Quantcast
Channel: FRONTLINE: Tehran Bureau | PBS
Viewing all 492 articles
Browse latest View live

Analysis | Newfound Status for Iran's Regular Armed Forces

$
0
0

634386639178995139.jpgSupreme Leader puts them on near-equal footing with Revolutionary Guards in apparent bid to build unity, loyalty.

[ analysis ] To fully appreciate the political standing of Iran's regular armed forces, the Artesh, in today's Islamic Republic, the key is to take into account the impact of the ongoing feud at the top ranks of the regime. The feud, pitching the factions of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against one another in a bitter contest for power, means the Artesh is an entity that neither can afford to ignore. Given that Khamenei is the final arbiter, the true commander-in-chief, in Iran's constitutional setup, he appears to be succeeding in his attempts to shape the Artesh with the aim of further consolidating his grip on power.

As Khamenei has set out to appeal to Artesh commanders, as well as the rank-and-file, two developments are evident. First, the Artesh is increasingly idealized by the state-controlled media. This is a noteworthy trend because the regime has largely sought to ignore or sideline the regular armed forces over the Islamic Republic's 32-year history. By contrast, the Artesh is now periodically put in the spotlight when the regime in Tehran seeks to show off its self-declared military capabilities. Until recently, the Artesh had rarely if ever been given the chance to outshine the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its politically favored military counterweight.

Second, there are now a growing number of joint Artesh-IRGC military exercises and operations. This development in particular suggests that Khamenei's efforts to bring the Artesh under his tutelage might go beyond mere rhetoric and public relations campaigns by the state-run media.

In the limelight

When it comes to the Iranian armed forces, the Western media has traditionally focused on war games and the IRGC's testing of ballistic missiles, which occurs at least once a year to much fanfare within Iran. On the last few occasions, however, that the Iranian military has made headlines in the West, it was not the IRGC that was involved, but rather the naval branch of the Artesh.

The most recent development came in early October, when it was announced that Artesh naval forces had begun patrolling international waters off the coasts of Somalia and Yemen. The mission was hailed by both military and political officials as one that would catapult Iran into the ranks of the world's leading military powers. On October 9, Rear Admiral Habibullah Sayyari, head of the Artesh Navy, declared his command a regime vanguard and said that "Iran's naval forces are considered strategic." Sayyari further stated that the Artesh Navy's presence in "international waters will act to defend the policies of the Islamic Republic." This sort of rhetoric and political boastfulness by a senior Artesh commander has been rare and unquestionably reflects a new phase in the regime's approach toward the regular forces.

Senior Artesh commanders, long hungry for attention and respect from a theocratic ruling class that has viewed the regular forces as relatively uncommitted to the regime, likely welcome such new high-profile military missions. The drawback, however, is the reputational cost for the Artesh, which has benefited from its image within Iran as a nonpoliticized force.

The Artesh's new bravado, echoing the sort of bluster usually associated with the IRGC, was exemplified by Sayyari's announcement in late September that the Artesh Navy plans to "establish a powerful presence near the marine borders of the United States" and that Iranian naval forces would be deployed in the Atlantic Ocean close to the U.S. coast.

Such far-fetched goals, which scarcely reflect the Navy's actual capabilities, do not fit the Artesh's traditional defense posture; they do, however, make a nice fit with the Tehran regime's propaganda efforts. Whereas military-related propaganda has hitherto been centered on the IRGC, Khamenei has evidently opted to involve the Artesh closely as well. At least ostensibly, this is seen as amplifying deterrence of the West through the presentation of a united front among Iran's military forces.

Furthermore, Khamenei evidently enjoys associating himself with Iran's military progress and takes credit as the visionary behind the policy of self-sufficiency, or khodkafaei. When Iran launched Jamaran, its first domestically constructed destroyer, in February 2010, the Supreme Leader was present at the high-profile event at the port of Bandar Abbas and repeatedly stressed that it was he who advocated for military production when the prevailing opinion was that Iranian scientists were not up to the job. In a predictable stroke, Khamenei cast himself as the prophetic leader, if not the savior, of the Iranian people, while handing over one of Iran's biggest military production achievements to the Artesh.

There have been a number of other recent cases where the Artesh has been exalted to the point where its long-time subordinate status is hardly apparent. For example, on September 28, Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, himself a senior IRGC commander, made an important symbolic gesture when he announced the simultaneous delivery of new anti-ship cruise missiles to both the Artesh and IRGC navies.

In another case, it was an Artesh commander who took the lead in promising new measures to defend the country against external threats. This past April, the chief of the Artesh's ground forces, Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, announced that his command would undergo structural changes and, given that Iran faced a "new phase of threats," the decision had been made to construct "new bases and garrisons in many border areas of the country." The fact that an Artesh commander was tabbed to take the lead on the national stage concerning such an important political-security issue was telling.

Recent signs that the Artesh might be handed a more significant role in military affairs were also corroborated with the announcement that ground forces from the Artesh and IRGC had staged joint operations in northwest Iran in July against the militant Party of Free Life for Kurdistan (PJAK). Although there is hardly any public record of joint Artesh-IRGC operations since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, it has been assumed that they cooperate in anti-insurgency efforts in restive Baluchistan province and elsewhere in the country's ethnic-minority-dominated border regions. Of some note, however, is the timing of the announcement, which occurred in the midst of the campaign against PJAK. The IRGC has customarily taken the glory in the operational realm, relegating the Artesh to a secondary role. All of a sudden, the Artesh was placed on an equal footing with the IRGC and involved in the sort of anti-insurgency campaign to which IRGC commanders have long laid virtually exclusive claim.

Sustaining the momentum

The role of the Artesh and its ongoing transformation is a topic that has been almost entirely ignored, including within Iran. There are hardly any major studies devoted to the force in either the Persian or English languages. Furthermore, there is very little current, reliable data on the regular armed forces. What is left for the analyst is to monitor developments and hope to uncover significant trends affecting the Artesh's status in the Islamic Republic.

That and deduction from the historical record point to the strong likelihood that Khamenei has set about to much more seriously integrate the regular armed forces both with the IRGC and the ruling system as a whole. There appear to be two primary motivations for this:

First, at a time when Iran faces the heightened possibility of armed conflict with the United States and its allies, it seems natural to want to consolidate the ranks of the country's different military branches.

Second, and probably more importantly, there is the fear of insubordination among the Artesh rank and file when Khamenei needs them most -- for example, in times of internal political turmoil. This factor was clearly demonstrated when reports emerged of Artesh troops' widespread sympathy for the opposition Green Movement in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential elections and the popular protests that followed.

Whether the Artesh's star continues to rise will depend almost entirely on how Khamenei and his camp -- which, at least for now, includes the IRGC's top leadership -- perceive the internal and external threats faced by the Islamic Republic. After all, it is changes in just those perceptions that have led to the Artesh assuming a greater public profile and operational role.

Alex Vatanka, a native of Iran, is an analyst at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He is also a senior fellow at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School. A different version of this article was first published as a Viewpoint by the Middle East Institute on November 18, 2011.

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau


Dispatch | The Water Pipe Wars

$
0
0

6065041424_ce391d609f.jpgConfusing rules, conflicting agendas. Sometimes a pipe is not just a pipe.

[ dispatch ] "Who cares about the election? Will there even be one? I doubt that," the rough, edgy voice of a middle-aged man exhaling a puff of white tobacco smoke from a three-foot-long water pipe (ghelian) cut through the giggles of the youngsters sitting on the neighboring table-bed and interrupted my conversation with the waiter.

It was a cold autumn evening, and the restaurant in the Farahzad district of northwest Tehran was half open to the elements. It had been raining on and off for the past month and it had even snowed a couple of weeks before, but neither the threat of precipitation nor even chill night winds dampen the spirit of those who have few other options for finding fun outside of home. The Iranian capital's restaurants and cafés tend always to be packed, especially in popular areas such as Farahzad, Darakeh, Tajrish, and Velenjak.

I was having dinner with my girlfriend, Bahar, and had just asked the waiter for a water pipe and the story behind the "water pipe wars." The waiter, a tall, skinny lad in his early 20s, had no apparent knowledge of the current political climate. "Well," he said, with a little shiver as if he was unsure that I was not a government agent or plainclothes police officer, "it is a circus. We don't know who is who anymore." He spoke about the "morality police," the special security force responsible for enforcing behavior and dress codes, using their shorthand name: "The Amaken tell us it is OK to serve water pipes, but the police come the next day and shut down the restaurant and prohibit the smoking of the pipes. It is confusing, because we have to keep paying both of them off."

Bahar, who had just finished her dinner and lit a cigarette, said, "Of course, the Amaken are appointed by the governor who is appointed by the president, and the police are controlled by the Leader and are directed by the judiciary branch. This is all a political maneuver to win votes in the upcoming parliamentary election." The waiter looked baffled: "Judiciary what? Which election?" The group of youngsters on the neighboring table-bed erupted in laughter at the waiter's confusion. It was at this point that the middle-aged man cut into the conversation.

Bahar ignored him and picked up her cigarette with her thumb and index finger. Holding it upside down, she raised her hand and, gesturing at me with it, said, "Do you know that I can get arrested for smoking this cigarette in the street? There are so many new regulations that are being issued left and right by the police contradicting the normal laws that govern the society -- not that those were any better -- that it really is confusing." Her voice was filled with conviction, and who was I to even try to contradict her?

One of the boys in the group of youngsters, who was smoking his water pipe so forcefully that I wondered if he might turn blue at any moment, looked at me. Blowing smoke out of his mouth and nose simultaneously, he said, "Where do you live, man? Who cares about the election? Are you from outside of Iran?" His friends erupted again in laughter. "In Tehran these days, only one man rules and that is Ghalibaf," said a girl in the group, referring to the capital's mayor, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The girl, whose nose sported some small bandages indicating recent cosmetic surgery, continued in her squeaky voice, "Any place that is operated by Tehran municipality is almost a self-governed island, and neither the Amaken nor the police bother those places."

"Dameshoon garm," said the hardcore young smoker in a streetwise accent, "right on, man." "Free concerts, free entertainment programs.... Man, do you know how much a ticket is for a concert by" -- he named a popular singer -- "at Milad Tower? Sixty-five dollars per person and you're lucky if you get a ticket. We saw him in Azadegan Center" -- a municipal cultural center in the southwest of the city that Ghalibaf inaugurated in July -- "for free and not just once but several times. For 30 days, the municipality held free entertainment for the public during Ramadan. There were other shows as well." As he spoke, all of his friends except one were backing him -- "Yeah, that is cool." Then the lone holdout spoke up: "But that MF has his own plans and they are not for this parliament." Bearded, with a serious face, he seemed defiantly at odds with his friends. "He has his own agenda," he continued. "He is the next Leader's pet."

ghahvekhune.gifThe middle-aged man reentered the conversation in his hoarse voice: "There is another cultural center run by the municipality located in southeast Tehran on Khavaran Expressway called Ibn Sina. It was inaugurated at the same time as Azadegan. They had free programs there as well." He concluded, referring to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "I guess Ahmadinejad has lost the capital."

Across from our three tables and just next to the restaurant's decorative fountain, now shut off, a group of conservative types sat, eating dinner. They looked as if they were from out of town. One, a stout, bearded man who was sitting with his back to our table, turned and with a Semnani accent said, "Tehran maybe, but not the provinces."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter. Photo via Welgard blog. Photo above and on homepage by yasin-m via Flickr

News | Oil Prices Heat Up as Sanctions Strike Iran Energy, Bank Sectors

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Standard Time (IRST), GMT+3:30

FireDriver1.jpg11:50 p.m., 1 Azar/November 22 Crude oil prices rose Tuesday in reaction to the announcement of new sanctions against Iran's energy and banking industries by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. The coordinated action, announced Monday, was a response to the report earlier this month by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that expressed "serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." (See here for an analysis of the report by Tehran Bureau columnist Muhammad Sahimi.)

While an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman dismissed them as an ineffectual ploy in a Western "media and psychological warfare campaign," the new sanctions, aimed at cutting off the supply of equipment to Iran's oil industry and raising obstacles to the Islamic Republic's ability to conduct international financial transactions, may continue to drive oil prices higher, say some analysts. Carsten Fritsch, with Germany's Commerzbank, told DPA that the sanctions indicate that a "risk premium is warranted." And the energy sector in Iran -- the world's third leading producer of crude oil -- could indeed take a hit:

The sanctions also ban supplies to Iran's petrochemical industry, which exported 8 billion dollars worth of products last year, according to Ehsan Ul-Haq, an expert with the British energy consultancy KBC.

In addition, the financial sanctions could make trade with oil and petroleum products even more difficult for the country, which has already been affected by previous sanctions, he said. This might lead to less oil production in Iran and higher prices globally.

"At the moment, there is enough oil" to supply global markets, Ul-Haq said. "But if demand rises, there could be a problem."

Fritsch added that it might become difficult to finance new oil fields and to invest in Iran's energy sector if ties to the country's banks are cut. However, China might chose to step on and make up for missing Western funds, he said.

NightFireHoses2a.jpgAnalysts who spoke with Bloomberg Businessweek voiced similar views, and suggested that the effect on oil prices was being magnified by the ongoing turmoil in Egypt:

"There are new sanctions on Iran and rioters back on the streets of Cairo reminding us of the geopolitical risks that impact this market," said Michael Wittner, the head of oil- market research at Societe Generale SA in New York. "The geopolitical risks never went away, but had moved to the background and are now back in the forefront." [...]

"Concern about the Iranian sanction seems to be supporting the oil market," said Tom Bentz, a director with BNP Paribas Prime Brokerage Inc. "People are just worried about potential military action, whether that happens or not." [...]

"There is still political concern about Iran and Egypt and it's making people worried that we may see some supply problems," said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy & Economic Research in Winchester, Massachusetts.

A Wall Street Journal report underscored the psychological issues, while it also suggested that Iran may have places to turn for help:

Although it does not supply oil directly to the U.S., fears are that if its barrels were removed from the global portfolio it would pinch the remaining available supply. Markets are also nervous about reaction to the measures from Iran and its supporters; Russia protested against the U.S. sanctions, calling them "unacceptable."

OilQuietDawn3.jpg

"This Iran issue is getting thornier and thornier," said Pete Donovan, a vice president and oil trader at Vantage Trading. "You never know how that's going to go. It's a big powder keg."

[O]thers questioned how effective the sanctions will be or how much impact they may ultimately have.

"The lack of complete global unity on Iran does limit the effectiveness of the already significant sanctions on the country," J.P. Morgan said in a research note.

On Tuesday, as well, European Union diplomats reached agreement on a plan to expand the E.U.'s list of sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities by approximately 200 names. The move, also intended to ratchet up pressure on the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program, is scheduled for formal approval at a December 1 meeting of the union's foreign ministers. According to Reuters, "In addition to extending the sanctions list, EU governments are also expected to discuss proposals by France and Britain for further sanctions, such as targeting the Iranian central bank. France also wants to target the oil industry...[and] said on Tuesday it was pushing hard to persuade its EU counterparts to move quickly on its proposal."

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

News | Details Emerge on 'Iran' Daily Raid; IRI Bigs Slam Oil Sanctions

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Standard Time (IRST), GMT+3:30

IranWebFrontPage.jpg1:25 p.m., 2 Azar/November 23 The attempt to arrest Ali Akbar Javanfekr, director of IRNA, Iran's official news agency, in a raid on the newspaper Iran, of he which he is the publisher, continues to be the subject of intense debate. In protest at what occurred, including the arrest of 40 of its staffers -- all now released -- Iran's Tuesday edition ran with a completely blank white cover (the online version is seen here). Tehran Prosecutor Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi said that Javanfekr resisted the arrest warrant and incited the Iran staff. According to Dolatabadi, Javanfekr ignored a warning he had been given about making statements that could cause "anxiety" in the society. He denied that tear gas was used in the attack on the paper. Among those arrested were Abdol Reza Soltani, Iran's deputy managing editor for political affairs. He told Dolat-e Ma, a website close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "The basic lesson that we have learned from Ahmadinejad is to defend the ideals of the Revolution with our lives." The situation became so critical that the president cancelled a planned trip to Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province. Reports indicate that Ahmadinejad had threatened that if Javanfekr were not released, he would go to Iran's headquarters and personally free him.

Hassan Roozitalab, a former Iran reporter and a supporter of Ahmadinejad, wrote in his blog that the attack on Iran was similar to the attack on the University of Tehran dormitories in July 1999. He said, as well, "The incident reminds us of the mobs on the newspapers in the [Mohammad] Mosaddegh era." Gozaresh-e Aghaliat (Minority Report), a pro-Ahmadinejad website, reported that during the attack, the security agents uttered profanities against the president and maligned his chief of staff and closest adviser, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, and Hamid Baghaei, his vice president for executive affairs. Once at the detention center, the agents reportedly told the staffers, "You are all puppets of Mashaei and Baghaei. Rest assured that we will soon bring Ahmadinejad here blindfolded."

