensible and so fundamentally misleading that it is damaging to our national security." The claim that the NIE was drafted by State Department employees appears to be entirely without basis.

How about sanctioning Iran? In December 2010, Gingrich wrote,

The administration should also sanction those companies already in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act, which has been on the books for almost 15 years. Penalizing one energy company would send a clear signal that Washington has a policy of zero tolerance when it comes to enabling the Iranian nuclear program.

Second, the Treasury Department should build on its designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a supporter of terrorist by designating major IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] entities that are dominant players in the Iranian energy sector -- sending shockwaves through Iran's energy partners that they are doing business with blacklisted U.S. entities.

Finally, the administration should provide the same kind of tangible, material and moral support to the Green Movement in Iran that President Ronald Reagan gave to the Solidarity movement in Soviet-dominated Poland during the Cold War. Releasing restrictions on the transfer of communications technology to the Green Movement would give its leadership the vital access it needs to satellite phones, satellite subscriptions and secure computer networks to evade Iranian censors.

In the CNN-sponsored foreign policy debate on November 22, Gingrich said that the United States should bomb Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power "as a last recourse, and only as a step toward replacing the regime." He added, "If we were serious, we could break the Iranian regime within a year starting with cutting off the gasoline supply to Iran and then, frankly, sabotaging the only refinery they have." Iran, in fact, has many refineries.

But he has also said, "The idea that you're going to wage a bombing campaign that accurately takes out all the Iranian nuclear program, I think is a fantasy. It would be a gigantic mess, enormous collateral civilian casualties." In another debate between the Republican presidential candidates, Gingrich said, "You have to take whatever steps are necessary.... First of all, as maximum covert operations -- to block and disrupt the Iranian [nuclear] program, including taking out their scientists, including breaking up their systems; all of it covertly, all of it deniable."

Former Utah Governor and U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman

In an interview with CNN on November 16, Huntsman took an extremely hawkish position on Iran. CNN's Pierce Morgan asked him, "What is the right way to deal with Iran if they are going to flagrantly ignore any form of international community opinion on this?" Huntsman replied that war with Iran may be inevitable:

Well I think that's exactly what's going on. You can layer sanction upon sanction and I think in the end the sanctions aren't going to have much of an impact. Sanctions have already been taken to the U.N. Security Council. You can go for another round of sanctions and that probably should be tried. You can go after their state bank. You can sanction the elite. You can sanction those traveling in and out. You can tighten the noose in ways that will make life a lot more difficult from an economic standpoint. But my sense is that their ultimate aspiration is to become a nuclear power, in which case sanctions probably aren't going to get you there. And that means [it's] likely we're going to have a conversation with Israel at some point. As we approach that point it's important for the United States to remind the world what it means to be a friend and ally of the United States.

In another interview, on December 13, Huntsman went even further. CNN's Erin Burnett asked him, "Do you think at this point, unless we're going to commit, and I'm curious whether you would commit to full on military conflict with Iran, that we have to accept that they will eventually be a nuclear power? It's more important to figure out how to deal with that than to yell and scream about it happening when it is inevitable anyway."

Huntsman replied, "Well, I think they've already made the decision to go nuclear." The CIA and most experts continue to say the opposite.

Burnett then asked, "So, if push comes to shove and this is important, I'm not saying this is something you do tomorrow, but if push comes to shove, if what was between them and a nuclear weapon or there was an uncertainty, required troops invasion, you'd do it?"

Huntsman replied, "I can't live with the implications of not doing it. I can't live with the thought of what a nuclear Iran brings to the region and what they said about Israel, which is our centerpiece alliance in the region. I can't live -- I can't live with the world with a nuclear Iran. So, then, you say, what do you do? And realistically, you got to have all options on the table. You got to be prepared to use all elements of national power."

Note that the Huntsman Corp., the chemical company founded by Huntsman's father, enjoyed commercial relations with Iran for years. A Tehran-based subsidiary that was purchased when Jon Huntsman worked for the company sold polyurethane in Iran, for which it was rebuked by the group United Against Nuclear Iran, because the polymer could be used -- and the operative word is could -- in solid fuel for Iran's missiles. Never mind that Iran's petrochemical industry produces the same polymer.

