Quantcast
Channel: FRONTLINE: Tehran Bureau | PBS
Viewing all 492 articles
Browse latest View live

News | Obama Administration, Romney Court Israel on Iran Showdown

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

ThomasDonilon2010Crop.jpg 10:50 p.m. IRDT, 8 Mordad/July 29 Israel's relatively liberal newspaper Haaretz reports that in his trip to Israel two weeks ago, Thomas Donilon, President Barack Obama's national security adviser, presented the U.S. plans for an attack on Iran. According to Haaretz,

Donilon sought to make clear that the United States is seriously preparing for the possibility that negotiations will reach a dead end and military action will become necessary. He said reports of such preparations were not just a way to assuage Israel's concerns.... Donilon shared information on U.S. weaponry and military capabilities for dealing with Iran's nuclear facilities, including those deep underground.

Those capabilities include a new bunkerbuster bomb weighing 15 tons that can destroy hardened underground targets, presumably including Iran's uranium enrichment facility at Fordow.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton also recently visited Israel, and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta will do so this week.

Meanwhile, European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, chief negotiator for the P5+1 in its talks with Iran, met with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and told him that the recent meeting in Istanbul between her deputy Helga Schmid and Ali Bagheri, deputy to chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, did not result in any progress. Ashton said that she would nonetheless continue the process until "she could show Europeans that she had done everything possible before abandoning the diplomatic track."

Romney visits Israel, says "ayatollahs...testing our moral defenses"

Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, arrived in Israel where he met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In a speech, Romney said, "My message to the people of Israel and the leaders of Iran is one and the same: I will not look away, and neither will my country." He added, "Make no mistake: The ayatollahs in Tehran are testing our moral defenses. They want to know who will object, and who will look the other way."

Dan Senor, Romney's chief foreign policy adviser, said, "If Israel has to take action on its own, in order to stop Iran from developing that capability the governor would respect that decision.... Gov. Romney recognizes Israel's right to defend itself, and that it is right for America to stand with it."

Netanyahu told Romney he "couldn't agree more" with his remarks regarding Iran. "We have to be honest and say that all the sanctions and diplomacy so far have not set back the Iranian program by one iota," declared the prime minister. "And that's why I believe that we need a strong and credible military threat coupled with the sanctions to have a chance to change that situation."

As noted here in March, addressing the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Romney brought out an innovative interpretation of the stated position of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog group, claiming, "We may not know when Iran will secure sufficient fissile material to threaten the entire world, but the IAEA warns that that hour is fast approaching."

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook


News | Health Group: Sanctions Put Tens of Thousands of Iranian Children at Risk

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

HemophiliacSociety.jpg 11:40 p.m. IRDT, 9 Mordad/July 30 The board of directors of the Iranian Hemophilia Society has informed the World Federation of Hemophilia that the lives of tens of thousands of children are being endangered by the lack of proper drugs, a consequence of international economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. According to the Society, despite misleading statements from certain elements in the West, the export of drugs to Iran has not been banned; however, the sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and the country's other financial institutions have severely disrupted the purchase and transfer of medical goods. Describing itself as a nonpolitical organization that has been active for 45 years, the Society condemned the "inhumane and immoral" U.S. and E.U. sanctions and appealed to international organizations for help.

This adds to the growing number of reports that many crucial drugs are unavailable in Iran due to the sanctions imposed on Iran's financial institutions, which are no longer able to provide lines of credit for their importation.

Rezaei: After Syria it will be Iran's turn

In a nationally broadcast television program, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary-general of the Expediency Discernment Council and former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, issued a dire prediction about the crisis in Syria, reflecting the Islamic Republic's mounting concerns about developments in the region.

After toppling the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the United States and other enemies of the Islamic Republic will come after us.... What is happening in Syria and the economic sanctions [imposed on Iran] are just the beginning.... They [the United States and its allies] know that so long as there is Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime, it would be very difficult to attack us because we have a long hand in the Mediterranean Sea. They want Assad toppled and Hezbollah weakened so that they can control the missiles that can attack Israel from [Lebanon] 70 kilometers away. Then they want to control Iraq and influence Iran. But as a start they have imposed sanctions on Iran to weaken it.

He rejected the view espoused by many senior officials that the United States does not have the power to attack Iran. "I do not accept the notion that the United States cannot attack us, it is we who have prevented it from attacking us. If the U.S. has not attacked us it is because it is aware of Iran's [capacity for a] counterattack."

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem is visiting Tehran to "convey the gratitude of Syria's leader for Iran's principled position concerning Syria." He met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. During a joint press conference with Salehi, Moallem said, "We have called on the opposition parties to turn to negotiations with the government." Salehi advised countries in the region to deal "rationally" with the issue, warning, "It is a whimsical hallucination to assume that change of government in Syria will bring peace and stability to the region." Unless other Middle Eastern states adopt a "benevolent" approach toward developments in Syria, he said, all will bear losses.

Meanwhile, 245 Majles deputies released a statement expressing their support for the Assad regime. They also declared that they back any reform undertaken by the Syrian government that would lead to "people's participation in deciding their fates." The hardline Kayhan newspaper followed suit with its lead headline on Monday: "Iran's Decisive Support for Syria."