Elias Hazrati, publisher and managing editor of Etemad, the reformist newspaper that this week was barred from publishing for two months, said that the reason his paper was closed -- in addition to its publication of an interview with Javanfekr in which he attacked Ahmadinejad's critics -- was that it had published news about Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the Green Movement leaders who have been under house arrest sine February. On Sunday, Etemad reported that Mohammad Javad Larijani, deputy judiciary chief for human rights, had said in New York that Mousavi and Karroubi were arrested under a judicial order. Iran's Supreme National Security Council has banned the media from publishing anything about the two opposition leaders.

***

Majles Speaker Ali Larijani said that Iran will reconsider its relations with the European Union, in view of the new sanctions imposed this week by Great Britain, along with the United States and Canada, and further ones being planned by the union at the urging of Britain and France. "The European Union should not think that its action will meet with no response," he said, adding, "What the U.S. and Britain do is a sign of their backwardness." Referring to the recent resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that the Islamic Republic has not been fulfilling its obligations to prove that its nuclear program has no military objective, Larijani emphasized, "There has been no new development in our nuclear program to prompt the approval of a new resolution. Thus, the root cause of the resolution must be elsewhere. It is the developments in the region. The dictators supported by the West have been toppled one after another and, therefore, the U.S. and Britain exhibit political stubbornness." Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the Majles's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said that the Iranian parliament will soon consider legislation to downgrade Iran's diplomatic relations with Britain.

Major General Hassan Firoozabadi, chief of staff of the armed forces, said, "The Islamic Republic of Iran has proven, as a regional and worldwide power, that it will not retreat from any sanctions or injustice.... Despite the sanctions of the West and the Americans we have been able, through God's mercy, to overcome such sanctions and grow in strength in the region and worldwide."

Firoozabadi's deputy for intelligence and operations, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, warned that the continuing pressure on the country and the pursuit what he called the project to instill "fear of Iran" will force the Islamic Republic to reconsider its military strategy. "The history of the Iranian nation testifies that aggression against others and [even] considering about it have never been part of our thinking, and we have never had any doubts about giving a firm response to threats. But the Supreme Leader said recently that a threat must be responded to by a threat, and this implies reconsidering the defense strategy of the Iranian nation," he said.

Ahmad Ghaleh Bani, chief executive of the National Iranian Oil Company, said that Iran is not concerned about the sale of its oil to Europe. He was reacting to the suggestion by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that the world should consider sanctioning Iran's oil and gas industry. A statement issued by Sakozy's office said that France is asking the United States, Canada, and Britain, as well as Japan and the European Union, to impose "unprecedented" sanctions, including freezing the assets of Iran's central bank and suspending the purchase of Iranian oil, a statement that was applauded by U.S. Senators John McCain (R-Arizona) and Joseph Lieberman (Ind-Connecticut). Ghaleh Bani said that Iran does not export any oil to France, and sells very little oil to the E.U. in general.

Meanwhile, Turkish President Abdullah Gul warned the West about its escalating confrontation with Iran. In an interview with London's Telegraph, Gul said, "Iran is a very important country in the region, with its potential, its history and its culture. The situation in a way is turning into another era of Cold War." The Guardian reported Gul as saying of Iran's leaders, "It is important to put oneself in their shoes and see how they perceive threats," referring to Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal. Gul said that Turkey was opposed to military attacks to address Iran's nuclear program. "Looking at the Middle East, one has to have a comprehensive approach [to disarmament]," he added. "A piecemeal approach would not yield the same results."

***

There have been several U.S. reports in the United States that two CIA operative networks have been identified in Iran and Lebanon, and dozens may have been arrested. CBS News reported that the Lebanese Hezbollah has unraveled the CIA's spy network. According to the report, over the past several months, several foreign spies working for the agency were arrested by Hezbollah. In June, the group made its first announcement to that effect, which was denied by the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. A month earlier, Iranian Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi announced that 30 people who had spied for the United States and Israel had been captured, and a total of 42 spies had been identified (the additional 12 may be those captured by Hezbollah). The Ministry of Intelligence stated that the spy network, set up by CIA operatives in several countries, attempted to lure Iranian citizens into espionage under the guise of assisting with U.S. visas, permanent residency, and job and study offers. The CIA operatives, according to the ministry, gathered information from "universities and scientific research centers, and in the field of nuclear energy, aerospace, defense and biotechnology industries, oil and gas pipelines, telecommunication and electricity networks, airports and customs, the security of the banking and communication systems," by using "U.S. embassies and consulates in several countries, particularly "the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Malaysia." There was no U.S. response at the time. ABC News now reports that the Iranian claim was accurate.

***

Mahan Air, Iran's second largest airline, has purchased an Airbus 310-304 that, for 20 years, transported Germany's chancellor and cabinet. The jet was first sold to a German firm, which it sold to a Ukrainian investor for 3.1 million euros, who in turn sold it to Mahan Air at unknown price.

***

In an important but little-noted development, Lieutanant Brigadier General Yadollah Javani, the ultra-hardline head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' political directorate, has been replaced. The new head of the directorate is Ali Ashraf Nouri, who was previously deputy commander of the Basij for political affairs. Javani has been appointed as an adviser to cleric Ali Saeidi, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's representative to the Guards.

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Opinion | Humanitarian Intervention or Naked Military Aggression?

$
0
0
In the view of this columnist, there is no doubt that the Tehran regime has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the vast majority of the Iranian people. There is no question that the ruling elite has squandered Iran's resources, violated each and every right of the Iranian people, made corruption a routine part of its rule, and imprisoned, tortured, and murdered some of Iran's best children. This article is not about the regime; it's about the opposition and what it can or should do, in my opinion. It's also about the role of the Western powers, if any, in the democratization process.

us-iranians-tried-to-kill-saudi-ambassador.jpg[ opinion ] Over the last several weeks we have been witnessing a fierce propaganda campaign -- more precisely, psychological warfare -- against the Iranian regime by the American conservatives and neoconservatives and their confederates in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other absolute monarchies of the Persian Gulf, to "sell" the public the narrative that the Tehran regime is an existential threat to the United States and its Middle Eastern allies. It is, of course, no secret that both Israel and Saudi Arabia want the United States to attack Iran. Documents released by WikiLeaks showed that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has repeatedly urged the United States to attack Iran and destroy its nuclear facilities. The same documents also showed that other Arab leaders have also secretly advocated military action against Iran, and that King Abdullah "frequently exhorted the U.S. to attack Iran" -- "to cut off the head of the snake," as Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, put it. Since the United States invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein, Israel sees Iran as its only serious rival in the region.

The psychological operation began with the sudden announcement that U.S. authorities had discovered a plot, supposedly hatched in Iran with the approval of high-ranking officials, to assassinate al-Jubeir in Washington and carry out other terrorist attacks, employing a drunkard used-car salesman and a Mexican drug cartel. The plot was so far-fetched that even some of the Tehran regime's most ardent foes did not believe it. Revealingly, American officials suddenly stopped talking about the alleged plot. Nothing has been said about it for weeks now, almost since the moment that the alleged central Iranian American culprit, who supposedly had volunteered to "tell all," recanted anything that he might have said and pleaded innocent when he was arraigned in New York. But this first stage of the psychological warfare had already achieved its objective -- preparing the public for the propaganda that would follow.

Then came the report by Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, the United Nations special rapporteur for human rights in Iran. The report was not part of the propaganda campaign and, as expected, was rightly and harshly critical of the state of human rights in Iran, enumerating a profusion of gross violations of the rights of journalists, political activists, university students, human rights activists, women rights activists, labor activists, and others. Those who have been pushing for military attacks on Iran shed, as usual, crocodile tears for the Iranian people, a routine I examined in a July 2009 article.

Then the run-up to the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran's nuclear program began. For at least two weeks before its release, there were many suggestions that Israel was very close to attacking Iran. According to the mainstream Western media, the IAEA report was going to demonstrate decisively that Tehran was working on the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It would be a "game changing" report, we were told. Never mind that alarming reports on the imminence of Iran getting its hand on nuclear weapons have been appearing since April 1984, none of which, obviously, have ever been borne out.

The IAEA report was finally released, and proved to be anything but what the media had promised. It acknowledged, once again, that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful to nonpeaceful purposes; it reported no smoking guns; it stated that there was a nuclear weapon program prior to 2003 (although it presented no evidence even for this) that ended after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but that some research (i.e., not even development) aspects of that program might have continued, or started up again at some later date. The report was replete with such hedges as "could be," "probably," "alleged," "might be," "may be," etc. Those aspects of the report that supposedly came close to showing off a "smoking gun" were completely debunked -- demolished might be a better word -- by Gareth Porter, former IAEA inspector Robert Kelly (see also here), Robert Parry, and Seymour Hersh (see also here).

At the same time, all the talk about "Iran's threat" and possible military attacks worried many Iranians, both in the homeland and the diaspora. The Organization of Islamic Revolution Mojahedin, a leading reformist group that has been outlawed by the hardliners, issued a statement that condemned any possible military attacks on Iran, even as it condemned the Tehran regime as well, faulting it for playing a major role in creation of the crisis. Former President Mohammad Khatami said, "In the event of a war, the reformists and nonreformists will confront it together." One hundred and twenty Iranian intellectuals, journalists, political activists and others issued a statement in which they rebuked the regime for its policies and for putting Iran in danger, but also declared that they oppose military attacks on Iran under any excuse. They issued a warning to those members of the opposition in the diaspora who may be trying to make secret deals with the United States in return for its support:

The voices of protests against the policy of oppression and repression [of the people] by the Islamic Republic are rising everywhere, from inside and outside Iran. It is not appropriate for the gathering of some of the opposition to be organized with the help of the foreigners, or be driven by the interests and goals of foreign powers. There should be no secret activities behind closed doors, away from oversight of the people, and without participation of all the opposition forces that are involved in the struggle for democracy and human rights in Iran.

Another group of activists in Iran issued a statement declaring, "We do not accept war under any condition and any excuse, especially when a deeply rooted and all-encompassing social movement [to oppose dictatorship and inequality] is going on in the world and in Iran." Certain Iranian monarchists declared their opposition to military attacks on Iran, as did some Iranian communists and secular leftists; see here, here, here, here, and here.

But the statements by various groups and political figures opposing any military attack on Iran on the basis of any excuse did not put an end to the speculation. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton granted two interviews, one to the BBC and another to Voice of America, in which she strongly suggested to the opposition that if they asked the United States for help, they would receive it. She declared that the reason that the United States had not provided help to the Green Movement was that its leaders -- Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi -- did not want it (and, in fact, actively discouraged it). In essence, Clinton was encouraging some to form an alternative to the Green Movement that would forge an American alliance, because the United States recognizes that the Green Movement will not take orders from it. Of course, many monarchist factions, supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khlagh Organization, and those who have aligned themselves with the neoconservative war supporters rejected the Green Movement to begin with. But the most interesting development was that a group within the diaspora opposition that always professed its support for the Green Movement appeared to respond to Clinton's statement.

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that this group arrived at its current position advocates only after Clinton's declaration. It has been in the making for nearly two years, as I first described in a March 2010 article. Mousavi's and Karroubi's extralegal subjection to house arrest beginning in February 2011 freed this group from any pretense. Talk of supporting the leadership of Mousavi and Karroubi, and even paying lip service to it, all ended. The two were quickly forgotten by this group, as if they never existed. Whereas the people in this group protest the arrest of even the most minor figure in Iran -- as they should - they have made no effort at all to create international pressure to free the two men and their wives from house arrest. This is while, by most accounts, the two men remain extremely popular within Iran.

To justify what some members of this group advocate, a "foundation" was necessary. Efforts thus began to rewrite Iran's modern history, in order to present the United States and its role in Iran since the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup in a different light. Suddenly, members of this group began claiming that the CIA coup was not really a coup, or that it was the ayatollahs who played the most significant role in it -- it was a coup by the clerics, one of them said in a television interview. Never mind that, in April 2000, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed America's regrets for the coup.

Still others, particularly two defenders of women's rights in Iran and the man claiming that the 1953 coup was the work of the clerics, began preaching that after the end of the Cold War and globalization, such concepts as imperialism and imperialist powers that try to control and exploit the resources of developing countries -- by force if they find it necessary -- are no longer applicable. They claim that such talk is an "old discourse. Imperialism belongs to the past." This is despite the fact that the nickname of one of them in his years as a university student was "Pol Pot"; he was known for routinely accusing critics of the Soviet Union of being agents of the SAVAK, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's dreaded security apparatus.

Another activist -- for whose courage I had the highest respect while he was in Iran-- claims that such views were held only by Iranian Marxist-Leninists. Let me just respond that I have never been a Marxist or communist of any variety, have been a proud nationalist-religious man, but firmly believe in such concepts and their relevance today. Such advocates surely know that there are many more like me in Iran with the same views, however hard he would like to pretend otherwise.

I suppose the illegal invasion of Iraq, the decade-long war in Afghanistan -- a crisis and human catastrophe that has no military solution -- U.S. support of Saudi Arabia's efforts to quash the democratic movements in Bahrain and Yemen, and other interventions represent acts of benevolence, not imperialist interventions. I suppose the United States maintains 700 military bases around the world out of sheer kindness, or as vacation spots for U.S. troops.

One advocate even questioned the right to sovereignty and independence. "Independence is valuable," he wrote, "the independence that does not become a tool for survival of dictators and fascist views.... The independence that can be supported does not challenge foreign intervention with an ideological view and double standards."

What ideology and double standards? Those who "consider the presence of Western forces [in a country like Iran or Libya] as capitalism intervention, but dream night and day about becoming [another Ernesto] Che Guevara and praise his intervention in other countries as a heroic act" [emphasis mine]. So, we are to accept the following: What Che's ragtag group did -- and whatever it did was in fact against U.S. intervention in Latin America -- was equivalent to (i) the U.S. intervention in Vietnam that led to the killing of nearly 1.4 million Vietnamese people alone, not to mention those in Laos and in Cambodia by the Pol Pot regime that were directly linked with the secret U.S. bombing there that began in 1970; (ii) sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s that led to the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children as a result of malnutrition; (iii) the invasion of Iraq that led to the destruction of the country's infrastructure and the deaths of at least 70,000 civilians and possibly more than a million; and (iv) the intervention of the United States in Latin America and its support of military and fascist dictatorships from the beginning of the 20th century all the way to the coup in Honduras in 2009. We are also to forget about U.S.-supported coups in Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Peru, and Uruguay, the support for fascist regimes in many of those countries and for the criminal Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s, and the invasions of Granada and Panama. We should also forget about the involvement of the CIA in Operation Condor that led to the murders of as many as 60,000 South American political activists.

As an aside, let me remind the great equivalency's inventor of an important episode. In 1996, Lesley Stahl of CBS's 60 Minutes asked Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the following question regarding the sanctions on Iraq:

We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that is more children than [the number of people who] died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?

To which Albright responded,

I think it is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it.

The inventor of this equivalency declares himself the proponent of a "dynamic and modern view of sovereignty." And, to give some backbone to his claims, he accuses at the same time the true defenders of human rights -- as opposed to the ones in his group -- of being silent about the attacks of Russian forces on the people of Chechnya, or of Chinese forces on some of their own fellow citizens. First, no true defender of human rights supports those brutal attacks. Such claims by the inventor are too cliché to be taken seriously. All atrocities against human beings must be, have been, and will be condemned by the true defenders of human rights and human dignity. Second, once again, comparing, for example, Russia's war in Chechnya -- which, in the final analysis, is an internal matter -- to what the United States and its allies have been doing around the world is yet another indication that the author's claims have no foundation in history.

The same author also romanticizes the war in Libya as a "humanitarian intervention," not as a naked military intervention by Western powers that have been eager to control Libya for decades and use it as a bridge to control of Africa. It is as if when a group of people are bombarded, it really matters whether we say that the bombs were for "humanitarian intervention" or for military aggression. Never mind that the new Libyan government has already accepted construction of a sprawling military base in Cyrenaica on Libya's eastern coast. Twenty thousand NATO troops will be stationed in Libya, which will give AFRICOM, the U.S. command for African intervention, founded by the George W. Bush administration in 2006 but long unable to find a host for its headquarters on the continent, a suitably local home. These have been NATO's true plans for Libya all along. Never mind the background of the new Libyan leaders (see, for example, this interesting article) and the fact that one of them has pledged to impose sharia in Libya. And, never mind that if the world is to ever engage in truly humanitarian intervention -- not the dubious one in Libya, the naked military aggressions that are applauded by the author in question -- they must be carried out by nations whose recent histories are truly laudable, not the Western powers whose track records over the past century read like indictments. Iignorance is bliss. I suggest this one in particular pick up Anne Orford's Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law, to at least learn the history of this "beautiful phrase" and clear the confusion in his own mind.

The same people who condemned -- rightly so -- the trials of the reformist leaders in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian presidential election as show trials, referred to the "revolutionary vigilance of the Libyan people" when they spoke on Voice of America about the murder of Gaddafi and his supporters on streets, because presumably war crimes had became "humanitarian intervention." The same people who protest the execution of even common murderers and narcotics traffickers (as do I, as an opponent of capital punishment), and the same people who told the postelection demonstrators in 2009 to avoid any violence, now allow themselves to refer to what is plainly naked military aggression as "humanitarian intervention."