Texas Congressman Ron Paul

Paul for years has consistently been opposed to war and intervention in foreign countries. He has explicitly opposed attacking Iran to prevent nuclear proliferation, or under the excuse of defending Israel. In the aforementioned Fox News-sponsored debate on December 15, he said that war-weary Americans would support his antiwar posture. "I would be running with the American people because it would be a much better policy," Paul said, stressing that there is no evidence Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon. He added, "To me, the greatest danger is that we would overreact." Paul also said that the anti-Iran propaganda is similar to the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, a war he opposed because he did not believe the misinformation that Saddam Hussein possessed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. "That's how we got involved in the useless war in Iraq and lost so much in Iraq," Paul said.

On December 30, Paul said in a campaign appearance in Iowa that as president he would not order military attacks on Iran because "they don't threaten our national security. If some other country [presumably Israel] thought they had to go to war with them, that is their business. He reiterated that there is no proof that Iran is producing a nuclear weapon.

In another campaign speech he delivered on the same day in Atlantic, Iowa, Paul said that the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies on Iran are "acts of war" that are likely to lead to actual military conflict. Responding to Iran's threat that it will close the Strait of Hormuz if the West does not allow it to sell its oil, Paul said that blocking the strait would be "so logical" as Iran would have no other recourse. He continued, "If the Strait of Hormuz closes, this whole financial thing could come down on our head. What would happen if oil doubled in price within a month or two? I think the solution is to do a lot less a lot sooner, and mind our own business, and we wouldn't have this threat of another war." See this amusing cartoon on the issue.

Texas Governor Rick Perry

Perry has said that his evangelical Christian faith compels him to defend Israel -- as in an article he wrote for the neoconservative Weekly Standard -- and that the United States should do anything necessary to prevent "that madman in Iran" -- presumably Ahmadinejad -- from having nuclear weapons. Perry has claimed that there are two types of Islam, one "moderate type" espoused by Saudi Arabia (in fact, the most radical Muslim extremists, such as the Salafis and the Taliban, are supported by Saudi Arabia), and a "radical type" emanating from Iran. In response to Paul, Perry said, "You don't have to vote for a candidate who will allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Because America will be next."

In an interview, ABC's Christiane Amanpour asked if a President Perry would advocate a preemptive American strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, to which he responded,

Well, here's where we find ourselves with two really bad positions. We're either going to allow this madman [Ahmadinejad] to have become in control of a nuclear device or we are going to have a nuclear strike, or excuse me, a military strike to keep that from occurring, either the Israelis unilaterally, or -- in a bilateral, or multilateral way -- with their allies.... I never would take a military option off the table when it comes to dealing with this individual.

After the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued its latest assessment of Iran's nuclear program in November, Perry released the following statement:

The new IAEA report is the latest indicator that the regime in Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Evidence that this includes work on a nuclear warhead design is particularly alarming -- and again puts the lie to Tehran's claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful, energy-related purposes.

President Obama's policy on Iran, based on outreach and limited sanctions, has failed. This administration has labored under the misconception that Iran's nuclear program could be negotiated away. But the plain truth revealed in the IAEA report is that despite years of negotiations, Tehran's relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons continues.

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose grave threats to not only American interests abroad, but also to our security at home. Iranian misconduct has met with little if any response from the Obama administration, and has included targeting Americans in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, supporting terrorist groups, threatening our allies, and even plotting to assassinate a foreign ambassador in Washington, D.C. This activity will only increase if Tehran obtains a nuclear weapon and feels it has impunity to act as it pleases.

Appearing on CNN on November 3, Perry was asked by anchor John King, "If that [IAEA] report says Iran is progressing, moving closer to having a nuclear weapon, there's a lot of talk in the region that Israel might take preemptive action. Would a President Perry say, 'Go ahead, Mr. Prime Minister, green light that?'"

Perry responded, "Obviously, we are going to support Israel, and I've said that we will support Israel in every way that we can, whether it's diplomatic, whether it's economic sanctions, whether it's overt or covert operations up to and including military action. We cannot afford to allow that madman in Iran to get his hands on nuclear weapons, period."