Iran to file complaints against U.S. in international court

Majid Jafarzadeh, head of international legal affairs in the Islamic Republic's Foreign Ministry, said that Iran is preparing a complaint against the United States and the European Union to be submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The complaint will be about the economic sanctions that the United States and its allies have imposed on Iran outside of and much harsher than those authorized under United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Khamenei again emphasizes "resistance economy"

In a meeting with a group of scientists, industrialists, and inventors, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei again emphasized the necessity of what he has been referring to since last week as a "resistance economy" in response to sanctions. Declaring that Iran is at a historical juncture, Khamenei said, "The problems and difficulties are minuscule compared with the determination and ideals of this nation.... The resistance economy is not a slogan. It is a fact that can be materialized."

Conditions of Karroubi's detention "worse than Evin"

Mohammad Taghi Karroubi, son of Green Movement leader Mehdi Karroubi, wrote in his blog that the conditions of his father's house arrest are worse than those suffered by the political prisoners in Evin Prison. He said that his father should either be transferred to his own home or incarcerated in Evin as the result of a legal process. He compared his father's detention with the house arrests of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Freeing political prisoners Khatami's main concern

Mehdi Karroubi's eldest son, Hossein Karroubi, reported that former President Mohammad Khatami has told him that his primary focus is on freeing the political prisoners, including the elder Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and his wife, Dr. Zahra Rahnavard. According to Hossein Karroubi, Khatami told him that he sees signs that indicate the political prisoners may be released, though the ex-president offered no specifics. He also said that Khatami emphasized that the reformists must ask the views of the Green Movement leaders before deciding what to do about next year's presidential election.

Ahmadinejad cabinet supports First Vice President Rahimi

A letter addressed to the judiciary written by a minister in Ahmadinejad's cabinet and reportedly signed by all but one cabinet member condemns the accusations made against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi in a major embezzlement case even though no charges have been brought against him. The trial of several people accused of embezzlement in the Bimeh Iran insurance company case has been underway for some time. Over the past few weeks, Rahimi has filed complaints against several newspapers that have reported on his alleged involvement in the case.

Bahareh Hedayat given medical furlough

Bahareh Hedayat, a member of the central committee of Dafter-e Tahkim-e Vahdat (Office for Consolidation of Unity), an umbrella group for many university students' organizations, has been granted a three-day medical furlough to seek treatment for her kidney illness. Charged with "insulting the Supreme Leader and the president" and "propaganda against the nezaam [political system]," she was sentenced after a show trial to ten years' incarceration.

Seven bloggers arrested in Tabriz

Colonel Ghasemloo, head of East Azerbaijan province's cyberspace police, said that seven bloggers have been arrested in Tabriz, the provincial capital, for conducting "unauthorized communications." At least four of the bloggers are under the age of 20.

Two Baha'i prisoners barred from having visitors

Two Baha'i prisoners, Zhinoos Noorani and Roofia Beydaghi, who are imprisoned in Semnan, have been barred from having any visitors. The punishment was imposed after they returned to detention from authorized furloughs and were told that public reports about prison conditions had been attributed to them. The Baha'i religion is not recognized by the Iranian government.

Arrest of nationalist-religious activist

Abdollah Abbasi, a nationalist-religious political activist in Kurdistan, has been arrested. The reason for his detention is not yet clear.

Arrest and conviction of four in the Kurdish region

Shahoo Partovi and Shamzin Ahmadnejad, two Kurdish activists in the West Azerbaijan city of Mahabad, have been convicted, respectively, of "working with an anti-regime party" and "security offenses." Partovi was sentenced to three years' incarceration; Ahmadnejad, to one year. Two other Kurdish activists, Rasool Ghader-Haji and Farhang Evasi, have also been arrested.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

News | 4 Death Sentences in $2.6B Bank Fraud; Case Opened on Larijani Brother

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

4:30 a.m. IRDT, 10 Mordad/July 31 Thirty-nine defendants have been convicted by an Iranian court of involvement in a $2.6 billion bank fraud that roiled the Islamic Republic's government last autumn. Four of those convicted have received death sentences; none of their names has been publicly revealed, as is true of most of the other defendants. Professor Muhammad Sahimi, a frequent contributor to Tehran Bureau, spoke Monday with PRI's The World about the case:

MohseniEjeiJuly302012.jpgPress TV, the English-language subsidiary of state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, reported on the case in the following fashion:

Iran's judiciary spokesman says a Tehran court has sentenced to death four people convicted in the biggest embezzlement case in the country's banking history.

"Of 39 defendants, whose charges were heard, the court's judge has sentenced four to death and two others to life imprisonment. The remaining defendants received prison terms of 25 years, 20 years, 10 years, and less," Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei [pictured Monday at left] was quoted by IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency] as saying on Monday.

The first court session in Iran's biggest bank fraud case was held on February 18.

The defendants were charged with misappropriating a total of USD 2.6 billion of funds by using forged documents to obtain credit from banks to purchase state-owned companies.