It was based on such "foundations" that a group in the Iranian diaspora seemed to be receptive to what Hillary Clinton suggested. Apparently, what had happened to Libya, as well as the effective elimination of Mousavi and Karroubi from the scene, the new IAEA report and Clinton's wink lured this group into thinking that it was not a bad idea to seek American help. One asked, "What is wrong with negotiating with the U.S., getting maximum benefits for Iran, and making the least concessions?" It is a good question. However, aside from the fact that the U.S. political-military establishment is not interested per se in spreading democracy, but rather in safeguarding and expanding what it perceives as vital U.S. interests, the better questions are: (i) Who gave anyone outside Iran the mission to negotiate with the United States on behalf of the Iranian people? (ii) Even if the man who made the proclamation had been assigned that mission -- which he was not -- why does he think that he and his like-minded friends have the skill to obtain "maximum benefits for Iran [while] making the least concessions" in negotiation with a world power?

These phenomena finally culminated in the release of a statement by a group of 184 people, supposedly to oppose war on Iran. In an email to the driving force behind the statement, I said, "What you call humanitarian is what people like me call military intervention." He responded, "That is your interpretation." True, except that I can document that it is naked military aggression, but he cannot present a shred of flimsy evidence that it is "humanitarian intervention." I wrote this to him because the original draft of the statement had a paragraph that stated the "humanitarian intervention" can be justified under certain circumstances, which was removed from the version that was issued.

In my next email to him I wrote, "We [in the opposition] should be different from the Velaayat-e Faghih regime [the rule of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] in that what we say should be precise and completely factual." I said this because, as I describe shortly, the statement is replete with inaccuracies. I told him that it should be redrafted, and to his credit he asked me to send him suggestions. But I soon realized that if my suggestions were to be addressed seriously, the statement would have to be entirely rewritten, which I thought was unlikely. For example, the statement does not even devote one full paragraph to the efforts by the neoconservatives and the war party in the United States to demonize Iran.

The statement refers to Tehran hardliners' "nuclear adventurism." Many top experts here in the United States and around the world do not believe that the hardliners want to produce nuclear weapons, but rather put themselves in a position to be able to do so, if they believe that Iran will be attacked by the United States and Israel. This is the so-called Japan model. As I have discussed here, the U.S. national intelligence estimate of November 2007 and its updated version of February 2011 actually say that Iran has not made any decision whether it wants to go ahead with production of nuclear weapons. In short, this is not adventurism, but a matter of deterrence (i.e., survival) against foreign attacks. The hardliners see that North Korea is not even threatened, simply because it has demonstrated to the world that it can make nuclear weapons, and that Iraq was invaded and occupied because the United States knew it had no such weapons. Of course, even if the hardliners were to make nuclear weapons, they are well aware that they cannot match the huge U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The statement also declares,

The new IAEA report presents evidence that indicates the determination of the [Iranian] government to deviate the nuclear program to a military path has entered a decisive step.

This is incorrect -- see the discussion of the report linked above. Even the IAEA itself speaks about a "possible" military dimension. The statement continues,

Through a hostile discourse and not cooperating with the Agency the current rulers increase day by day the possibility of military confrontation with Iran.

This is also incorrect. On what basis does the IAEA certify in each and every report on Iran that there has been no deviation of Iran's known nuclear materials, technology, and facilities from peaceful to nonpeaceful purposes? On the basis of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. The fact is all of Iran's nuclear facilities and materials are under IAEA safeguards, and monitored and inspected on a continuous basis. The dispute between the IAEA and Iran is over the contents of a laptop that many experts believe to be forged and implementation of the Additional Protocol of the safeguards agreement, which Iran did carry out on a volunteer basis from October 2003 to February 2006, stopping only when its dossier was sent to the United Nations Security Council. I have discussed these matters numerous times, and thus will not repeat myself here.

The statement mentions the ruling group's "misleading information [to the IAEA], playing with time, negotiation for the sake of negotiation, lack of cooperation, and violation of the NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty]." The IAEA has never said that Iran has given it misleading information. Neither the IAEA nor even the United States has ever claimed that Iran has committed any violation of the NPT, which would be the case only if Iran made a nuclear bomb, helped another nation to do so, or transferred its nuclear technology to a non-IAEA member state -- none of which has happened. In my aforementioned discussion of the report, I show in detail how shallow are the claims of "lack of cooperation." Therefore, most of this statement is also incorrect. My suggestion to this group is to consult an objective expert, read the IAEA reports and all the relevant international treaties before declaring their position on Iran's nuclear program based on the mainstream media. This is not about Tehran's regime, but about having a correct reading of the facts and preventing an on Iran based on falsehood and lies.

The statement declares,

The Islamic Republic is not just a violator of the dignity and rights of the citizens of land of Iran, but also a threat against worldwide peace and stability.

I completely agree with the first part, but the second part is a word-by-word copy of what the neoconservatives and the war party in the United States and their Israeli allies have been saying for a decade, and has no basis in reality.

The statement also declares,

We believe that the skill [honar] of the forces that believe in democracy and [protecting] the national and Iranian interests is aligning the foreign pressures [on the hardliners] with the domestic struggle.

There is an international society and international public opinion, and then we have Western powers and governments. The two are not the same. Who can claim with a straight face that the invasion of Iraq, the decade-long war in Afghanistan, the interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, the sale of tens of billions of dollar worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia and the Arab dictatorships of the Persian Gulf, the delivery of bunker-buster bombs to Israel and more recently to the United Arab Emirates are all in the interest of the citizens of the United States and its NATO allies, at a time when they are struggling with collapsing economies, high unemployment, and gaping divides between the rich and the poor? So what exactly is meant by "foreign pressure"?

The statement declares,

Instead of issuing generic and definitive axioms in praise or condemnation of foreign support [of Iran's democratic movement], it is better to have a national dialogue in order to identify the prerequisites, limitations, and types of the support and the tools for overseeing it to prevent personal and factional abuse of the support by the international society, takeover [of the movement] by opportunists, and creation of an alternative by suspect groups. The path to democracy to Iran passes through reliance on the neverending power of the nation and the existence of an effective and organized leadership.

There is no question that generic statements are not useful. The signatories should practice what they preach by not issuing a generic statement like the one above. There is no question that a national dialogue among Iranians is needed. But where can this dialogue take place? Not in Iran, under present conditions. So where? Should it take place in Washington, in the corridors of power and behind closed doors? There is no question that effective leadership is needed for any movement. But who are the leaders? Are they exiles and opportunists who have no popular base of support in Iran, but present themselves as representatives, spokesmen, or advisers of Karroubi? Or are they those who have been bedfellows of the neoconservatives ever since they arrived in the United States? Or are they the people who were until recently in Iran and quiet, but now that they have arrived in Washington have suddenly become ultra-revolutionaries?

Interestingly, the same people who wrote a letter to President Obama to thank him for intervening in Libya, and the same people who refer to NATO's actions there as "humanitarian intervention," declare in the statement, "Debate about Libyazation of Iran is useless and a waste of time. Foreign support can come in a variety of ways, and the type used in Libya has no relation with the current conditions in Iran." If the debate is useless, why publish a long article about the attacks on Libya and present them as "humanitarian intervention?" Why use every opportunity to justify and support them? Who needs "theoretical discussions about Libya," as the article's author has framed it, at a time we should all be focused on what to do about the catastrophic situation in Iran? And of course, this statement does leave open the door to Libyazation of Iran, if Iran's "current conditions" change. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the statement's first draft did express something along these lines.

The statement called on Iran to temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment program and to end all military aspects of its nuclear program in general. Since at least February 2007, when I spoke at a conference on U.S.-Iranian relations at the University of California in Irvine, I have supported temporary suspension of the enrichment program. But the suspension that I support is conditional. It should be done if Iran's nuclear dossier is removed from the U.N. Security Council and returned to the IAEA, its rightful place, and the sanctions imposed on Iran -- at the minimum, those that clearly hurt only the common people -- are suspended.

After the statement was issued, the group's spokesmen began their campaign. In particular, one who used to be a communist, then a pro-Khatami reformist, then a "leader" of the call for a national referendum in Iran, then talked about using the U.S. "pickax to bring democracy to Iran," appeared everywhere to defend the statement and the U.S. military intervention in Libya. He accused the signatories of the statement signed by 120 Iranian activists of saying the same things as the Islamic Republic, forgetting that a large majority of them had spent years in the Islamic Republic's prisons, when he himself was living in the United States. In one of his most absurd statements, he demanded that the nuclear program be put to a general referendum. Although no government puts such programs to a referendum, the question is, If it is put to a referendum, how does the "nuclear expert" know that the people will reject it, and based on what scientific poll or estimation?

The response of another one of the signatories to Khatami's statement that in the event of war every Iranian will defend the country is also very illuminating. He declared that, yes, he will also defend the country, but not under the current leadership of Iran's military. I suppose he will either form his own military in a hurry, fly from Washington to Iran, and defend the nation or, "live from D.C.," he will call on the Iranian people in Iran to handle the defense.

The path to democracy in Iran does not pass through Washington, Paris, London, Brussels, and Berlin, but through Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Esfahan, and Shiraz; the Alborz and Zagros mountains; the shores of the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Caspian Sea; the northern forest and the central desert. The sooner Iranians understand this, the better. Many people who like me reject the Velaayat-e Faghih regime, also object to any military attack on Iran and sanctions whose real effect is felt by the common people.

The views are the author's own. Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Blog | Manoto TV

$
0
0

[ spotlight ] Manoto ('Me & You'), part of the London-based Marjan TV network, is a Persian-language variety entertainment channel launched in October 2010 and targeted primarily at young adults in Iran. In addition to original news, music and sports programming, the channel subtitled British television dramas such as Poirot and the BBC miniseries Emma. Two of the most popular programs are reality shows: Befarmaeed Sham ('Dinner is Served'), in which participants host dinner parties and compete for the title of best cook and entertainer; and the Googoosh Music Academy, an American Idol-like talent contest hosted by Shah-era pop legend Googoosh. Viewers call in their votes for their favorite singer contestant.

Manoto's viewership rates are difficult to determine; however, anecdotal evidence about the channel's ubiquitous popularity suggests that it has gained rapidly in market share to rival more established satellite channels like BBC Persian and VOA Persian. According to a BBC report in 2008, these channels may be watched by at least 30 percent of households inside Iran.



Video (top): A mock interview with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Above: Iranian Hip Hop star Hichkass.


Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Dispatch | Iran and Qaddafi: Questions over the 'Chemical Warfare' Connection

$
0
0

khamenei+qaddafi.jpgClaims that IRI sold Libyan dictator mustard-gas shells require more scrutiny.

[ news analysis ] On November 20, iwatchnews.org, the online publication of the Center for Public Integrity, carried a report titled "Iranian Help Suspected in Secret Libyan Chemical Weapons Arsenal." It is no secret that Libya had a chemical weapons program, as did the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to a Defense Information Agency report (cited in Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? [Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009], 140), Iran initiated a chemical weapon development program in 1983 "in response to Iraqi use of riot control and toxic chemical agents." In April 1984, the Islamic Republic's U.N. representative, Farhang Rajai-Khorassani stated, ''We are capable of manufacturing chemical weapons. If the Iraqis repeat their crime, we may consider using them. But we think that to resort to retaliation can only be justified when all other means of preventing Iraq are exhausted and still Iraq repeats its crime.'' The next year, the American government, citing its intelligence agencies' monitoring of purchases of chemical components used to make chemical weapons as well as monitored radio transmissions, expressed concern that the Islamic Republic was making a major effort in producing chemical weapons (New York Times, April 25, 1985). During the final year of the war, Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi declared that "sophisticated offensive chemical weapons" and long-range missiles had been deployed along the front. In the estimation of one observer, this was "pure propaganda" (Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran [Free Press, 2008], 304).

It is generally believed that, for all that, Iran did not use chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. However, a search through the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies leads to two documents from Saddam Hussein's military reporting that concern the Iranian use of chemical agents against Iraqi forces, including in a 1983 attack. One possible explanation for this (hinted at in Jim Davis, "A Biological Warfare Wake-Up Call: Prevalent Myths and Likely Scenarios," in Jim Davis and Barry Schneider, The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm [Praeger Publishers, 2004], 300) is that they represented Iranian forces firing captured Iraqi chemical weapons back at their creators.

It was later alleged that Said Karim Ali Sobhani, an Iranian diplomat in Germany, had arranged the sale to Iran of several hundred tons of Indian-manufactured thionyl choride, a chemical used in making mustard gas (but also many other products, such as batteries, medicines, and pesticides). A U.S. Customs Service investigation in Baltimore uncovered evidence that Sobhani had arranged three shipments in 1987 and 1988 "of other chemicals needed to make mustard gas" (New York Times, June 27, 1989). Even after the war ended, there was a flurry of reports that India and Germany were allowing the sale of chemicals whose sale to Iran (and Iraq) had been banned, since they could be used to build chemical weapons. (New York Times, January 29, 30, June 27, 28, 29, July 1, 6; in one article, the reporter, Ferdinand Protzman helpfully reported that "Iran used mustard gas in its eight-year war with Iraq" and quoted one "Vezarate Defa, an official of the Iranian state import authority." Vezarat-e Defa is Persian for Ministry of Defense.) Ultimately, however, American officials were not impressed by the progress the Islamic Republic had made. "The Iranians are simply not that far along," a U.S. official said. "But getting access to precursors is one of the necessary steps in improving capability. This is enough to make a difference."

This blew over after the German government acceded to American pressure to exercise closer supervision over German companies' exports of dual-use exports. (Germany had just recovered from a scandal over exports of such items to Libya. For detailed reportage on German industries' arming Iraq, see Kenneth Timmerman's The Death Lobby.)

At the same time that Tehran was working with German companies, it also built up a working relationship with an Israeli arms merchant, Nahum Manbar, then based in Poland, according to Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman. Manbar met one of the Iranians involved in the Iran-Contra scandal while in Vienna. This led him into highly lucrative contracts for Polish tanks and, eventually, anti-chemical, -radiological, and -biological gear. Deals for mortars and ammunition, which were in the works, fell through. All this was done with the approval of the Israeli government, according to the Israeli daily Haaretz. According to Bergman, in mid-1990, Manbar was introduced by his Iran-Contra connection to Dr. Majid Abbaspour, who was, among other things, at the center of Iran's chemical weapons procurement network. Within months they drew up a contract for over $16 million under which Manbar would supply advanced Israeli know-how in this field for the Iranians. More precisely, he tried to "help [Iran] set up factories for the production of two chemical warfare agents, mustard gas and nerve gas." Yossi Mellman, the historian of Israel's intelligence apparatus, went so far as to say that Manbar was "[o]ne of the largest suppliers for Iran's chemical program." According to Israeli intelligence agencies Shin Bet and Mossad, "Manbar seriously and irreversibly damaged Israel's security, they said, noting he sold Iran equipment and information intended for use in building a mustard and nerve gas factory, probably for use against Israel."

The Obama administration believes that the People's Republic of China, despite having ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, is still exporting materiel to Iran that can be used to make chemical weapons.

Ultimately, in November 1997, the Islamic Republic of Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The iWatch article

The article in question reports that "[o]ne U.S. official said Iran may have sold the shells to Libya after the close of its eight-year war with Iraq." Another official said, "These were acquired over many years." "Iran" is said to have made a hitherto unrevealed "declaration to inspectors" that it made "2500 tons of mustard agent near the end of its war with Iraq." Unspecified Pentagon and CIA analysts asserted that

Iran fired chemical artillery shells at Iraqi troops in 1988, a contention supported by secret Iraqi government documents obtained after the fall of Baghdad in 2003. A 1987 letter, written by Iraq's military intelligence director and stamped "top secret," described three Iranian chemical attacks and sought to assess what appeared to be a growing Iranian interest in mustard agent.

"U.S. officials" have reported that "[t]he Obama administration is investigating whether Iran supplied the Libyan government of Moammar Gadhafi with hundreds of special artillery shells for chemical weapons that Libya kept secret for decades." These shells were filled with mustard gas. It continued that "a senior U.S. official" said "the shells were custom-designed and produced in Iran for Libya."

There are a number of problems will all of this.

What governmental institution declared the country's mustard agents? Why do we only hear about it almost a quarter of a century after the war ended? How does a letter written in 1987 substantiate information about an attack that took place in 1988?

And then there is that report we know of through the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies about a chemical attack dating from 1983. Why are iWatch's reporters reticent on this? Did a 1983 attack strain the authors' credulity but a 1987 attack didn't?

Then there is the question of sources. The author does not even raise the issue of the credibility of documents from Saddam's military intelligence that directly contradict the entirety of the remaining sources. Who are the unnamed Pentagon and CIA analysts and why is there no mention of how their views contradict virtually all other reports on this matter? (More on this below.)

Finally, the author shows no curiosity about how the "senior U.S. official" determined the provenance of the shells found in Libya.