"Even if it started a war in the region?" King asked. Perry replied, "We cannot allow that madman to get his hands on a nuclear weapon, because we know what he would do with it."

Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney

After the IAEA report's release, Romney wrote an op-ed published by the Wall Street Journal in which he addressed the emergence of the Green Movement in the wake of the disputed Iranian presidential election of June 2009:

Here -- more than a year before the eruption of the Arab Spring -- was a spontaneous popular revolt against a regime that has been destabilizing the region, supporting terrorism around the world, killing American soldiers in Iraq, and attacking the U.S. for three decades. Yet President Obama, evidently fearful of jeopardizing any further hope of engagement, proclaimed his intention not to "meddle" as the ayatollahs unleashed a wave of terror against their own society. A proper American policy might or might not have altered the outcome; we will never know. But thanks to this shameful abdication of moral authority, any hope of toppling a vicious regime was lost, perhaps for generations. [...]

Si vis pacem, para bellum. That is a Latin phrase, but the ayatollahs will have no trouble understanding its meaning from a Romney administration: If you want peace, prepare for war.

I want peace. And if I am president, I will begin by imposing a new round of far tougher economic sanctions on Iran. I will do this together with the world if we can, unilaterally if we must. I will speak out forcefully on behalf of Iranian dissidents [no one has asked him to]. I will back up American diplomacy with a very real and very credible military option. I will restore the regular presence of aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf region simultaneously. I will increase military assistance to Israel and coordination with all of our allies in the region. These actions will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.

During his previous campaign for the presidency in 2008, Romney ran a TV ad called "Jihad" that appeared to conflate the interests of Iran's Shia theocratic rulers with violent nonstate Sunni actors such as al-Qaeda:

It's this century's nightmare, jihadism -- violent, radical Islamic fundamentalism. Their goal is to unite the world under a single jihadist caliphate. To do that, they must collapse freedom-loving nations like us. As president, I'll strengthen our intelligence services. Increase our military by at least 100,000. And monitor the calls al-Qaeda makes into America. And we can and will stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

"I do not believe we are not able to deal with Iran militarily," declared Romney at a forum held the previous year by the Republican Jewish Coalition. While avoiding the deployment of ground troops, he stated that he would consider "blockade, bombardment, and surgical military strikes."

Former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum

Santorum has called repeatedly for an attack on Iran. In response to Paul in the Fox News-sponsored debate on December 15, Santorum said of Iranians, "They have been at war with us since 1979. The IEDs [improvised explosive devices] that have killed so many soldiers [in Iraq and Afghanistan], they are manufactured in Iran." This claim has not been proved, and Santorum did not describe any evidence to support it. He continued,

Iran is not any other country. It is a country that is ruled by the equivalent of al Qaeda on top of this country. They are a radical theocracy. The principle virtue of the Islamic Republic of Iran according to President Ahmadinejad is not freedom or opportunity, it is martyrdom. The idea, Ron, that mutual-assured destruction, like the policy during the cold war with the Soviet Union, would work on Iran when their principle virtue is martyrdom, mutual-assured destruction with respect to Iran would not be any kind of idea of preventing a war, it would be an inducement to war. This is what their objective is, their objective is to in fact to create a calamity. This is what their theology teaches.

They believe that it is their mission to take on the West. They don't hate us because [of] what we do or the policies we have; they hate us because of who we are and what we believe in. And we need to make sure that they do not have a nuclear weapon, and we need to be working with the state of Israel right now. We need to use covert activities. And we need to plan a strike against their facilities and say to them that if you do not open up those facilities and close them down, we will close them down for you.

And on NBC's Meet the Press on Sunday, Santorum charged Obama with turning the United States into a "paper tiger" concerning Iran. (Note the link misidentifies the source of the interview as Fox News.) He said that as president he would issue the Islamic Republic an ultimatum to either grant observers access to its nuclear sites or "dismantle" them. If they do not comply, he said, "we will degrade those facilities through air strikes."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.