According to the indictment, the owners of the Aria Investment Development Company, which is at the center of the controversy, had bribed bank managers to get loans and letters of credit. The company has more than 35 affiliates which are active in diverse business activities.

Seven state-owned and private Iranian banks are said to be involved in the fraud case.

Former CEO of Iran's Melli Bank Mohammad Reza Khavari, who is one of the main suspects in the case, escaped justice after the scam was revealed.

Late last September, within a day after leaving his post as chief of Iran's largest bank, Khavari fled to Canada, where he and other members of his family hold dual citizenship.

***

MJLarijaniJamaran.jpg The Iranian Students News Agency reports that a criminal case has been opened against Mohammad Javad Larijani, the elder brother of Majles Speaker Ali Larijani and the chief of Iran's judicial system, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani. Currently the head of the judiciary's human rights council, Mohammad Javad Larijani has previously served as a Majles representative and a deputy minister of foreign affairs. Ali Reza Avayi, Tehran province's chief prosecutor, stated that the case involves illegal land profiteering. According to a report from Azerbaijan's Trend News Agency,

Prior to opening the case, Avayi spoke to Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani, who urged the prosecutor to continue investigation.

"He said that there should be no exceptions regarding such issues, and the investigation on the case should continue. He noted that if a basis exists, a case should be opened," Avayi said of talks with Sadegh Larijani.

Some time ago, Bamdad-e Khabar website released a report on land speculation. It alleged that Mohammad Javad Larijani has illegally seized 342 hectares [845 acres] of protected land.

The powerful Larijani brothers have long been political adversaries of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Last November, in a speech to a group of supporters in Tehran, Ahmadinejad, while discussing his differences "with the heads of the other two branches of the political system" -- Ali and Sadegh Larijani -- made a cutting reference to "land around Tehran that someone has taken over."

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

The IRGC Strategic Brain Trust | Part 1: Ghasem Soleimani and Ahmad Vahidi

$
0
0

6CE998D0-3216-4402-A27A-EE0CFC61B505_mw800_s.jpg

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' two paramount strategists.

Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of Southern California, is a columnist for Tehran Bureau and contributes regularly to other Internet and print media.
[ profiles ] There are very few military forces in the world that receive more international media coverage than Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It seems that practically every news item about Iran mentions the Revolutionary Guards, often prominently. And as speculation about possible military attacks on Iran persists, the role of the Guards -- or Sepah, as they are often called inside the country -- will be pivotal in any resulting confrontation.

As I have previously described (see, for example, here, here, and here), the Revolutionary Guards are the most powerful institution in Iran. Their power is due not solely to their military might and the fact that they consume the lion's share of Iran's military expenditures, but also to their political and economic clout and the large number of officers -- most of them officially retired, but some still on active duty -- who have penetrated every branch of government.

Since 2005, the administrations of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have included at least seven cabinet ministers who have served as Guard officers: Parviz Fattah, deputy head of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the Guards' engineering arm, and former minister of power; Masoud Mirkazemi, former minister of commerce and then oil; Interior Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najar, former defense minister; Sadegh Mahsooli, former head of three different ministries -- interior, welfare, and labor; Hossein Saffar Harandi, former minister of culture and Islamic guidance and currently senior adviser to Guard chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari; Minister of Power Majid Namjoo; Minister of Oil Rostam Ghasemi, former head of Khatam ol-Anbiya; and Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi.

171479_441.jpgTehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pictured here with Soleimani) is a retired Guard brigadier general and former commander of its air wing. Most provincial governors and many mayors are former Guard officers. The secretary-general of the Expediency Discernment Council is retired Major General Mohsen Rezaei, who was the Guards' top commander for 16 years. Judiciary chief Sadegh Larijani's senior adviser is Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, one of the most hardline Guard officers.

Majles Speaker Ali Larijani, another former Guard officer, worked for years in the Guards' ideological division, trying to modernize the theoretical basis for Velaayat-e Faghih (the doctrine of rule by the Islamic jurist, in the person of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei). At least 66 deputies in the newly seated Majles are former Guard and Basij officers, including influential figures such as Esmail Kosari, Parviz Soroori, Ali Reza Zakani, Mehdi Eisazadeh, Mohammad Esmail Saeedi, Mohammad Ashoori, Abbas Ali Mansoori, Javad Karimi Qoddoosi, and Ebrahim Agha Mohammadi. The parliamentary Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy is essentially controlled by retired Guard officers, as are several other powerful legislative commissions.

Most of the sensitive positions in the armed forces have been given to Guard officers. For example, in addition to Vahidi, Major General Hassan Firoozabadi, chief of staff of the armed forces, began his military career as a member of the Basij militia and is considered a Guard officer. The most important intelligence posts, particularly those involving internal security, are controlled by the Guards' intelligence unit. The Ministry of Intelligence itself is filled with current and former Guard officers.