The article continues,

In the late 1990's, the Clinton administration came close to demanding a special inspection of Iran after U.S. intelligence satellites observed trucks bearing artillery shells pulling up to a suspect chemical plant, according to one official.

This was certainly news to me, and I could find no other reference to this alleged event. The author shows no curiosity about why this information has taken a dozen years to emerge. Under the Clinton policy of double containment (containing both Iran and Iraq), there were many charges leveled against the Islamic Republic of Iran. An obvious question is, if the Americans had satellite images of shells loading up at a suspect chemical plant, why was nothing said about the matter? This is particularly surprising since this would have occurred around the time the Iranian government had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Allegations of Iranian use of chemical weapons

Up to this point, the only allegation about Iranian use of chemical weapons in the war with Iraq which was taken seriously was made by Stephen C. Pelletiere, a critic of American intervention in Iraq. If we were to impugn motives to him, it would seem that he was eager to discredit the claim that Saddam had used chemical weapons against his own people. Indeed, this argument was popularized by fringe elements of the anti-interventionist movement, although the Bush administration latched on to them in an effort to ramp up anti-Iran sentiment. This was challenged, most notably by Joost R. Hiltermann, particularly in his book A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, which provides a forensic examination in agonizing detail of this horror.

iWatch

iWatch's slogan is "Investigation. Impact. Integrity." But on Iran, it shows a remarkable lack of interest in investigating the impact on the integrity of the American political process of the flood of money sloshing around between hawkish institutions, the People's Mojahedin, and American military and political leaders. A search for "Mojahed" and "National Council of Resistance" came up empty.

Moreover, its discourse on Iran is unrelievedly mainstream. "Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria" are described as the "terror-linked nations." Another article is cheerfully headlined "U.S. Government Iran Sanctions Working," with no thought given to their impact on the people's daily lives. With the exception of Molly Bingham, who has unorthodox views on the Israel-Palestine conflict and produced a courageous documentary about the Iraqi resistance to the American-led coalition's occupation, and, to an extent, Barbara Slavin, iWatch's reporters do not raise uncomfortable questions.

Postscript: Coming full circle

Now that the Islamic Republic of Iran stands accused by nameless, faceless bureaucrats of supplying Qaddafi's Libya with chemical weapons, we read in an item that appeared on Debka.com, the rightist Israeli rumor site, which has been archived there but is available on allied right-wing websites, that

Tehran threw its support behind the anti-Qaddafi rebels because of this unique opportunity to get hold of the Libyan ruler's stock of poison gas after it fell into opposition hands and arm Hizballah and Hamas with unconventional weapons without Iran being implicated in the transaction.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Opinion | Breaking the Stalemate

$
0
0

Editor's note: Earlier this month, a group of Iranian activists in the diaspora issued a statement calling on the Islamic Republic to "temporarily and conditionally suspend its uranium enrichment" and to halt alleged "military aspects" of the program as well. The declaration, signed by more than 175 "political, civil, student, university, and journalist activists," followed the most recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency expressing "increasing concern" over Iran's controversial nuclear program. This increased pressure, coupled with the Iranian government's continued suppression of the Iranian opposition inside the country, led the group to hint at international humanitarian intervention as a possible solution. This view, which has been reportedly toned down in subsequent iterations of the statement, has nevertheless ignited a fierce debate in the Iranian blogosphere and further divided the Iranian community. This weekend Tehran Bureau ran a reaction to the statement which has raised more questions and fueled more debate. To help clarify the debate, we've reprinted below a translation of this statement initially provided here. This version tries to stay close to the original expression of the activists' position in Farsi. We invite your responses.

NuclearIran.jpg[ opinion ] The body of our dear homeland, exhausted from incessant blows by the tyrannical and oppressive Guardianship [of the Jurist as represented by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei] and the government, which is void of legitimacy, is now passing through difficult days. The government's stubborn insistence on continuing its policies of hostility is eroding the interests of the nation and submerging the homeland into a dark future ruled by an iron fist, a police state and a continued state of terrorization.

One of the government's ruinous strategies during the past decade has been to fan the flames of crisis mongering in the international arena. It has done so by placing the pursuit of its nuclear adventurism at the center of these tension-provoking actions. By ignoring international laws and agreements, it is pursuing a quixotic policy on the world stage to cover up its domestic difficulties. By perpetuating the foreign crisis...the government is...preparing the means necessary to maintain its police state and keep the country in a state of anxiety.

The publication of the most recent report by the International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) presents evidence that the government's intention of diverting its nuclear program into a military course has entered into a decisive phase. The current rulers, with their hostile discourse and lack of cooperation with the IAEA, are increasing the dangerous possibility of a military confrontation with Iran. While Iran's neighbors are taking great strides towards economic development and raising the welfare of their people by strengthening economic relations with the farthest reaches of the globe and attracting capital and state-of-the-art technology, Iran is falling into further isolation which deepens by the day. The results of this isolation is visible and palpable in the daily lives of all the people of Iran. Should sanctions on the Central Bank go into effect, this may yet raise them to an unbearable level.

The rulers who trampled on the people's legitimate rights during the elections of 2009 and crushed their peaceful protests in blood consider these international threats as a means to recover their domestic legitimacy and to use the threats of a foreign attack to club the liberal Iranian activists harder and harder.

The totalitarian regime has disturbed international peace by stalling and providing misleading information, withholding full cooperation with the IAEA, deviating from the Non Proliferation Treaty, and avoiding the implementation of UN's declarations...

A tolerant posture toward the world and the revival of the rights of the Iranian citizen are intertwined. While demanding their fundamental rights, Iranian citizens must question their ruler's lack of comprehension, preparedness, and willingness to resolve international disputes of this kind.

We find that the government's continuation of the current impasse, its nuclear ambitions, and empty saber-rattling is preparing the grounds for an increase of the likelihood of a military conflict in the future whose primary victims will definitely be the people of Iran in general and the children and the toiling social layers in particular. Of course, we must keep in mind that exaggerating the danger of war and fear-mongering, too, has negative consequences for Iranian social interests.

The destructive consequences of war and occupation require no explanation. But in our opinion, mere verbal and written condemnation of war and the leaders of world militarism and those who fan the flames domestically cannot prevent military aggression. The international community's anxieties are on a different course [and are not reflected by] the division between the nation and government in today's Iran. The Islamic Republic does not only disturb the human rights and dignity of Iranian citizens, it is also considered a threat to world peace and stability. This separation does not necessarily mean that one may not find common ground between domestic demands and legitimate international demands.

In our opinion, the duty of those forces that believe in democracy and Iran's national and territorial interests is to align foreign and domestic pressure. In the meantime, the search for moral purity and an ideological and passive approach is inappropriate. Indeed, one must, by preparing the way for a solution, show the world that the Iranian people's democratic movement has the power not to allow the government's incitement of tension to slip through the tolerance of international institutions. Along these lines, we must refrain from seeing international relations in black and white and basing oneself on the binaries of permanent friend and foe or devil and angel and axioms related to the age of the Cold War. A realistic view of the current condition of the country and the world serves as a warning about what happens when a widespread social movement, which takes into account the world's legitimate concerns, fails to exist inside the country. In that event, the political forces of the opposition will not have any weight in the international decision-making arena.

Neglecting this matter and being captive of clichéd understandings and classical anti-imperialist perspectives without taking the initiative in escaping from the crisis ultimately results in a complete parting of ways of international society and the Iranian people's struggle for freedom. This division, considering the irreparable breach between the nation and government in Iran and the passivity in the realm of action, will encourage the world powers to choose the military option with the aim of eliminating nuclear and military institutions. This is something which in its containable form the government's extremist wing will welcome in order to both strengthen its control over the reins of the economy and the sources of power and to legitimize itself by taking its place in the front ranks of the struggle of Islamic fundamentalism against the West.

An effective and responsible way to prevent war requires the organization of a powerful social movement which includes various tendencies and factions from the Iranian social mosaic which wants independence, respect, democracy, the observance of human rights, a lasting and humane peace, interaction and friendship with the world and has nothing to do with the injustice, absolutism, and the absolutist type of peace provided by the grave,

In the meantime, the existence of problems in the world system and double standards, such as a lack of international objection to the military nuclear programs of Israel, India, and Pakistan, should not result in ignoring the wrongs of the crisis-fanning government of Iran and by seizing on the poisonous quality of foreign pressure, allow the government to have a free hand to take advantage of nationalist sentiment and the existence of the objectionable in the international sphere and the sacrificing of human relations at the feet of the interests of the world's powerful countries in certain quarters, allow it to continue on its perilous path. One can also demand the elimination of nuclear weapons prioritizing the elimination of nuclear weapons from among the countries of the Middle East and totalitarian countries like North Korea as a step towards international nuclear weapon's disarmament while opposing the destructive nuclear program of the current Iranian government.

Along these lines, one can, while defending the country's independence, utilize the legitimate resources of the international community to promote democracy, human rights, and national government in Iran. Instead of issuing general and conclusive decisions in praise or denunciation of foreign support, it would be appropriate to hold a national conversation to specify the preconditions, limitations, criteria, and oversight apparatus to prevent individuals or groups from taking advantage in regard to the support of the international community and drive opportunists from the field and prevent dubious currents from making an alternative of themselves. The path to democracy in Iran passes through reliance on the nation's inexhaustible strength and an effective and organized leadership.

The primary problem is to concentrate efforts on how to activate the democratic movement's dormant forces. Foreign support presents a variety of difficulties. We defend the political support of the world community of the democratic demands of Iranians.

The international community, for its part, should be aware that any measures which result in a violation of Iran's territorial integrity or national interests will increase the legitimacy of the repression of the freedom-loving forces in Iran and weaken the discourse of peace.

Any way we look at it, in the final analysis, the cause of the current international crisis is the system of the Islamic Republic in general and its extremist wing, which through its miscalculations, will fan the flames of a probable war. To oppose war, one must target those in the government who create the crises. Now that the consequences of the international economic recession have caught up with the Iranian economy and exacerbated the economic difficulties resulting from the government's mismanagement, no logical position can excuse the fact that the people of Iran, and particularly those who live below the poverty line, were never consulted over the nature and method of the nuclear program and how it was implemented. This strata of society, which has been so disrespectfully treated, has had to pay the price for the saber-rattling of their prosperous and comfortable rulers!

Thus full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA and a temporary and conditional cessation of uranium enrichment as a confidence-building measure within the NPT framework and an immediate cessation of all military aspects of the nuclear program are one of the central demands of the Iranian people's democratic movement in its pursuit or peace. Alongside this demand are demands for observing human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy, which would mean a manifold increase in the potential for weakening the twin pillars of absolutism and aggression and thus preventing war.

Signed by,

Abdol Reza Ahmadi, Ahmad Ahmadian, Kamal Aras, Ardavan Ershad, Jamshid Asadi, Farid Ashkan, Morteza Eslahchi, Amir Hossein Etemadi, Bijan Eftekhari, Ali Afshari, Maryam Akbari, Mohammad Javad Akbarin, Kian Emani, Mehdi Amini, Fariba Amini, Nader Entessar, Maryam Ahri, Ahmad Azad, Rahim Bajoghli, Ahmad Batebi, Hossein Bagherzadeh, Mehran Barati, Mohammad Barzanjeh, Khosro Bandari, Shahla Bahar Doost, Behrooz Bayat, Kourosh Parsa, Misagh Parsa, Behzad Pornia, Katayoon Pezeshki, Bijan Pirzadeh, Sayeed Pourheydar, Saeed Payvandi, Ali Tarikh, Habib Tabrizian, Ali Taghipour, Kamran Talatof, Nayereh Tohidi, Setareh Sabety, Mehdi Jami, Jahanshah Javid, Mohammad Hossein Jafari, Reza Jafarian, Mehdi Jalali, Arash Janati Ataie, Mehran Jangali Moghaddam, Aydin Jahanbakhsh, Pouya Jahandar, Gisoo Jahangiri, Reza Charandabi, Aram Hesami, Bijan Hekmat, Abbas Hakimzadeh, Faramarz Khodayari, Amir Khadir, Faramarz Dadvar...

اسامی امضاکنندگان
عبدالرضا احمدی ،احمد احمدیان، کمال ارس ،اردوان ارشاد ،جمشید اسدی ،فرید اشکان ،مرتضی اصلاحچی ،امیر حسین اعتمادی ،بیژن افتخاری ،علی افشاری ،مریم اکبری ،محمد جواد اکبرین ،کیان امانی ،مهدی امینی ،فریبا امینی ،نادر انتصار ،مریم اهری ،احمد آزاد ،رحیم باجغلی ،احمد باطبی ،حسین باقرزاده ،مهران براتی ،محمد برزنجه ،خسرو بندری ،شهلا بهار دوست ، بهروز بیات ،کوروش پارسا ،میثاق پارسا ،بهزاد پرنیان ،کتایون پزشکی ،بیژن پیرزاده ،سعید پور حیدر ،سعید پیوندی ،علی تارخ ،حبیب تبریزیان ،علی تقی پور ،کامران تلاطف ،نیره توحیدی ، ستاره ثابتی ،مهدی جامی ،جهانشاه جاوید ،محمد حسین جعفری ،رضا جعفریان ،مهدی جلالی ،آرش جنتی عطایی ،مهران جنگلی مقدم ،آیدین جهانبخش ،پویا جهاندار ،گیسو جهانگیری ،رضا چرندابی ،آرام حسامی ،بیژن حکمت ،عباس حکیم زاده ، فرامرز خدایاری ،امیر خدیر ،فرامرز دادور،کمال داوودی ،فریبا داوودی مهاجر ،مهرداد درویش پور ،عبدالستار دوشوکی ،مهشید راستی ،نیما راشدان ،احمد رافت ،علی راکعی ،محمد رضا رحیمی راد ،امیر رشیدی ،سحر رضا زاده ،فرامرز رفیعی ،مریم روزبهانی ،مینا زند سیگل ،حمید زنگنه ،محسن سازگارا ،نسترن سامی ،بهروز ستوده ،نسیم سرابندی ،رضا سیاوشی ،سلمان سیما ،کریم شامبیاتی ،رحیم شامبیاتی ،منصوره شجاعی ،حسن شریعتمداری ،روحی شفیعی ،حسن شهپری ،عباس شیرازی ،محمد صادقی ،کوروش صحتی ،بیژن صفسری ،سیاوش صفوی ،رامین صفی زاده ،علی ضرابی ،ارسلان ضیائی ،حسن طالبی ،علی طایفی ،میثم طهماسبی ،شهره عاصمی ،غلام عباسی ،مزدک عبدی پور ،سیاوش عبقری ،شهلا عبقری ،نازلی عراقی ،مهدی عربشاهی ،کاظم علمداری ،حسین علوی ،رضا علوی ،مهرنوش علی آقایی ،لیونا عیسی قلیان ،حمید غفرانی ،علی فاتحی ،شیرین فامیلی ،امیر حسین فتوحی ،روزبه فروزان ،کامبیز فروهر ،امیر علی فصیحی ،فیروزه فولادی ،شهاب فیضی ،آیدا قاجار ،پروین قاسمی ،سعید قاسمی نژاد ،رضا قاضی نوری ،رضا قریشی ،مهدی قلی زاده اقدم ،علی قنبری ، فرزاد قنبری ،ناصر کاخساز ،فاطمه کشاورز ،علی کشتگر ،الهه ککرایی،امیر کلینی ،آزاده کیان ،علیرضا کیانی ،روبرتو گادی،امیر حسین گنج بخش ،حمید مافی ،مجید محمدی ،پویان محمودیان ،پرویز مختاری ،احمد مدادی ،علی مستشاری ،احمد مشعوف ، انوشه مشعوف ،نیما مشعوف،نریمان مصطفوی ،فواد مظفری ،منصور معدل ،امیر معماریان ،رضوان مقدم ،حسن مکارمی ،پیمان ملاز ،امید ملک ،مرتضی ملک محمدی ،فرشته ملکشاهی ،رویا ملکی ،محمود منشی پوری ،اشکان منفرد ،علی مهتدی ،محمد مهدیان ،بهزاد مهرانی ،بهناز مهرانی ،سید داوود موسوی ،علیرضا موسوی ،احمد میر فخرایی ،امیر حسین میرابیان ،کاویان میلانی ،همایون نادری فر ،ابراهیم نبوی ،یوحنا نجدی ،روجا نجفی ،آرش نراقی ،پری نشاط ،بورگان نظامی نرج آباد ،علی نظری ،شروین نکوئی ،مرتضی نگاهی ، داوود نوائیان ،شیوا نوجو ،مهدی نوربخش ،نادر هاشمی ،شیخ محمد هدایتی ،لعبت والا ،فرزین وحدت ،احمد وحدت خواه ،سجاد ویس مرادی، محسن یلفانی

The views are the authors' own.