Guard-linked companies have taken over much of the national economy. Many Iranian economists estimate that a significant portion of the official national economy is controlled directly or indirectly by the Guards. As for the unofficial or black market economy, the Guards use many jetties that are out of control of the custom office to import vast quantities of goods. This was famously mocked by Ahmadinejad, himself a former Guard operative, when he referred to the Guards' illegal imports as "baraadaraan-e ghachaghchi-ye khodemaan" (our own smuggling brothers). The Guards' intervention in the national economy has become so glaring that it has brought criticism even from some conservatives. In response, the Guards recently felt obliged to declare that all profits made by Guard-linked companies will be spent on the development of poverty-stricken regions and that "Khatam ol-Anbiya will not take part in projects that cost less than 300 billion tomans" -- about $250 million according to the official rate of exchange. There is, of course, no way of independently verifying such claims.

As I have discussed in the past, the Guards' drive to gain political and economic power began almost immediately after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was appointed Supreme Leader in June 1989. As he had no significant base of popular support and was not held in high esteem by the senior clerics, he relied heavily on the security and intelligence forces, allowing the Guards to enter the economic arena under the pretext of using the experience that Khatam ol-Anbiya had gained during the eight-year war with Iraq. During the presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-97) and the first term of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2001), the Guards attempted to influence the political process through cultural activities and intense propaganda; with the nationwide city council elections in 2002, they began to seek overt political power. After the 2009 presidential election, the Guards effectively took control of the nation. Cleric Amrollah Mohammadi, Khamenei's representative to the second district of the Guards' naval forces, recently told IRNA, the state news agency, "In the 1388 [2009] fetneh [sedition, the hardliners' epithet for the Green Movement], a lot of our forces were shaky. Only Sepah stood behind the Supreme Leader to the end."

Who are the Guards' leading strategists? While many senior Guard officers are repeatedly in the news, loudly warning the United States and Israel about the consequences of attacking Iran or boasting about Iranian advances in military hardware, most of these rhetoricians are not considered truly influential. Based on extensive research over the past year, and conversations with two well-informed sources in Iran, we have found that the Guard brain trust appears to consist of five generals, of whom two are paramount. All five are senior commanders, but they will play their most crucial roles as the Guards' true strategists in any military confrontation pitting Iran against the United States and its allies.

***

Unlike what many believe in the West, the top two Guard strategists are not Generals Jafari and Firoozabadi, the corps' top two commanders, but Major General Ghasem Soleimani and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi.

Ghasem Soleimani

As I wrote in a profile of Soleimani published here last December, he is essentially in control of Iran's Middle Eastern policy and reports directly to Khamenei. While Soleimani is lionized in Iran, he and the elite division under his command, the Quds Force, have been accused of intervening in Syria's internal conflict and supporting the regime of President Bashar al-Asaad (pictured above with Vahidi). The charge was recently confirmed by Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, the Guards' deputy chief, who told the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) that the Quds Force is in Syria, but that they are there to prevent the massacre of the people. A few hours after publishing this report, ISNA removed it from its website.

Ahmad Vahidi

7f0bc96f711989520b982a01ea4b3376.jpgAhmad Shah Cheraghi, universally known as Ahmad Vahidi, has been an important military/intelligence figure right from the Islamic Republic's inception in 1979. Born on June 27, 1958, in Shiraz, he received a B.S. in electronics, a M.S. in industrial engineering, and is currently a doctoral student in strategic management at Tehran's Imam Hossein University.

Vahidi joined the Guards in 1979 and the Quds Force when it was formed in 1983. After Mohsen Rezaei's appointment as Guard chief in 1981, he appointed Vahidi deputy chief for intelligence, as well as commander of the Balaal base, which was used for planning and directing operations outside Iran, particularly in Iraq. Vahidi organized the Guards' intelligence directorate and created separate divisions for Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the nonpeninsular Arab nations, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and North Africa, as well as one for special operations. He played a key role in organizing the Ministry of Intelligence, which was established on August 18, 1984.

In the midst of the Iran-Iraq War, President Ronald Reagan approved a plan whereby Israel would supply Iran with TOW antitank missiles and other arms, in return for which Iran would persuade the Lebanese Hezbollah to release seven American hostages held in Lebanon. In August 1985, Israel delivered 96 of the missiles, and one hostage was released. Then, Colonel Oliver North, who was working for the U.S. National Security Council, altered the plan so it became a direct sale of arms to Iran at a marked-up price. The profits were earmarked to aid the Contra forces who were fighting to overthrow the leftist Nicaraguan government of President Daniel Ortega in a campaign that Reed Brody of Human Rights Watch describes as consisting of "bloody abuse of human rights, of murder, torture, mutilation, rape, arson, destruction and kidnapping." This led to the delivery of over 1,000 TOW missiles to Iran in February 1986; by the end of the year, the total had reached 2,000. The United States also supplied Hawk antiaircraft missiles and spare parts for the missiles Iran had previously purchased.

On May 25, 1986, Reagan's national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, and North flew to Tehran under fake Irish passports. They brought a cake in the shape of a key (to "unlock" relations between the two countries), a Bible, and spare parts for 60 Hawk missiles; according to the following account, a gift set of pistols was also part of the package. In his memoirs, former President Rafsanjani writes,

Messrs [Mohsen] Kangarloo [an adviser to then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi] and Ahmad Vahidi, who is in charge of the intelligence unit of Sepah, came to my office and presented a report on the U.S. delegation to Tehran and the U.S.-made Hawk missiles. They had brought with them one quarter of the parts for the [240] Hawk missiles that Iran had purchased before the Revolution. Mr. McFarlane, special adviser to Reagan, and other influential figures are members of the delegation. They have brought a Colt and cake for our leaders, and would like to meet with the leaders. It was decided not to meet with them, not to accept the presents, but talk to them through [Dr. Hassan] Rowhani [a close aide to Rafsanjani; later Iran's chief nuclear negotiator] and Mehdi Nejad [an aide] about [buying] other weapons.