Protesters Storm UK Embassy in Tehran

$
0
0

13900908195843375_PhotoL.jpg


Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Daylight Time (IRDT), GMT+4:30

13900908201425_PhotoA.jpg11:0 p.m., 8 Azar/November 29 From our correspondent in Tehran:

They attacked both the Qolhak Garden [where embassy personnel live] and the embassy compound at the same time. There were around 300 so-called students. While they tried to suggest it was spontaneous -- and none of the websites I checked had discussed such a gathering for today -- the fact that they had Molotov cocktails, banners and photos of martyrs suggest otherwise. I also strongly believe that they were not all students. They stormed the embassy and grabbed whatever evidence they could and tossed it out of the building. In the process they apparently found pictures of the shah in the embassy, according to Fars news.

The students who they are claiming found the "evidence" have never experienced the Shah era and for them the Shah era is just a story. The photo suggests the people who orchestrated the takeover wanted to influence not just a bunch of 20-year-olds. Plus, they [Guardian Council] decided to expel the British envoy yesterday, so the demands that caused them to storm the embassy had already been met.

Police were on the scene and allegedly tried to disperse the crowd and get them out of the embassy but the fact that it took a good few hours means they weren't doing much and actually wanted the "students" there.

Mehr news agency was the first to run the story that six people had been taken hostage, but quickly removed the report from its website. The only other Iranian news outlet that ran with the story was Jahan news, which is affiliated with the IRGC. According to Press TV, "police said all foreign nationals in the compound are under protection of security forces," meaning there could be hostages but that those who seized them were not angry students.

I wouldn't be surprised if officials tried to dig up the April 1980 takeover of the embassy of the Islamic Republic in London as a justification for what happened. (Update: Not far off the mark: Fars news just published this, inferring Iranian police handled the situation better than police in Britain.)

Coming full circle...


The White House released this statement on the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran:

The United States condemns in the strongest terms the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran. Iran has a responsibility to protect the diplomatic missions present in its country and the personnel stationed at them. We urge Iran to fully respect its international obligations, to condemn the incident, to prosecute the offenders, and to ensure that no further such incidents take place either at the British Embassy or any other mission in Iran. Our State Department is in close contact with the British government and we stand ready to support our allies at this difficult time.
ukusembassies.jpg
As The New York Times reported, today's "images evoked memories of the siege of the American Embassy following the Iranian revolution of 1979." The video above is actually not from the November 4, 1979 seizure, but one that took place on Wednesday, February 14, 1979.

10:0 p.m., 8 Azar/November 29 Our columnist Muhammad Sahimi compiled the following items from the Iranian press:

Chanting "Death to England!" Iranian Majles deputies passed legislation Sunday to downgrade diplomatic and commercial relations with Britain. (It was approved by the Guardian Council on Monday.) In a provocative dispatch, Fars News Agency, which is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), asked, "What is the difference between the British Embassy and the nest of spies," a reference to the U.S. Embassy in Tehran that was overrun by Islamic leftist students on Nov. 4, 1979. The Fars report accused the British embassy of having played a major role in provoking large-scale demonstrations in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election.

Fars also applauded the move to downgrade relations with Britain and declared, "Does tolerating 'spy homes' [embassies] of some countries not have any limit?" In effect, Fars and by extension the IRGC, set the stage for attacking the British embassy.

8:20 p.m., 8 Azar/November 29From our Tehran correspondent back in May 2010:

Relations between Iran and Britain have long been strained, and the Islamic Republic has been in the habit of pinning the blame for anything that goes wrong in the country on the British. In response to last year's election results, British officials made a series of comments that Tehran interpreted as meddling in its internal affairs. Iran retaliated by expelling the BBC's Tehran correspondent as well as arresting a British-Greek journalist, nine British embassy employees, and a number of other British passport holders said to have been involved in rioting.

In February, President Ahmadinejad said that Iran was left with no choice but to limit relations with Britain due to its unwelcome intrusions. Lawmaker Parviz Sarvari told Fars News Agency, "The nation's tolerance for Britain's hidden and apparent policy of interference is over. The Iranian nation and its parliament could no longer tolerate this behavior." He declared that "there would be a crushing response by Iran."

Using the British as the face of "the enemy," who is constantly conspiring to lead Islamic Republic officials astray and force them into defection has repeatedly proven an effective tool in diverting attention and restoring the balance of power. Expect more of the same.

#Iran's Fars news headlines interesting: 'students won't back down...' then, #UK 'embassy cleared of students' bit.ly/vpr1Ou

7 p.m., 8 Azar/November 29 Citing IRGC-affiliated Fars News, BBC Persian says #Iran police freed 6 hostages in takeover of British Embassy in Tehran.

7 p.m., 8 Azar/November 29 Citing #Iran govt news sites, BBC Persian reporting #Iran protestors removed documents from #UK embassy and disrupted satellites there.

Photos

These photos are purportedly from the UK Embassy takeover today in Tehran:

ukembcarfire2.jpg

UKEmbcarfire.jpg

UKbreakingwindows.jpg

Videos

Iran's Press TV is referring to the takeover as a "rally." "Some protestors tried to storm into the embassy compound," it said, "but police stopped them."



Background

According to the BBC,

Protesters in the Iranian capital, Tehran, have broken into the UK embassy compound during a demonstration against sanctions imposed by Britain.

Militant students are said to have removed the British flag, burnt it and replaced it with Iran's flag. State TV showed youths smashing embassy windows.

The move comes after Iran resolved to reduce ties following the UK's decision to impose further sanctions on it.

On Sunday, Iran's Majles (parliament) passed a bill to downgrade diplomatic ties with the UK in response to economic sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program. The Guardian had this report:

Iran's parliament has voted to expel the British ambassador in Tehran in retaliation against economic sanctions imposed by the west over the Islamic republic's disputed nuclear programme.

Iranian MPs on Sunday passed a bill that in effect gave President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government two weeks to expel the ambassador, Dominick Chilcott.

The bill, which also requires Iran's economic and trade links with the UK to be reduced, has yet to be approved by the Guardian Council, the powerful body of clerics and lawyers that vets parliamentary activity.

If the bill comes into effect, diplomatic relations between Tehran and London will be downgraded from ambassadorial level to that of chargé d'affaires and Chilcott - who took up his post only a few weeks ago - will have to leave Tehran. Iran's embassy in London had been operating without an ambassador for several months.

This dispute has been brewing for some time now. Last week the UAE's National newspaper reported on a dispute over the British compound's trees:

The compound's British "occupiers" have been accused of environmental vandalism after they allegedly cut down and burnt more than 300 trees. Tehran municipality officials said this week they have slapped the British embassy with a US$1.23 million (Dh4.5m) fine for the "crime".

Britain insists no healthy trees were felled. But it had to remove a "small number" that died of "natural causes and become dangerously unstable" after the compound's water supply was disrupted by the extension of the Tehran Metro nearly three years ago.

The embassy has been working with the Iranian authorities, including the Tehran Municipality, "to re-establish a water supply as a matter of urgency to ensure that any environmental damage is kept to a minimum", a spokesperson for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) said.

Even so, Tehran's mayor, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, announced at the end of last month that he is going to court in an attempt to reclaim the Gulhak compound. He insists the British embassy has no legal right to the prime real estate.

Official Fars news photos:

13900908170800109_PhotoL.jpg13900908170755234_PhotoL.jpg13900908170758468_PhotoL.jpg 13900908170805125_PhotoL.jpg

Copyright © 2011

Region | Hidden Lives: Afghan Girls in Germany

$
0
0

465_afghan_art_070205.jpgA culture clash experienced in everyday battles and lasting repercussions.

[ personal history ] When I was growing up as a teenager in Hamburg's Afghan diaspora, my father received a phone call out of the blue one day. It was from a friend, an urbane and educated man well-respected in the community. "It's an urgent matter," he pleaded. "Can you come over immediately?"

As it turned out, the matter was of an awkward nature. Surrounded by his peers in the comfort of his sitting room in the north of Europe, the despairing Afghan man blurted out, "My daughter wants to marry a Muslim man who is not Afghan. What shall I do? Shall I kill her?" He was asking his friends for permission to murder his own flesh and blood. "Why don't you just let her marry the man? After all, he is a Muslim," said my father to his astonished friend. This alternative took the distraught father by surprise: "And you wouldn't mind if l let her marry him?"

Back home, my father shook his head in despair as he recounted the surreal incident. Listening to the story, I wondered why the man had made the life or death of his own daughter my father's business. After all, they were not even family. My father was just a friend, a fellow member of the local diaspora community. Why had the man turned him and his other friends into judges, deciding the fate of his child? The whole thing smacked of some bizarre mafia-style mentality, under which the legal code of Germany, the country that had given the family refuge, was replaced by unwritten mob rule. I felt sorry for the girl. It appeared to me that the German neighbors' pets who lived in her building had more rights, were granted more respect and dignity. Her father had delivered her to the whims of a bunch of men who were not even her blood relatives. Authority over her very life was denied her, and the community had been called upon to play god.

Despite its bizarre and unsettling nature, the curious episode was soon forgotten. The father followed his peers' advice and allowed the girl to marry the non-Afghan Muslim man. The rest of her story was a happy one.

My father's story alerted me to a curious fact. It seemed to me that honor killings were a method of male-on-male peer pressure -- women served as tools by which to control a man's standing and reputation. My father used to tell me the sad tale of another Afghan man, a business owner whose daughter was perceived by the community as dressing inappropriately. It was decided that he would be punished by boycott, and soon few people dared to shop in his store. It collapsed as a result, pushing the family toward bankruptcy.

"That's how the community treats men who appear not to have control over their daughters," my father used to observe, pleading with me to behave myself in public for the sake of his reputation. "You know my views about women's rights, and I know that you are a decent girl. But outside, just make sure you don't give them reason to talk," he told me again and again. He had to live in fear of family and community gossip about me until his death. When I started to write articles in 2008, I paid extra attention to my publicly distributed photographs, making sure that I was dressed modestly and did not give ammunition to an unforgiving and judgmental community. After all, its more conservative members would have liked nothing better than to use someone like me, an Afghan woman who had left the traditional path, as a cautionary example, a reason to stop their own daughters from pursuing careers that involved a public presence. This responsibility was a burden, frequently leading me to self-censorship -- I often denied myself the right to write openly and freely, particularly about issues pertaining to women.

When my family arrived in Hamburg, the Afghan society that I knew back home was replaced by a much smaller, more intimate enclave, making privacy impossible for any family that was a part of it. An internal campaign of vigilantism was launched, focusing on young females in particular. "Let's keep an eye on our virgins," was its motto. The girls were placed under a microscope, with every movement, outfit, and life decision the subject of public scrutiny and comment, tabsera, a dreaded term that could destroy a girl's reputation and future for good.

Walking the streets of Afghan-majority immigrant neighborhoods, one could feel the eyes of the older women, watching from behind the curtains, peering down the blocks. The police state mentality was also present at my school, where the Afghan boys and some of the girls took it upon themselves to act as informants, watching every step, observing every action, and reporting to their parents back home that such and such was wearing a short skirt and was seen talking to a boy. Bored out of their minds on seemingly endless afternoons, the older women took great pleasure in such gossip. It gave them something to talk about, living as they were amid a society with which they had virtually nothing in common.

As such, privacy, respect, and dignity were nonexistent for young girls, who found themselves in the middle of a cultural clash waged between their community and the wider German society. If at home, Afghan girls were encouraged to be submissive, dress modestly, and replace their posters of Western pop stars with images of Muslim holy sites, at school their teachers demanded that they be confident and outspoken, thereby providing evidence of their integration and acceptance of German values. The manifestation of those values included mixed-gender classes and school trips that could mean a week or two away from familial control and the full freedom to attend parties and dress the Western way. The school trips were a contentious business and many girls were simply banned from taking them, which ensured that they never fully bonded with their German classmates. They were left behind with the sick and girls from fundamentalist Christian families, attending instead the cooking classes that the school provided for such outcasts.

The representatives of both Afghan and German cultures, embodied by community elders and teachers respectively, were equally self-confident in their belief that their model of education was the best, the most morally sound, and the healthiest. If the former relied on faith and centuries of tradition, the latter based its stance on psychology and pedagogic science.

One incident in particular revealed to me the breadth of the gap that divided the two sets of values. Prior to a school trip, an instructor from the Health Ministry arrived to teach our class all about pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Donning gloves and confidently placing a condom over a plastic model of a male sex organ, she told the class, "We know that you will have sex soon, probably during the trip, so you might as well learn how to do it in a safe way." I remember blushing deeply and averting my gaze from the health official and her hands. I didn't know where to look and whether it was OK for me to even be there. I felt guilty, as if I had crossed a forbidden boundary.

Our philosophy teacher later underlined the validity of the school's method. "My toddler is intrigued every time I light a candle. I know that she's tempted to try it out herself, so I taught her how to use a match and light a candle in a safe way," he beamed. The Germans' approach was "Let's talk about it." The Afghans' approach was to shelter and protect their girls from anything remotely sexual until their wedding night. When the two methods collided in German classrooms, it created a conflict of values that was often fought internally, alone.

It took me a number of years to realize that neither society actually cared for my well-being as an individual and that the battle that they made me fight had nothing to do with me but was all about a cultural clash intertwined with and impelled by East versus West snobbery. I decided to opt out of the battle and choose my own path, combining what I saw as the best features of each civilization.

My fellow Afghan German schoolgirls were equally creative, each developing her own unique strategy to cope with the conflicting requirements of her native Afghan and adopted German cultural values. Some girls went down the path of psychological compartmentalization, leading double lives: a secret life complete with boyfriend and the latest trends in Western youth culture, and a public life as a traditional Afghan girl, played out only for the sake of the family and, by extension, the community. Keeping the two very different lifestyles separate put the girls under enormous stress; many succumbed to anorexia and depression, which in turn affected their academic performance.

Other girls decided to surrender to community pressure, while they plotted revenge for after the mandated wedding. "I will make him pay. I will tell him that he can have my body but my heart will never belong to him," said one girl whose true love was a Turkish boy she knew she would never be allowed to marry. This brand of melodramatic statement was a recurrent feature in the Bollywood films that such girls adored. The announcement would be made on the first night of marriage, setting the tone for the years to come. An ever-growing rate of divorce within the community was the consequence.

Another girl used to turn up at school half an hour earlier than everybody else, wearing hejab. She would use the time to change in the restroom, reemerging with full makeup, dressed in the latest Western fashion. Her transformation was worthy of Madonna and ensured her popularity among her German peers, one of whom, particularly popular, became her boyfriend.

Meanwhile, the girls who had decided to act as informants kept an eye on their classmates. Upon spotting them in a compromising situation, the blackmail would begin. The unhealthy relationships that resulted were fairly widespread at my school. "Why are you friends with so and so if you dislike her so much?" I asked a girl, noticing her contradictory behavior. Behind her best friend's back, she was full of venom, but as soon as the other girl neared, she would smile, hug and kiss her and plot their next secret outing together. So...why? "She saw me talking to a boy. She can ruin my life any time by phoning my family and grassing on me. I have no choice but to placate her," was the girl's reasonable answer. They were all intelligent, but much of their energy and brainpower were wasted on keeping contradictory worlds apart. The price they paid for this struggle was often their own well-being.

During a recent trip to Hamburg, I met a girl from my school who remembered our journey toward self-reliance in the midst of a full-blown German-Afghan cultural war. "You know what Nushin?" she said, confidently driving her BMW around our old haunts. "We were both wasted on that society. We had so much talent and yet we had to waste so much time on stupid values." I looked at this once awkward, frightened teenager who had transformed herself into a bright-eyed, cheerful, and successful doctor happily married to a husband of her own choice, who was, incidentally, not Afghan, though Muslim. "You look great and I am proud of you," I told her the truth. "And I am proud of you," she smiled.

There we were, two survivors of an international cultural clash played out on the grounds of a school in a city in the north of Germany, involving traditions that had traveled across 4,000 miles and countless generations. It was true that we were lucky, but we also knew that our success was our own doing, for we had chosen to opt out of the routine of fighting for other people's values. We had lost nothing in the process. On the contrary, we had gained something altogether precious: our own individuality.

Nushin Arbabzadah writes the "Islamic Republic Next Door" column on Afghanistan for Tehran Bureau. She is a former BBC journalist and a regular contributor to the Guardian.

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011

Opinion | Islamist Fictions, Leftist Fashions, and the Embassy Invasion

$
0
0

13900908170758468_PhotoL.jpgA restaging full of sound and fury, signifying only worn-out ideological posturing.

[ opinion ] Many like me were struck by an image from the pro-regime attack on the British Embassy yesterday. It was of a looter walking out of the embassy carrying a framed poster of an iconic moment from Quentin Tarantino's Pulp Fiction, emblematic of the fake, hollow nature of the event. The image, and the event that it signified, also seemed to mark the end of an era: anti-imperialist posturing has run its course, at least in Iran.

Unlike the seizure of the U.S. Embassy by Iranian students more than three decades ago, this embassy invasion looked plainly staged and failed to resonate with anyone. It appeared to involve thugs hired to take part in a play, akin to a ritual reenactment of the martyrdom of Hussein, replete with symbolism that has lost its meaning over time and carries only nostalgic value in certain Islamist circles. None in the crowd looked like they were students and not one person in Iran whom I was able to contact believed that they were. By all accounts, this was the same despised bunch that attacked the real students who protested the disputed presidential elections in 2009.