Three days later McFarlane and North left Tehran without meeting any significant figure in the leadership.

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, many Guard commanders who wanted to remain with the military were commissioned and given ranks commensurate with their experience and bravery during the war. Vahidi was made a lieutenant brigadier general (he was later promoted to brigadier general). It is widely believed that Khamenei appointed Vahidi as commander of the Quds Force in 1990, a post he is said to have held until 1997, although this is not mentioned in his official biography. Regardless, there is no question that Vahidi was deeply involved with the Quds Force for a long time. He reportedly brought in the most experienced and seasoned Guard fighters and intelligence officers, turning it into a formidable special unit for operations beyond Iran's borders.

In July 1990, Saddam Hussein's army invaded and occupied Kuwait. An international coalition force led by the United States drove the Iraqi army out. The subsequent revolt of Iraq's Kurdish region was aided by the Quds Force, as was the case during the Iran-Iraq War. During the Balkan war in the first half of the 1990s, the Quds Force provided weapons and training to the Bosnian Muslims who fought Serbian fascist forces.

One of the most important events during Vahidi's tenure with the Quds Force was the bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. On July 18, 1994, a huge explosion at the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina killed 85 people and wounded 250. In August 2003, the British government arrested Hadi Soleimanpour, who was Iran's ambassador to Argentina in 1994, but he was released three months later and returned to Tehran. After years of investigation, two Argentinean prosecutors accused the Islamic Republic in October 2006 of directing the operation. The following November, Interpol published the names of six people, five of them Iranian, and put them on the Interpol Red Notice List (contrary to what some have claimed, presence on the list is not equivalent to an arrest warrant): Generals Rezaei and Vahidi; Ahmad Reza Asghari and Mohsen Rabbani, diplomats in Iran's Buenos Aires embassy at the time of the bombing; then Minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahian; and the Palestinian Imad Fayes Moughnieh, who was assassinated by Israeli operatives in Damascus on February 12, 2008.

After Mohammad Khatami was elected president in 1997, Khamenei appointed then Brigadier General Soleimani as Quds Force chief, and Vahidi was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. Khatami appointed Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, who also served with the Guards during the Iran-Iraq War, as defense minister, and Shamkhani appointed Vahidi as his deputy for planning. He remained in that post until 2005 when Ahmadinejad was elected president. He appointed Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najar as defense minister and Vahidi as his chief deputy. Vahidi also chairs the Political, Defense, and Security Affairs Commission of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is headed by Rafsanjani.

After Ahmadinejad's "reelection" in 2009, he nominated Vahidi as the new defense minister, as Najar had been nominated for the post of interior minister. Internationally, Vahidi's nomination provoked protests; at home, the Majles confirmed his appointment with 227 votes out of a possible 286. Argentina's chief prosecutor Alberto Nissman condemned the appointment due Vahidi's alleged involvement in the Buenos Aires bombing. Then State Department spokesman Philip Crowley called the Iranian parliament's endorsement of Vahidi "disturbing" and "precisely the wrong message."

436x328_16942_151424.jpgDue to the allegations, Vahidi remains a controversial figure. In May last year, Argentina's government and its Jewish community protested his invitation to Bolivia to take part in a ceremony. He was ordered to leave Bolivia, and Bolivian President Evo Morales apologized to Argentina's Jewish community for having hosted him.

Vahidi has been a major proponent of Iran becoming self-sufficient in the production of a wide range of conventional weapons. Iran has a relatively robust arms industry, and during his time at the Ministry of Defense, Vahidi has pushed to increase production of tanks, missiles, and armored personnel carriers. The first Iranian fighter planes, the Saegheh and Shafagh, are in the final test stages before entering service. The former is almost entirely based on the old American fighter F-5, but with more powerful engines and larger wings. The latter is an improved version of Saegheh, which is said to have some radar-evading ability. Neither is at the level of the latest U.S. fighters, but Iran's advancement in this area has been impressive. According to a report released by the Pentagon on June 28, "Iran's military doctrine remains designed to slow an invasion; target its adversaries' economic, political, and military interests, and force a diplomatic solution to hostilities while avoiding any concessions that challenge its core interests"; it concluded that the Islamic Republic possesses a "formidable force defending Iranian territory."

Vahidi is considered loyal to Khamenei. When the rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei became too public to ignore, he acted as the Supreme Leader's observer in the president's cabinet and reportedly submitted a memorandum to Khamenei informing him of the chaos within the cabinet.

In public, Vahidi has always been a hardliner. Appearing on a nationally televised program last July, he was asked about the possibility of an Israeli attack. He responded, "The Zionist regime is in complete isolation, and does not have the power to attack Iran, unless it has decided to commit suicide, because [if it does] it will be hit very hard and will be destroyed."

On June 27 this year, the 25th anniversary of Iraq's chemical weapons attack on the town of Sardasht in West Azerbaijan province, Vahidi accused the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain of helping Iraq to manufacture the chemical bombs (the accusation is credible). The attack killed 110 people and wounded 8,000. In total, Iraqi chemical strikes against Iran killed at least 2,600 people in the short term and injured approximately 100,000, many of whom continue to suffer and die as a result.

The experience of such attacks, aided by the Western powers, have shaped the worldviews of men like Vahidi. They have been in the middle of wars and are keenly aware of their consequences for Iran.

End of Part 1 | Part 2 will describe the strategy-making roles of Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Brigadier General Seyyed Mohammad Hejazi, and Guard chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Media Watch | Israeli Paper Reports Major Military Opposition to Iran Strike

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

BennyGantzTableCrop.jpg 11:55 p.m. IRDT, 11 Mordad/August 1 According to a report Wednesday in the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot that was partially translated into English by the Jewish Daily Forward, anonymous officials have leaked information that key members of Israel's top military brass oppose an attack on Iran. They are said to include Benny Gantz and Ya'akov Ayash, chief of the general staff and chief of operations of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); Tamir Pardo, head of the Mossad; and Aviv Kochavi, who is in charge of Aman, the military intelligence directorate. (The names of these officials are not given in the original report, only their titles.) Perhaps most notable is that the "department heads" of Mossad are also cited as opposing an attack (Mossad has at least eight departments, of which only six have been publicly identified). The Jerusalem Post added that the unnamed sources speaking to Yediot Ahronot were reportedly U.S. officials, and that the head of the Israeli Air Force -- Amir Eshel -- was also among those named as opposing an attack.

The report also noted that at least four members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's eight-man "kitchen cabinet" either oppose an attack or would accept one only as a matter of last resort in the event of an Iranian weaponization breakthrough. Those opposed are reported to be Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy Dan Meridor, Minister without Portfolio Benny Begin, Minister of the Interior Eli Yishai, and Minister for Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya'alon -- who reportedly qualified his dissent by stating that he could support an attack, but only if it were joined by the United States. Shaul Mofaz, the head of the parliamentary opposition, is on record opposing an attack.

This collective opposition to an attack within the Israeli leadership has been reported before in Newsweek and Haaretz, and also in an earlier Yediot Ahronot report published in May. Some former officials like retired Mossad chiefs Meir Dagan and Efraim Halevy, former Aman director Shlomo Gazit, and ex-chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi also oppose an attack, though like Ya'alon, some of those speaking out have qualified their opposition to allow for an attack performed in collaboration with the U.S. military. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom is one of the few ex-intelligence leaders who publicly favors a preventive strike by Israeli forces alone.

Chief of Staff Gantz, for one, has now distanced himself from the Yediot Ahronot report, saying that he has gone neither to the press nor to U.S. officials to voice discontent, and that the IDF will follow whatever orders it is given by the civilian leadership. Gantz has never ruled out an attack on Iran, but is believed to oppose one due to the difficulty of crippling the program for good and the political fallout that such an attack would surely provoke in the region. The prime minister's office is also pushing back on the report.

This is not the first time that the chief of staff has had a position involving Iran contrary to that of the prime minister attributed to him and then walked back. According to an item published by Iran's Mehr News Agency, Gantz recently told a reporter for Israel's Channel 10 network that Israel was not prepared for war with Iran. That video has since been scrubbed, and online commentaries by the right-wing Israeli news portal Arutz Sheva 7 and the center-right Times of Israel on the comments attributed to Gantz have also been taken down in the past few days without explanation. Such actions by Israeli media outlets are not unusual due to the country's strict military censorship laws (indeed, it is strange that cached versions are still accessible.) Israel media watcher Richard Silverstein says that the retraction by Channel 10 was ordered by the Israeli defense minister himself.

Even so, Netnayahu is apparently concerned enough by the Yediot Ahronot report, and perhaps the Channel 10 item as well, that he gone to the press -- something he is generally loath to do, as left-leaning Israeli media outlets often complain -- to warn against any military or intelligence dissension over whatever order he might give on Iran.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

News | Professor Nima Arkani-Hamed Wins Prestigious Physics Prize

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

NimaArkani-Hamed.jpg 12:40 p.m. IRDT, 12 Mordad/August 2 Nima Arkani-Hamed, professor of physics at the Institute for Advanced Study's School of Natural Sciences in Princeton, has been named one of the nine recipients of the inaugural Fundamental Physics Prize, established by Yuri Milner, a former physics student who dropped out of graduate school in 1989 and later earned billions investing in Internet companies like Facebook and Groupon. Arkani-Hamed is a son of Professor Jafar Arkani-Hamed, who used to chair the physics department at Tehran's Sharif University of Technology and is now emeritus professor of earth and planetary sciences at McGill University in Montreal.

Each recipient of the Fundamental Physics Prize will receive $3 million, and together the nine will form a selection committee for future winners of the prize. It is expected that the prize will henceforth be awarded to one physicist annually for what the Milner Foundation describes as "transformative advances in the field."