The image of the mob storming and looting the British Embassy, as police officers stood idly by, highlighted the regime's hypocrisy and failed to stir any of the nationalist or anti-imperialist sentiments evoked by the events of 1979. That year, we toppled the U.S.-backed Shah, overran the embassy, and took Americans hostage. Then we ran our own country for more than three decades. But our own Islamist leaders ruled over us with such a heavy hand, engaged in such blatant nepotism and thievery, and displayed such arrogance that the "American puppet" we so valiantly ran off now seems like the better option. In my opinion, many of the opposition, if not the majority of Iranians, share this post-Islamist frame of mind. We tried Islamic governance and have come deeply to despise it.

Even though we have been wronged by the West, as with the CIA-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, we have gotten over our grudge, especially after 30 years of indigenous rule have shown that sometimes homegrown tyranny is worse than "imported influence."

To understand the new generation of Iranians and this new sentiment toward the West, one must shed the grammar of the traditional left, something that many of us who eagerly took part in the 1979 Revolution find hard. But post-Islamist Iranians no longer see the West or Americans as their enemies. Having had anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism shoved down their throats, they have come to love Israel and the United States.

You see, when we got rid of the imperialists and their puppets, we also got rid of many of our freedoms too. This was much more acutely felt by us women. Out with "imperialism" went our rights to full citizenship. We could still vote and hold office, but we had to cover our heads under the newly enforced sharia, or Islamic law. We got rid of the so-called imperialists, but we were not allowed to sing, or drink a beer, or have a boyfriend. We literally got a whipping for any transgressions.

Maybe you have to be a woman to really feel it. You really have to be forced to put something on your hair every day before going out in public to comprehend how humiliating and degrading it is. But it was not just that: We also had to witness our children being murdered, first in a war with Iraq that could have ended much earlier, then in the mass executions of leftists in the 1980s, and finally after the disputed 2009 elections.

What sovereignty did we gain? At what price? And for whom? Certainly not for us women, or minorities, or homosexuals, or atheists. Through the agony of three decades, we have come to realize that the biggest demon is not the West, but our own extremists, and especially our own Islamist men.

Now we even have some Iranian American academics (see here and here), who want to lay claim to being the intelligentsia of the opposition and still remain fashionably leftist, lecturing us on how American or Western "humanitarian intervention" is not so humanitarian. As if we didn't know! As if we are as naïve as the students who sit in their 101 classes.

We know all about Western intervention and imperialism and we frankly prefer it to our own Islamist rulers. Call me what you want -- or worse, call me a neocon -- but I am expressing the pent-up anger of many Iranians who are fed up with the empty rhetoric of the fashionable left, which refuses to come up with a new grammar for the post-imperialist world and has no clue how to digest our post-Islamist embrace of the West.

We Iranians, hardened by revolution and war, want jobs, opportunities, and the simple freedom to do what we want with ourselves. The utopian promises of the Islamists and the anti-imperialists have both left us jaded. No ideological posturing will satiate our need to breathe the fresh air of everyday liberty, the kind that "brother" Tarantino gets to breathe.

I know that I will get attacked for much of what I have claimed here, so let me make myself perfectly clear: I have no way of polling people in Iran. But neither do you. This is my assessment of a new Iranian sensibility, a new ethos. It is based on following events closely and engaging with them passionately for over 30 years and living both in the Islamic Republic and the Shah's Iran. Until someone comes up with a way to collect accurate data in Iran, then my point of view remains just that, my opinion, and it cannot be quantified.

The views expressed are the author's own.

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Dispatch | The Man to Watch in Iran?

$
0
0

Iranian-FM-Ali-Akbar-Salehi.jpgAli Akbar Salehi: Iran's foreign minister...and future president?

[ profiles ] After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic's new leaders confronted the dilemma of what to do with the remnants of the Pahlavi monarchy. One such remnant was the partially constructed nuclear power plant located in the southeastern city of Bushehr along the Persian Gulf. Construction of the plant by a group of German companies had begun just four years earlier, under Mohammad Reza Shah.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ordered the creation of a five-person fact-finding committee to investigate the Bushehr plant and advise on its status. One of its members was a young graduate of the nuclear engineering doctorate program at MIT, Ali Akbar Salehi, who in late 2010 became one of the most prominent figures in Iranian politics when he was appointed foreign minister by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

After visits to the Bushehr facility, the committee was unable to reach a consensus. Three of its members argued for the plant's destruction, while two -- including Salehi -- believed it should be completed and brought on line. Occupied by the war with Iraq, Khomeini decided neither to continue work on the plant nor to destroy it, putting off the matter until a later date.

For many years afterward, Salehi kept a safe distance from politics and pursued a career in academia, serving as chancellor of Sharif University of Technology, regarded as the Iranian MIT.

Then, in 1997, President Mohammad Khatami was looking to name a new envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), someone with both expertise in the field and sufficient distance from the regime's power elite to avoid international objections to his appointment. He chose Salehi.

Salehi himself was the source of much of this information relayed to Kambiz Tavana starting in 2003 when the reporter started covering him in Iran and on his travels.

Salehi was never fully accepted, particularly by Hassan Rowhani, a political insider who was chief negotiator with Europe for Iran's nuclear program and a member of the Supreme National Security Council, which coordinates nuclear policy under the Supreme Leader's guidance. Rowhani derisively referred to Salehi as a "foreigner" because of his birth in Karbala, Iraq, years of study at the American University of Beirut, and ability to speak fluent Arabic.

Salehi has stated that he felt "cut off from the team" during his tenure as IAEA envoy. After writing a letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in which he articulated his concerns, he left the country for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he worked on education programs as deputy secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) from 2007 to 2009.

In 2009, Ahmadinejad brought Salehi back to head Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, which is the primary body responsible for operating and regulating nuclear energy activities around the country.

Ahmadinejad has championed the development of Iran's nuclear program and it thus seemed odd that Salehi would reenter Iranian politics at his hands and in such a position. Aside from having typically filled key posts with friends and allies, Ahmadinejad has evinced a particular disdain for those who served in the administration of the reformist Khatami. However, one of the top engineers at the Isfahan nuclear facility observed, "People who work on the nuclear program are not political and are not prone to make trouble through partisan in-fighting."

photo_1314537593974-1-0.jpgThroughout his professional life, Salehi does not appear to have pursued any obviously self-serving agenda. Given the cutthroat nature of Iranian politics, a strong support network, involving inner circles within inner circles, is a necessity for almost every officeholder who seeks a lasting career. Salehi, however, does not seem to belong to a clique and has performed his various jobs in academia, administration, and diplomacy without exploiting them as launching pads to superior positions.

These qualities made Salehi an asset to the Khatami and Ahmadinejad administrations, both of which needed, at times, a skilled and devoted worker without the baggage routinely borne by political figures in the Islamic Republic. Now there is a chance that these very qualities may propel Salehi to high office.

The general feeling among most analysts has been that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani or Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf are next in line for the presidency. They are both central players within the regime and have shown themselves to be loyal to both the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader, who will have the final say. (See here and here for how each staked positions against the British government before and after the November embassy seizure.)

Larijani and Ghalibaf each have strong political bases, as well -- Larijani among the clerical class and Ghalibaf among the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Given the current state of the regime, this must be seen as a mixed blessing. The sort of backing each man enjoys could provide impetus for a challenge to Khamenei once either became chief executive, just as Ahmadinejad has challenged the Supreme Leader over a wide range of matters, most memorably with the president's bid to force out Intelligence Minister Heydar Moselhi. Khamenei and many others in the regime will do their best to avoid the internal divisions that have plagued Ahmadinejad's second term, especially in the face of ever-increasing pressure from the United States and Europe.

Even setting aside the fear of another four years of rampant political intrigue, there is the fact that Salehi has impressive knowledge and experience in two crucial arenas in which Iran has invested considerable financial and political capital: its nuclear energy program and its relations with Arab nations around the region.

With the publication of the new IAEA report and the West's imposition of increasingly severe sanctions, Salehi may be the best act Khamenei has to follow up the provocative Ahmadinejad. Cables made public by WikiLeaks show that some Western diplomats were "optimistic" when he was assigned to head Iran's Atomic Energy Organization. According to one cable from the U.S. mission in Vienna, which covers the IAEA, the consensus among his Western counterparts is that he is an "intelligent and skilled interlocutor and [they] prefer dealing with him than some other Iranian officials." As the volume of accusations about Iran's nuclear program rises, the well-informed, soft-spoken Salehi offers either the best chance to sell the world on the idea of a nuclear Iran, which seems next to impossible, or at the very least to explain his country's position without the bellicosity that has colored Ahmadinejad's defiant speeches.

Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors, meanwhile, are troubled on three distinct fronts: its continued attempts to understand and sway the Arab Spring; the fine line it must walk with Syria between supporting President Bashar al-Assad and maneuvering for maximum influence should the civil war there yield a new government; and Washington's allegation of a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador that has brought Iran-Saudi tensions to their worst level in decades.

There may be no political figure better equipped than Salehi, who has lived for years in Arab countries and has a strong command of the language, to serve as the Islamic Republic's ambassador-at-large to the region. In fact, last month, despite criticism at home, it was he who flew to Saudi Arabia to represent Iran and pay condolences after the death of Crown Prince Sultan ibn Abdulaziz al-Saud.

"If this were the case," quipped one Iranian academic about the prospect of Salehi becoming president, "it would, ironically, be following the tradition of Iran's medieval monarchs and Qajar kings to appoint the most enlightened, but duty-bound person as the chancellor."

On the other hand: "He is a nice person," a principlist told Tehran Bureau. "You know, nice people do not become very important in the Islamic Republic."

Yet with all the chaos that has taken place within the Islamic Republic over the past few years, this may be just what Khamenei wants and what he needs: someone who will get the job done and be smart enough to not be very important.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

News | Last Iran Diplomats Depart UK; Ambassador Describes Invasion

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Iran Standard Time (IRST), GMT+3:30

LoweringUKFlagCrop.jpg2:50 a.m., 12 Azar/December 3 Responding to the 48-hour deadline set by British Foreign Secretary William Hague on Wednesday for their departure, the last group of Iranian diplomats and embassy staff left the United Kingdom on Friday. Hague issued the ultimatum in reaction to what he termed the "outrageous and indefensible" invasion of the British Embassy in Tehran earlier in the week. Addressing the British Parliament, he declared, "If any country makes it impossible for us to operate on their soil, they cannot expect to have a functioning embassy here." The Independent reports from London:

As officials loaded luggage on to vehicles outside the embassy...a group of 20 protesters shouted anti-regime slogans such as "terrorists, terrorists; must go, must go".

Many were members of the London Green Movement, which opposes president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and campaigns on Iranian human rights issues.

Akbar Karimiam, 49, from Iran, said: "As an Iranian, I'm embarrassed about what happened in the British embassy in Tehran.

"The Iranian embassy here is not representing the nation, it's representing the regime. We are here to say goodbye to the dictator regime represented here."

In interviews with the BBC and Sky News, British Ambassador to Iran Dominick Chilcott described the experience of Tuesday's assault on the embassy compound and the diplomatic staff's residential complex in north Tehran. Excerpts from his comments follow:

It was quite frightening. In our compound we were locked in to the chancery building. We were up on the top floor in our safe area and the mob failed to get into the building.

We'd heard them trying to smash the doors and the windows down below but they couldn't get into our part of the building, except in one point where they got into one of the consular offices and started a fire. In the end it was the fire and the smoke [...] which forced us out.

[The staff] did follow the well-established procedures, which was to try and get out of the compound if they could and two of our staff did manage to get out, although they got into a car and they were chased to the gate and just got out before the invaders reached them.

So, it must have been really frightening for them. The others did what they had to do, which was go into the safe areas, what we call the keeps, and locked themselves in.

The keeps are designed to keep them safe for a certain limited time until the police arrive. But what nobody knew then was that the police weren't going to arrive; they were waiting to let the intruders do what they wanted to do.

[In the residential complex], one of our staff was on his own in his keep [safe room] and he barricaded the door with a heavy safe and a bed, and braced himself against the wall. And for 45 minutes he could hear people bashing down the door, smashing the windows and trying to get in

It must have been a very frightening experience -- until eventually the door gave way and they got him.

Then our staff, in the end there were seven altogether, were taken to one of the properties and they were made to sit silently, they were not allowed to talk in the room by the invaders, without really knowing what was going on.

It must have been a troubling experience. They were quite roughly handled, one or two of them, as well.

Iran is not the sort of country where spontaneously a demonstration congregates and then attacks a foreign embassy. That sort of activity is only done with the acquiescence and the support of the state.

And there are a number of reasons why, with the benefit of hindsight, it's very clear that this was a state-supported activity.

Asked if he ever feared that an extended hostage situation like the one endured by the staff of the U.S. Embassy in 1979-80 would result, Chilcott replied, "It would be untrue to say that those thoughts don't go through your mind, of course, and you hope that that is not going to happen. We were in a completely new situation and how it was going to end was not predictable and the behavior of the police was so strange that we weren't sure whose side they were on, if you like, and that didn't really give us much comfort."

The ambassador also expressed his belief that the Islamic Republic's regime may have not foreseen the severity of the British reaction: "The risk is that certain people in the regime who liked the idea of confrontation, because they felt it would rally people to the flag, miscalculated how strong the response would be. They probably didn't expect us to send home the Iranian embassy in London and, reading between the lines, you can see in the way they have responded to that move, some remorse in having provoked it."

On the website of Press TV, the English-language subsidiary of the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting network, the sole mention Friday of the London embassy's closure appeared in the middle of an item disavowing regime responsibility for Tuesday's attack, which was attributed to "angry students":

Despite British allegations that Iranian authorities had organized Tuesday's protests outside the UK Embassy in Tehran, US Vice President Joe Biden says there is no such indication.

"I don't have any indication how and or if it (the protests) was orchestrated," Biden told Reuters on Thursday.

The comments stand in sharp contrast to earlier claims made by British Foreign Secretary William Hague that the protests in Iran had been state-sanctioned and orchestrated.

Hague, in an address to the UK parliament on Wednesday, blamed Iran's Basij forces for the attack, saying, "We should be clear from the outset that this is an organization controlled by elements of the Iranian regime."

Britain further used this pretext to "immediately" close Iran's Embassy in London and expel Iran's diplomatic missions from the UK.

Angry students protested outside the British Embassy on November 29, pulling down the UK flag and demanding the speedy expulsion of the British envoy.

The English-language website of IRNA, the Iranian state news agency, ran a brief report on the last stages of the London embassy's evacuation that read, in part, "Some of the diplomats, talking with IRNA on the phone, said they and their families are leaving Britain with 'dignity and pride'." According to IRNA, Britain's demand that the embassy be closed was "described by many experts as hasty and passive."

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Q&A | Poet, Activist Remembers Life in Iran Pre-Revolution

$
0
0

"At that time, nobody paid attention to what girls did when they got together."

saghi_ghahraman.jpg[ lifestyle ] Saghi Ghahraman is an Iranian lesbian poet and gay rights activist who lives in Toronto. Born in 1957 in the holy city of Mashhad, she studied classic and contemporary Persian literature at Azarabadegan University in Tabriz. She left Iran in 1982 after attacks on the women's organization she worked at, and was a refugee in Turkey until 1987 when she emigrated to Canada.

She now works with PEN Canada's Exiled Writer program. She has published three collections of poetry and one collection of short stories. She also serves on the board of the Iranian Queer Organization.

Ghahraman recently spoke about what life was like for her growing up as a lesbian during the Shah's regime and just after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

***

Lesbians in Iran do not get much attention internationally. Is this because the Iranian authorities pay less attention to them than to gay men? Are some of them also arrested and charged with being homosexual?

The gay movement in Iran started right before the Revolution, and then picked up again around 1990, with gay men leading the fight without any lesbian involvement for a very long time. Lesbians appeared very slowly and reluctantly around 2005 or 2006, and without much fuss or pretense in making their presence felt as part of a social movement. So the attention is rightly given to gay men.

Iranian lesbians were heavily oppressed by the Iranian women's movement and its concerns. Lesbians were told to be quiet so as to prevent any labeling of the movement by the regime. They argued that all activities in the women's movement should deal only with Muslim women's requirements, lest the movement [be] attacked by the regime with allegations of Westernization of the movement.

When lesbians began to show up in society, or online, they were mostly interested in meeting, eating out, and having some fun with other women, and then going back to their "normal" lives. Many of the lesbians have married, either by force or by choice. You might know that, according to sharia in Iran, women aren't allowed to study, get a job, rent apartments, be operated on in hospitals, travel, rent hotel rooms, etc., without a male kin's permission. To have this permission, many lesbians have to get married and comply with traditional requirements and respond to their own desires and preferences only in the private setting of "all-women parties." That limited women being outspoken, or from taking chances with the law and/or the negative publicity of being openly gay.