Born in 1972 in Houston, Texas, Nima Arkani-Hamed received a joint degree in mathematics and physics from the University of Toronto in 1993. He received his Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in Berkeley in 1997, after which he spent two years as a postdoctoral fellow at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. He then joined the Berkeley faculty as an assistant professor in 1999; he was promoted to associate professor two years later. After spending one year at Harvard University as a visiting professor, he joined the faculty and served as a professor of physics from 2002 to 2007. He then joined the Institute for Advanced Study.

Among his previous honors, Arkani-Hamed was recognized as an outstanding young scientist with an Alfred P. Sloan fellowship in 2000-02 and a Packard fellowship in 2000-05. In 2003, he received the Gribov Medal from the European Physical Society and, in 2008, Israel's Raymond and Beverly Sackler Prize in Physics. He was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2009.

One of the greatest questions in physics has been why gravity is so weak compared to the other three fundamental forces in nature. Arkani-Hamed's research has addressed this question and shown how gravity's weakness might be explained by the existence of up to seven extra dimensions of space that cannot, as yet, be directly detected. He has proposed new physical theories that can be tested at CERN's Large Hadron Collider near Geneva, Switzerland.

The other recipients of the prize are Professors Edward Witten, Juan Maldacena, and Nathan Seiberg, all of the Institute for Advanced Study; Andrei Linde of Stanford University; Alexei Kitaev of the California Institute of Technology; Alan Guth of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Maxim Kontsevich of the Institute of Advanced Scientific Studies, outside Paris; and Ashoke Sen of the Harish-Chandra Research Institute in Allahabad, India.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Dispatch | A Surprising Rehabilitation: The Shah in the Eyes of Young Iranians

$
0
0

234875.jpgMany perceive a loss of "respect" in society since the monarchy's fall.

[ dispatch ] More than three decades after Mohammad Reza Shah Phalavi's death and despite relentless official demonization of the former monarch, the younger generations of Iranians have a soft spot for the man whom their parents brought down. Last Thursday, the anniversary of the Shah's death, I spent some time talking to the residents of Tehran about him.

The fifth day of Mordad, the fifth month of the Iranian calendar, is not officially remembered in Iran. No significant event took place on the date according to the official calendar of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, occasional "this day in history" bulletins in state and state-aligned media outlets include a brief mention: "On this day, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, died in exile in Cairo, Egypt, of cancer." That is it.

More than 70 percent of Iranians today were born in the years following the Shah's fall. They do not have any memories of the man who ruled Iran for 37 years and has been portrayed as a Satanic, despotic dictator for the past three decades.

And yet many Iranians born during the late 1970s and 1980s have kind words to say about him. Leila, a 32-year-old teacher and mother of two who lives in central Tehran, tells me, "I think people, particularly our parents, were very unfair to Shah. He was not a bad man at all." I tell her about the SAVAK and all the political prisoners. "Even worse!" she says, "Look at these guys who rule the country now -- compared to them he was a saint!"

Leila might be right; Tehran cabdrivers often refer to Shah as "Oon khoda beyamorz," which literally means "He, who God may rest in peace." I tell one driver -- 20-something Hossein -- who is taking me to Azadi Square, once known as Shahyad or "Shah's memory," that it is the anniversary of the Shah's death. "God rest his soul in peace, these people did not deserve him," he says. I ask why he thinks so. Hossein, the rear of whose car bears a large religious sign, replies, "Those days people were free. My dad bought a Paykan for 24,000 tomans. Those days, Iranians could go anywhere in the world. There was no inflation. He treated them decently." He shakes his head mournfully. "Now look at people lining up for a piece of chicken."

Ordinary Iranians like Leila and Hossein don't feel the need to rely on any statistics or history books; they live in a society where corruption cases against government officials seem to mount unceasingly. A recent text message reads, "Officials have run out of alphabet letters to name the suspected individuals in the 3 billion [dollar] case" -- a reference to the Iranian judiciary's habit of keeping suspects anonymous in official reports by using only their initials.

Ahmad Reza, a lawyer who graduated from the University of Tehran in the early 1990s, comes face to face with corruption on a daily base. "While in university, my professors told us that during the Shah's era the judiciary was secular, while the new judiciary is implementing the laws of Islam," he says. "And yet they would tell us that during the Shah and in a secular system it was impossible to bribe a judge." He is bitter about how his cases are handled. "Today it is hard to find a judge who will not demand a bribe!" For him, the Shah's era was a time when lawyers and judges had "some real respect" in the society.

"Respect" and "respectability" are words one hears often when talking to young Iranians. Thirty-seven-year-old Golam Hossein, a devout Muslim and a native of Isfahan, a city with a strong revolutionary tradition that suffered massive casualties in the war with Iraq, speaks the same way. "People respected the principles more in those days," he declares. He got married when he was 23; his wife, Fatemeh, wears a chador. "Some people look at us differently," he says, "it is like we should not enjoy a good life. My friends often think I am restraining my wife, while it is her choice to wear a chador." Fatemeh explains, "All of the women in my family wear chadors, even during the Shah. They tell me that they were shown more respect in those days. Today, even my chador does not stop men from harassing me."