I have heard about lesbians in various cities of Iran being murdered, or arrested and jailed. I have even heard of harsh treatments in jails of lesbians, but I have not directly interviewed women who have been arrested or jailed.

What was it like for you to grow up in Iran during the Shah's regime as a lesbian? How did things change for you after the Revolution of 1979?

At that time, nobody paid attention to what girls did when they got together. Parents thought it was the safe way to have girls mingle only with girls, and this gave us a lot of room to explore. I had my own early experiences when I was ten years old, and my first serious sexual relationship at 16, and my first love at 19, and nobody ever suspected anything. It [lesbianism] was practiced, but wasn't talked about.

I remember a married woman who was a distant relative, who was said to be a lesbian, and had many girlfriends who were changed every couple of months, and although no one approved of her, no one attacked or insulted her. She was a very strong woman, with a husband who very obediently followed her instructions and kept quiet and seemed okay with his wife's active extramarital life.

All the harsh treatment, the stigma and horror around gay men and lesbians began right after the Revolution with the strong force of the regime encouraging parents and the public to harass homosexuals.

I fled Iran three years after the Revolution. I was working with a communist party and its women's branch at the time. I had stumbled into an unpleasant marriage and right after the Revolution, by changes in the laws, I had lost the right to get a divorce.

I had a very supportive father who would do everything to protect me, and when the party was cracked down upon and demolished and members arrested and executions started, he was convinced I couldn't stay and arranged for smugglers to take me over into Turkey via the bordering mountains. I was never out [of the closet] when I was in Iran, and I wasn't there long enough to face complications. The last person I said goodbye to before I left for the border was the woman I loved and spent four years with in a room in the university dorm. And then I was out of Iran. But I had many problems within the Iranian community in Canada, and had my share of fights.

Has life improved for lesbians in Iran over the past 20 years?

Life went downhill and became horribly unbearable during the first decade of the Revolution. It started to get better only when people found the means of finding venues to have private lives, and also by seeking asylum in the West. During the last couple of years, it has gotten worse because now everyone is looking for signs of homosexuality and their first guess when faced with a woman refusing dates, suitors, and marriage is that she is a lesbian, and thus, the family and political pressures begin.

In the Persian Gulf Arab states, because of the extreme segregation of the sexes, especially in Saudi Arabia, this has allowed a flourishing subculture of lesbianism to develop in girls' schools. My Saudi women friends tell me that there were many lesbians in their classes who had romances with other girls, giving them flowers, chocolates, and other gifts. Does a similar thing happen in Iran, and do the teachers punish the girls or look the other way?

I remember when I was about to start my grade 1 elementary school, my mother told me on the way to school not to talk to "baroonis," not to accept gifts from them, and not to follow them when they asked to go with them, anywhere. I asked, who the baroonis were. And she said, "They're girls who are sweet on girls, and give them flowers or chocolate and follow them around everywhere."

This was my first encounter with the image of girls who fancy girls. And, yes, it was a common scene to see a girl admiring another girl, getting too close to her, and shadowing her everywhere. Rarely would the other girl respond openly, but then it was common knowledge that in private they'd be having more intimacy.

Parents would not allow their children to hang out with the other children of the opposite sex, but it was very common for girls to sleep in the same bed when sleeping over and take showers together, so having a relationship without being exposed was very easy. I remember I had many occasions to make out with girls at my house or theirs, with our parents taking their afternoon nap not very far from where we were supposed to be taking ours. My girlfriend, when I was 16, visited me every day, and we spent hours and days together, and at the same time, my parents didn't allow me to stay in the same room with my uncle, who was only slightly my elder, out of fear of letting -- as they say in Iran -- fire and cotton brush by each other.

This subculture of lesbianism in Gulf schools has led some female academics to study the issue and they have called it the "boyat" phenomenon. Unsurprisingly, they have lectured against it, calling it an un-Islamic and perverted state of mind, urging psychotherapy as a way of "correcting" this behavior. Has something similar to this happened in Iran?

This has never happened in Iran openly. Feminists and women's movement activists have tried hard to stay away from those openly lesbian figures like myself and made it a point to keep the scene clear of lesbians up to and until the 2009 presidential elections and the aftermath. And although Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Prize winner, openly opposed homosexual rights, no member of the women's movement has asked for the psychological treatment of lesbians.

As an activist for human rights, do you think there is any hope that gay rights are respected in Iran as long as the clerics and sharia law reign?

It depends on how much the longevity of the regime's life depends on it complying with LGBT rights. This regime doesn't want anything and doesn't respect anything besides staying in power. If their future depends on it, yes, they'll oblige, for sure, and they'll say, as Khomeini said, "Alas, I'll drink the cup of hemlock." So it depends then on how the international community deals with the regime. I mean, they don't care much about sharia; only staying in power counts for the group that is ruling Iran.

Islam allows for many different readings and interpretations of its rules. Also, it takes only one religious scholar to announce a fatwa that says: It is not okay to kill homosexuals.

Rasheed Abou-Alsamh is a Saudi American journalist who lives in Brazil and blogs at rasheedsworld.com. He is a regular contributor to Al-Ahram Weekly and O Globo.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Media Watch | The Mysterious Blast in Isfahan

$
0
0

Air Force maneuvers or explosion? Accident or sabotage? Was uranium conversion facility the target? And was it struck?

CamerasIsfahanUraniumFacility.jpg[ media watch ] One week ago, around 2:40 p.m. local time Monday, November 28, the sound of a massive blast was heard throughout the city of Isfahan, in central Iran. The moderate conservative website Farhang Ashti reported that the sound of the apparent explosion was so strong that people, terrified, rushed to the streets.

According to Tabnak, the website close to Major General (ret.) Mohsen Rezaei, former top commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, there were unconfirmed reports that the sound might have been related to maneuvers by the Iranian Air Force near a base outside of the provincial capital, while others attributed it to the possible explosion of a natural gas pump in the city's Dolatabad neighborhood. The Israeli and Western news media focused on the fact that Isfahan is home to several nuclear-related sites most importantly a uranium conversion facility (seen here in an archive photo); some English-language media outlets claimed that this facility was severely damaged, though there was nothing like a consensus that sufficient evidence existed to draw such a conclusion. The incident took place two-and-a-half weeks after an explosion at an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps facility 30 miles outside Tehran killed Major General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, a leading figure in the development of the Islamic Republic's missile program, and at least 16 other Guard members -- that blast was attributed by at least one Israeli source to a joint Mossad/MKO operation; a "Western intelligence official" similarly told Time that Mossad was involved in that deadly explosion.

Aftab News, the website close to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, soon reported that Deputy Governor-General Mohammad Mehdi Esmaili of Isfahan province had confirmed the occurrence of the enormous sound, though he had no information about its cause. Mashregh News, a website aligned with the security forces, also confirmed that the sound of a giant explosion had been heard; before long, however, Mashregh reported that Esmaili had recanted his statement and said there had been no indication of any explosion. The Isfahan municipal fire department and the provincial governor-general's crisis management center similarly confirmed the occurrence of the sound at first, only to subsequently retract their statements.

Gholam Reza Ansari, Isfahan province's judiciary chief, told Aftab News that a loud sound like that of an explosion had been heard, but that he did not believe it was anything significant. According to the Ebrat News website, which is believed to be close to the Isfahan prosecutor-general's office, the sound of an explosion was heard in many neighborhoods, but that, due to security considerations, it had not reported on the matter until it was officially confirmed by the judiciary. Ansari later told the semiofficial Fars News Agency, which is under the control of the Revolutionary Guards, "I hope that this is nothing important." According to Rah-e sabz (Jaras), the pro-Green Movement website, Fars featured an independent report on the sound of the blast that it removed from its site after the news was picked up by Israeli media.

On the website of Israel's relatively liberal daily Haaretz, the lead story on the incident was headlined "Report: Explosion rocks Iran city of Isfahan, home to key nuclear facility." The item devoted particular attention to that facility, whose existence went virtually without mention in Iranian coverage of the incident. As Haaretz put it,

It should be noted that Iran operates a uranium conversion plant near Isfahan, one with an important function in the chain of Iran's nuclear program.

It first went into operation in 2004, taking uranium from mines and producing uranium fluoride gas, which then feeds the centrifuges that enrich the uranium.

Since 2004, thousands of kilograms of uranium flouride gas were stockpiled at Isfahan and subsequently sent to the enrichment plant in Natanz.

The Times of London, published by embattled conservative press baron Rupert Murdoch, flatly claimed that Isfahan's primary nuclear site was "hit by a huge explosion" (the following text is excerpted from the report as republished in the Times's Murdoch-owned sister paper The Australian):

Satellite imagery seen by The Times confirmed that a blast that rocked the city of Isfahan on Monday struck the uranium enrichment facility there, despite denials by Tehran.

The images clearly showed billowing smoke and destruction, negating Iranian claims yesterday that no such explosion had taken place. Israeli intelligence officials told The Times that there was "no doubt" that the blast struck the nuclear facilities at Isfahan and that it was "no accident". [...]

"This caused damage to the facilities in Isfahan, particularly to the elements we believe were involved in storage of raw materials," said one military intelligence source.

He would not confirm or deny Israel's involvement in the blast, instead saying that there were "many different parties looking to sabotage, stop or coerce Iran into stopping its nuclear weapons program".

The Times report did not address the question of the toxic fallout that would presumably have resulted from the sort of blast it claimed took place, and why there was no evidence of such fallout or efforts to contain it or clean it up.

Time reported on comments made by Israeli military figures hinting that Israel was responsible for the Isfahan event, with the apparent assumption that a nuclear facility was the target:

"Not every explosion over there should be tied to reconnaissance and stories from the movies," Dan Meridor, Israel's minister for intelligence and atomic matters, told [Israeli] Army Radio. Saying, "it isn't right to expand on this topic," Meridor nonetheless went on to acknowledge that espionage has set back Iran's nuclear program. "There are countries who impose economic sanctions and there are countries who act in other ways," Meridor said.

A former director of Israel's national security council, retired Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, told the station the Isfahan blast was no accident. "There aren't many coincidences," he said, "and when there are so many events there is probably some sort of guiding hand, though perhaps it's the hand of God."

Four days after the incident, Haaretz columnist Yosi Melman tied it directly to last year's Stuxnet computer worm, which infected systems at multiple facilities related to Iran's nuclear program, and the recent Guard facility explosion. "The war is under way," he wrote, "though no one declared it and no one will confirm it. This is the secret war against Iran's nuclear project." He used the occasion to paint a provocative scenario of a coordinated sabotage effort that "requires sophistication, financial and technological resources, agents and precise intelligence":

[W]ith all due respect for Western intelligence's great efforts -- including what is probably unprecedented operational coordination -- it is unlikely these operations could have succeeded without inside support, meaning from individuals or groups ready to help sabotage the ayatollahs' regime. It should be remembered that Iran is a mosaic of ethnic minorities, and almost all have reasons for disliking the regime; some have their own underground armed militias.

The theory about inside-help gains traction given that, in addition to the military targets, other sites -- including oil facilities, gas pipelines, trains and military bases -- were also damaged over the past year. Last year there was a considerable increase, of at least 10 percent, in "breakdowns" and "accidents" at Iran's strategic infrastructure sites. Some were caused by poor maintenance, due in part to the international sanctions, but the volume of these incidents may also indicate the "hand of God" was involved. If this is the case, then it's possible that internal Iranian opposition groups (as opposed to exiles ) are stronger and even better organized than generally thought.

Despite all this, however, Melman acknowledged that -- notwithstanding the Murdoch empire's take on the matter -- when it comes to Isfahan, "It is not yet clear what was damaged in the blast."

A source in Isfahan told Tehran Bureau that last week's incident, contrary to the Times's claim of "billowing smoke," produced no visible smoke and, as far as he was aware, resulted in no damage or injuries. According to the source, there was just a loud sound, similar to one -- also unexplained -- heard some months ago.

Columnist Muhammad Sahimi and Senior Editor Dan Geist contributed to this report.

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau


Preview | Majles Elections 2012

$
0
0

majles_11_9_1.jpg[ Q&A ] w/ Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, and the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System, published by the International Foundation of Electoral Systems.

What is Iran's parliamentary election schedule?

Election activities began in December as Iran's Election Commission announced that the Ministry of Interior established election headquarters in all 31 provinces. The key dates are:

December 24: The candidate registration period begins.

December 30: The registration period ends.

January: The Guardian Council reviews the credentials of all candidates, a process that usually takes about a month.

Late January or early February: The final list of eligible candidates -- and disqualified candidates -- should be released. In the past, the majority of candidates have been disqualified for not meeting vague criteria.

February 22: The official campaign period begins and lasts eight days.

February 29: The official campaign ends.

March 2: Election Day.

Who will organize and run Iran's latest election -- and how has control over voting procedures changed over the past three decades?

Two bodies are charged with managing and administering election-related activities in Iran:

• The Guardian Council has a broad supervisory role. It vets all candidates, monitors the voting process, and certifies the election results.

• The Ministry of Interior implements election operations under the council's authority. It is responsible for the conduct of elections, including establishing and operating polling stations, administering the vote, and tabulating the results.

Iran's electoral infrastructure has technically not changed much since the 1979 revolution, but in practice the role of the Guardian Council has increasingly marginalized the Ministry of Interior. The 12-man Council of religious and legal experts has emerged as the main arbiter of election outcomes in two ways. First, the Council has extended its powers to interpret the constitution to include supervising all stages of the elections, including the approval and rejection of candidates.

Second, the Council has transformed its temporary supervisory offices staffed with volunteers into permanent offices in every county across the country. Today, Iran has more than 384 Guardian Council supervisory offices operating year-round with full-time staff members. Concurrently, the Council has enjoyed an astronomical budget growth from $480,000 in 2000 to $25 million in 2011. The Guardian Council, dominated by conservatives, has thus morphed into the most omnipotent and omnipresent electoral management body in Iran.

What are the political undercurrents and competing interests among the government offices that oversee elections?

Over the past three decades, relations between the Guardian Council and the Ministry of Interior have fluctuated -- sometimes quite seriously. Occasionally, the two bodies have had common interests, but other times they have been controlled by competing factions. Since its inception, the Council has been tied to conservative factions. The Interior Ministry, however, has changed hands as part of the executive branch of government.

During the 2004 Majles elections, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council and the reformist-controlled Ministry of Interior were at daggers drawn. But the 2008 Majles elections were organized at a time that both institutions were under conservative control. The upcoming 2012 Majles elections are unique. Although conservative factions control both the ministry and the Council, their rivalries have turned the process into political fratricide.

Far from being a homogenous group, conservative factions have generally melded into broad coalitions during electoral events to maximize their share of the votes. At the onset of the 2009 presidential election, competing conservative factions united against the reformists. But after the regime suppressed the Green Movement, brewing tensions over President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's long-term political agenda re-emerged. A public rift between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad erupted in the spring of 2011 and deepened conflict among conservatives. The president's staunchest conservative supporters quickly turned into his vocal critics. The president's associates were charged with corruption and embezzlement and publicly dubbed "political deviants."

Revelations about Iran's largest banking embezzlement, scandals over corruption in the automotive industry and the alleged plundering of social security pensions fueled the conservatives' war against Ahmadinejad. Members of Parliament have repeatedly threatened to summon the president to parliament for questioning and some have even proposed to impeach him.

In late 2011, Ahmadinejad fought back by threatening opponents with revelations about their own misconduct. He has reportedly also used state resources under his control to win over interest groups. The president and his controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, have reportedly paid between $15,000 to $40,000 to all Friday prayer leaders, who play an important role in mobilizing the faithful.

The open power struggle among disparate conservative factions is likely to make the elections more interesting or contentious than originally expected.

What are the various electoral bodies doing to prepare for the March 2012 poll? Will there be different procedures this year?

Politically, the two main institutions in charge of elections are implementing strategies intended to tilt the balance of power in their own favor.

The conduct of elections provides the sole avenue for President Ahmadinejad and his supporters to influence the election outcome. So, for the first time, the Interior Ministry is conducting training seminars for local authorities in Iran's provincial capitals. The training is designed to enhance the technical knowledge of election officials, but it also appears to be politically motivated.

Ahmadinejad's rivals have not been idle. The judiciary has also set up special judicial branches in Iran's provincial capitals to ensure the implementation of election rules and the swift prosecution of electoral violators. The judiciary is, notably, headed by Sadeq Larijani, a former Guardian Council member and brother of the parliamentary speaker. State Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, a bitter foe of Ahmadinejad, heads this initiative. The Guardian Council has warned the "deviant current" against trying to manipulate the election. The new judicial procedure is widely seen as a means of providing the Guardian Council and forces close to the supreme leader with additional levers of pressure against the president and his supporters.

This article is presented by Tehran Bureau, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as part of the Iran project at iranprimer.usip.org.

Spotlight | 'One Arrives and One Departs': The Poetry of Bijan Jalali

$
0
0

jalali1.jpg


Elegance in concision, eloquence in simplicity.

[ spotlight ] Bijan Jalali was born in 1928 in Tehran, where he received his elementary and secondary education. For several years he studied physics at the University of Tehran and natural sciences in Paris and Toulouse. Ultimately, his passion for poetry led him to obtain a bachelor's degree in French literature from the University of Tehran. Over the course of his professional life until his retirement in 1981, Jalali taught English and French, consulted with the Ministry of Culture's Museum of Anthropology, and worked for Tehran's Petrochemical Organization as a translator. In 1999, he passed away in the city of his birth.

my poems

have not stepped

further than joy

and sorrow


the same joy and sorrow

that bring me to

you

Jalali's first collection of poetry was published in the early 1960s, later than most of his contemporaries. Nine volumes of his work have been released: Days (1962), Our Hearts and the World (1965), Color of Waters (1971), Water and Sun (1983), Play of Light: Selected Poems (1990), Dailies (1995), About Poetry (1998), Encounters (2001), and Verse of Silence: A Selection of Unpublished Poems (2002).

I have something

to say that I have yet

to write

for it is whiter

than paper

Poetics and lyricism developed simultaneously in the Persian literary tradition. Consequently, poetry has been conceptualized and described to Persian readers as lyrical. Simin Behbahani (b. 1927), a distinguished voice in Iranian literature, has credited Jalali with changing the mode of perception of traditional poetry readers toward sher-e sepid ("white," or free, verse), an evolving tradition in Persian poetry that does not adhere to regular schemes of rhyme and meter. In terms of composition, Jalali's poetry bears no similarities to classical verse and very few to sher-e no (modern verse). The reader does not encounter dazzling diction or complicated verbiage, but an unadorned, straightforward phraseology expressed through a lighthearted and unpretentious voice. Jalali's eloquence resides not in complexity and sophistication but in simplicity. His verse is filled with lifelike, unemphatic narratives.

cleansing

in the sound

of waves


the sea

for long appears

in uproar


and I am

a pebble

resting on seabed

In his introductory essay, "On the Components of Rhetorical Analysis," the prominent poet and scholar Mohammad Reza Shafi'i Kadkani (b. 1939) asserts that classical literary critics did not examine the overall structure of a poem, but rather focused on each beyt, a metrical unit in Perso-Arabic poetry more or less equivalent to the line in English poetry. In contemporary Persian poetry, poems are not assessed on the basis of each line. Kadkani further argues that a poem may not employ any literary devices, yet still masterfully convey a message that both resonates meaningfully with the poet's readers and transcends their time and place. Jalali's verse departs from qualities of the classical tradition. There is no reliance on figures of speech or literary devices such as hyperbole. Jalali skillfully makes use of a great body of imagery, strengthened by his sharp observations and brevity. His body of work has redefined the role of aesthetics in Persian poetry by placing an elegantly simple and brief form of expression at the heart of the poetic process.

how much of a poet

does one need to be

to see

or to recite

a flower

An extension of his personality, Jalali's imagination is gentle and peaceful. "When you met him, and if you did not know he was a poet, you would never be able to find out. He never talked about it; although he always engaged you in a deep discussion about many things," writes Goli Emami, a distinguished writer and translator. Jalali has dealt with enduring despair, largely due to the heartbreaking death of his adopted son, a tragedy from which he never recovered. Remarkably, Jalali's poetry is profoundly at peace with the world.

looking at it

carefully -- a flower

is everything


and it seems

that the world is big

staring at us

with its astonished

bright eyes

All the same, his pain remains tangible and heartfelt, which gives the serenity of his verse more depth. For instance:

I entrust my sorrow

to words

that ripple

like a sea

that drowns me

One of the most dynamic elements of Jalali's verse is the place of dialogue and the absence of authority, the latter defined as the poet's lack of judgment. Readers are given intellectual space to freely probe their unique points of view. In Encounters, published posthumously, Jalali writes, "There exists in my poems a continuous dialogue, at times with God, the world, or nature. In this regard, these poems always possess a dark and a bright side, but their common factor is the continuation of thought at large." Jalali turns his thoughts and observations into short narratives; many of his poems would work perfectly as the beginning or concluding sentences of a novel: "only possibilities smiled / and passed me by / leaving me / befallen / to impossibilities." Another example:

It was for you

my long-enduring silence

and it is for you

now that I disclose

the silence of my past

History is not at all present in Jalali's verse. His disregard for historical developments and events sets him apart from many of his contemporaries who adhered to the poetry of commitment (littérature engagée). The theory of commitment, which declares that the artist has a responsibility to society, was circulated before and after the Iranian Revolution -- prevalent in the works of Kadkani, Ahmad Shamlu (1925-2000), Saeed Soltanpour (1940-81), Mohammad Mokhtari (1942-98), and others. Labeled as gheyr-e moteahed (noncommitted), poets such as Sohrab Sepehri (1928-80) and Jalali were dismissed by some for their disregard of the anxieties of their era. Jalali was uncontroversial and quiet. He did not make headlines or receive much media attention at all. He was weary of geopolitical history. The history of the human struggle to achieve happiness and reconcile with the forces of nature -- this is what preoccupied his mind and shaped his artistic imagination.

the world begins

where I end

where i am no more

tall mountains rise

and roaring rivers flow


i begin where

the world ends

where mountains are flat

and roaring rivers no longer flow


it is there

where my heart -- in its emptiness -- beats

like a volcano

Describing his poems as dialogues with the world, Jalali wrote, "It means that they express an idea and further provide a background that ignites a passion for thinking and ruminating. These dialogues always remain interrupted, unfinished, which creates a sense of anticipation. They do not have a logical form, whether outwardly or inwardly, and thus they are not an impediment to the reading process; the path for continued thinking is wide open thereafter."

Jalali was a devout animal lover and shared his home with many dogs and cats. Devoted to his mother, he never married. The Bijan Jalali Literary Award was established in memory of his lasting accomplishments.

***

one arrives

and one departs

and their sweet

smiles turn bitter


pity the myth

that we weave

every time

like cobweb


a housewife,

one unfamiliar to us

freely tears

rubs and

throws it all

away


**


should someone ask

for me tell them

he has gone to watch

the rain


if they insist

tell them he has gone

to see the storms


if they prove

adamant tell them

he will not return


All translations by Aria Fani. Comments af@ariafani.com.

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Background | Fierce Debate over Diaspora Activists' Statement

$
0
0

ukdownwithenglish.jpgAre signatories 'Fifth Columnists' or representatives of the new face of Iranian patriotism?

[ background ] Last month, a group of 185 Iranians in the diaspora released a statement that called on the Islamic Republic to "temporarily and conditionally suspend its uranium enrichment" and immediately cease all "military aspects of [its] nuclear program," of which the Iranian regime has persistently denied there are any. The statement (which can be read here in the original Farsi or here in an English translation) followed the report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on November 8 that expressed "serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme."

The statement -- whose intended "main audience is the Iranian people" in the homeland, one of its drafters, activist Ali Afshari, said in an interview with Tehran Bureau -- sparked passionate debate around the diaspora, especially passages that some readers understood to be hinting at a call for Western military intervention:

The destructive consequences of war and occupation require no explanation. But in our opinion, mere verbal and written condemnation of war and world military leaders and those who fan the flames domestically cannot prevent military aggression. [...]

A complete parting of ways of international society and the Iranian people's struggle for freedom...will encourage the world powers to choose the military option with the aim of eliminating nuclear and military institutions. [...]

[I]n the final analysis, the cause of the current international crisis is the system of the Islamic Republic in general and its extremist wing, which through its miscalculations will fan the flames of a probable war. To oppose war, one must target those in the government who create the crises.

On November 21, Al Jazeera published a fierce-toned commentary by Columbia University Professor Hamid Dabashi, in which he suggested that the statement (along with other public comments by members of the diaspora that have more explicitly advocated intervention) raised the question of when "does noble opposition to a tyrannical regime end, and treacherous collaboration with belligerent warmongering against one's own people begins." He perceived the statement as evidence of "the formation of a 'postmodern Fifth Column' that is now winking and elbowing to entice and encourage the US and Israel to invade Iran.... [W]hat they do and say is the Orwellian nightmare all over again: They issue a statement calling it 'against war', which in fact paves the way for war."

Six days later, Tehran Bureau published an opinion piece by columnist Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of Southern California, that raised questions about the statement's accuracy, in particular its claims that the Islamic Republic has "deviated from the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty" and is a "threat to world peace and stability," which he said "has no basis in reality."

Sahimi noted that the "original draft of the statement had a paragraph which stated that 'humanitarian intervention' can be justified under certain circumstances, which was removed from the version that was issued." He objected strongly to the notion, reporting an email he sent to one of the statement's primary authors in which he wrote, "What you call humanitarian is what people like me call military intervention."

Dabashi, who may also have had access to an early draft of the statement, attacked the concept throughout his piece, as in the following passage, which commences with vociferous irony:

There is no colonialism, no imperialism, no national sovereignty -- these are all fictions that "old lefties" have made up. [...]

To crown these pieces of rare jewellery, these postmodern Fifth Columnists celebrate the idea of "humanitarian intervention". No, they insist, this is not a military strike, nor is it imperialism. It is "humanitarian intervention" -- just as the US and NATO say it is, from which sources these good folks take their cues. The link between knowledge and power has scarce been more at a gunpoint.

A response from one of the statement's signatories, author Setareh Sabety, appeared on Tehran Bureau on November 30. While she named neither Dabashi or Sahimi, she referred to their respective commentaries (to which Tehran Bureau provided links) and wrote,

Now we even have some Iranian American academics...who want to lay claim to being the intelligentsia of the opposition and still remain fashionably leftist, lecturing us on how American or Western "humanitarian intervention" is not so humanitarian. As if we didn't know! As if we are as naïve as the students who sit in their 101 classes. We know all about Western intervention and imperialism and we frankly prefer it to our own Islamist rulers. Call me what you want -- or worse, call me a neocon -- but I am expressing the pent-up anger of many Iranians who are fed up with the empty rhetoric of the fashionable left, which refuses to come up with a new grammar for the post-imperialist world and has no clue how to digest our post-Islamist embrace of the West. [...]

The utopian promises of the Islamists and the anti-imperialists have both left us jaded. No ideological posturing will satiate our need to breathe the fresh air of everyday liberty.

Responding to a Tehran Bureau request for a comment on the controversy over the statement, one of the group's leading voices, Assistant Professor Borghan Nezami Narajabad of Rice University, replied via email:

First, let me bring to your attention two clear statements from Dabashi's article. He states that "In one way or another the Islamic Republic will develop nuclear weapons capabilities -- and there is very little that the apartheid Israeli garrison state sitting on hundreds of nuclear bombs and refusing even to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can do about the matter." He [goes on] to state: "both the Jewish State and the Islamic Republic appear as two garrisons destined to dismantle each other -- for good".

These are precisely the reasons...why the 185 signatories of our letter worry and why they want to stop the Islamic Republic's confrontation with the world powers. I understand why Al Jazeera and its Qatari owners might be interested in an isolated Iran. I understand why they might publish an article which calls 185 of the finest Iranian activists (more than 45 of them former prisoners of conscience) with the same name that the I.R.'s leader repeatedly uses to address his opposition: "fifth column." After all, Qatar has managed to reach the highest GDP per capita in the world by exporting gas from the largest natural gas field, the South Pars, which it shares with Iran, while international isolation and numerous sanctions prevent Iran from utilizing its share. Of course it is easy for Mr. Dabashi and Qatar to promote "anti-imperialism" and "anti-zionism" when they are not paying its price.

The Iranian activists who signed our letter oppose the war and state, "To oppose war, one must target those in the government who create the crises." We demand the I.R. to curtail its confrontational approach. That is the only way to remove the sanctions and rule out the possibility of military confrontation from the horizon. Mr. Dabashi, on the other hand, doesn't hide his desire for a fatal (and possibly nuclear) confrontation between Iran and Israel. It's ironic that he doesn't at least refrain from citing Orwell when he calls us "warmonger[s]"!

[Concerning Sahimi's criticism of the statement's accuracy in regard to its description of Iran's nuclear activities], I just refer to the numerous UN security council resolutions, specially resolution 1929 (ratified in June 2010). The resolution which imposed international sanction on Iran "Affirms that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008)." On a separate but related subject, it is also necessary to remind ourselves that the same resolution "Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology", while the I.R. continues to do so. Less than two weeks ago its main man in charge of the ballistic missiles program, Major General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, was killed while doing experiments with ballistic missiles. [See here and here for more on the incident to which Narajabad refers.]

[Concerning Sahimi's criticism of the claim that the Islamic Republic is a present "threat to world peace and stability"], I shall say I don't know what Mr. Sahimi calls "reality", but just the recent attack on the British embassy in Tehran on Monday Nov. 29, (which was condemned unanimously by the UN Security Council) and the alleged plot against the Saudi ambassador in Washington (condemned by the UN General Assembly on Nov 18, 2011) shows that the Islamic Republic has little respect for the most basic rules of conduct in the international arena. We call such a government "a threat to world peace and stability." Iranian people have suffered from all sorts of brutalities. The crackdown of their peaceful demonstrations by the I.R. security forces in 2009 is still fresh in our minds. The burden of sanctions, which are caused by the I.R.'s "anti-imperialistic" ambitions, [is] piling up on the shoulders of [the] Iranian people. We believe that [the] Iranian people are tired of paying for the anti-imperialism bill.

On the matter of the alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir, Sahimi wrote a commentary for Tehran Bureau in October that raised doubts on several grounds about the U.S. Justice Department's claim that Islamic Republic officials were involved in any such plot.

Afshari, who spoke with Tehran Bureau via phone, said he believed that Dabashi had reached a "significant misunderstanding" of the statement, that his Al Jazeera commentary was replete with "baseless accusations," and that "I do not consider that article a worthy criticism. That's not any relation with our statement." While Afshari said that he viewed Sahimi's piece "considered and valuable as a criticism," he did not cite any specific points on which it had swayed him.

Turning to the statement itself, Afshari said, "In my opinion and in the perspective of the 185 signatories, the recent report of the IAEA shows that the Iranian nuclear program is converting to a military way." (See here for Sahimi's commentary on the IAEA report, in which he argues that it presents virtually no evidence of any such ongoing or recent military conversion.)

"It is important that the Iranian government shows it has proof that it has no military goals with the program," Afshari continued. "They have to take some practical steps.... If the Iranian government becomes capable of producing nuclear bombs, this leads to unnecessary instability in the region, and that's not good for world peace."

Afshari concluding by emphasizing his belief that his primary "responsibility is to prevent further hardship for the Iranian people. The sanctions are a fact on the ground. The first step is to suspend [uranium enrichment] to remove the sanctions; after that, to build confidence that there is no intention to use [Iran's nuclear material] for military purposes."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

Follow Tehran Bureau on Facebook and Twitter.

Media Watch | IRGC Displays Downed American Drone

$
0
0

[ media watch ] On Sunday, Iran said that it had shot down a U.S. stealth drone near the country's eastern border. American officials disputed the story.

"[T]here is absolutely no indication up to this point that the drone was shot down," an unnamed official told VOA. The denial was carried by the new "Virtual U.S. Embassy in Iran," a website launched to offer Iranians "another perspective and another source of information."

U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal that the craft could have been "an unmanned reconnaissance plane that veered off course [in Afghanistan] and crashed last week," perhaps due to "a mechanical failure."

But today The New York Times noted that "the stealth technology of the RQ-170 -- which greatly reduces the chances that the drone can be detected by radar -- had little use in western Afghanistan, because the Taliban have no radar to detect flights."

The report also said,

The stealth C.I.A. drone that crashed deep inside Iranian territory last week was part of a stepped-up surveillance program that has frequently sent the United States' most hard-to-detect drone into the country to map suspected nuclear sites. [...]

Until this week, the high-altitude flights from bases in Afghanistan were among the most secret of many intelligence-collection efforts against Iran, and American officials refuse to discuss it. But the crash of the vehicle, which Iranian officials said occurred more than 140 miles from the border with Afghanistan, blew the program's cover.

Yesterday, the Journal reported that U.S. officials considered conducting a covert mission inside Iran to retrieve or destroy the "crashed" stealth drone but decided against the risk, afraid it might provoke "a more explosive clash with Tehran."

As noted by a news roundup by Ali Alfoneh of the conservative American Enterprise Institute, Fars News Agency released some technical specifications of the RQ-170 drone, stressing that the intelligence gathered by it did not self-destruct.

Iran has also said that Russian and Chinese experts have asked for access to the drone.

Copyright © 2011

Video | Missing Ex-FBI Agent: 'Help Me'

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

Via AP:

The family of retired FBI agent Robert Levinson, who vanished years ago in Iran, issued a plea to his kidnappers Friday and, for the first time, released a hostage video they received from his unidentified captors.

The video message released on the Levinson family's website publicly transformed the mysterious disappearance into an international hostage standoff. Despite a lengthy investigation, however, the U.S. government has no evidence of who is holding the 63-year-old father of seven.

Copyright © 2011

Viewing all 492 articles
Browse latest View live