Golam Hossein sums it up. "Under the Shah, if you wanted to drink or to go to a place to dance you would have done so, and if you wanted to go to a mosque and to pray you would have done so without anyone judging you. Today, everything is out of its place."

One could argue that many ordinary Iranians, especially those who do not remember the Shah's reign, lack sufficient knowledge to speak authoritatively about the country's past. So I talked to Hamid Reza, 38, who was born into a religious family. His brother served at the front while Hamid Reza was a first grader. He works with a few government sponsored research centers and often attends seminars on modern history. He thinks the Shah was not a devil, but was definitely not a saint either. To him, "Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a typical Cold War era dictator, who had some good intentions." He sees the Shah's fate as typical of dictators of that era, men like Afghanistan's Mohammad Zahir Shah and many others. Hamid Reza says, "Looking at him, one realizes that he ignored his law-abiding opposition, tortured Marxists and other leftists, and was not careful about the Islamic beliefs of half of the society." He believes that "it was only natural for Iranian people to rise up against the rule of one person 70 years after their constitutional movement." The Shah's biggest mistake, according to Hamid Reza, was to postpone reforms until it was too late.

There's a question I feel compelled to ask. "Would it have been possible to avoid the Revolution?" Hamid Reza nods. "Revolution was not inevitable. It could have been avoided if the Shah had begun a program for political freedom a few years earlier." I ask him how plausible that would have been given the way Iranian intellectuals despised him and his close affiliation with the West.

"Still revolution might have been avoided," Hamid Reza responds. "It is true that there was no love lost between him and Iranian intellectuals. And the intellectuals did much to vilify the Shah's image among the youth and the masses, but the Shah could have responded by reaching out to the masses." He refers to a set of memoirs in his library by Assadollah Alam, the Shah's minister of court and confidant. "If you read these, you get the idea that the Shah was more concerned with the public opinion in Washington and London than with the public opinion in Tehran or Tabriz."

Others have even harsher words for the Shah. Marziyeh, a graduate student of engineering, tells me, "The Shah was a dictator; his mistakes made the revolution inevitable." She is upset that some people look kindly on the Shah just because "the Revolution has not brought us what people had expected originally."

"Under the Shah, there was no freedom, there were scores of political prisoners, and many like [Khosrow] Golsorkhi was executed," she says. "The SAVAK was infamous for torture. We cannot say the Shah was good because those who came afterward did much worse than him." Marziyeh thinks that "people are just nostalgic about a past they do not even remember. The young ones do not know of the social injustices of that time."

For my last interview, I speak to a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. Ismail is 42 years old. He served at the front during the conflict's last two years, joining the Basij as a volunteer right after he graduated from high school. "It was the natural thing to do," he says. He remembers the days of the Revolution, when he was ten years old. "In our house, TV was forbidden because my father believed it to be haram [religiously prohibited]. We had a radio; he would turn it on to hear the call to prayers." After the Revolution, though, "My father bought a TV. He told us that we had an Islamic government, so TV would not corrupt our morals."

I ask him what he thought of the Shah. "I think people of that generation did not want to have a dialogue with him," Ismail says. I tell him that his comment surprises me. "When I was at the front, I believed everything the nezaam [political system, or regime] told us," he continues. "When I graduated from university, I started to read history." Now he sees things differently. "There was no need for a revolution. People and intellectuals should have talked to him about their demands." He looks at a photo of himself and his friends at the front. "So much bloodshed could have been avoided."

Ali Chenar is a pen name.

by the same author | Tehranis Talk of the Elections' Stakes and Khatami's Shock Ballot | A Swift End for the Innocent: The Sanctions Hit Home | Firewall Fears: Iran's Uncertain Internet Future

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

The State Blog | Nukes and Pipelines

$
0
0

AlexVatankaThumbnail.jpg

The State is a weekly column about Iranian security and diplomatic issues. Alex Vatanka is a scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. Previously he was the managing editor of Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst.

[ comment ] In recent years, Tehran has hoped to become a key strategic energy provider to the energy-craving subcontinent. This week's power blackouts in India and Pakistan's chronic electricity shortages could in theory bolster Iran's appeal to both Islamabad and New Delhi. Iran is after all close by and it has some of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves. In fact, one big-ticket Iranian energy project that has yet to formally succumb to U.S. pressure is a planned 1,700-mile-long pipeline to deliver gas to Pakistan, the so-called Peace Pipeline. But will the pipeline finally be built after years of delay in the project's implementation? Well, not if the United States can help stop it. The failure of Iran to realize this pipeline is to a large extent tied to a broader phenomenon: Tehran's isolation on regional and international stages.

Back in the 1990s, Iran lost big in the Great Game for the hydrocarbon riches of the Caspian Basin. Thanks to intense U.S. lobbying, Iran was never allowed to become a significant player or even a conduit for Caspian oil and gas exploration and exports. The U.S. policy of isolating Iran from regional energy projects is still very much alive and that is why the Peace Pipeline to Pakistan is anything but a done deal. In fact, this week Pakistan's Express Tribune reported that the United States is intensifying efforts to broker a deal between Pakistan and Qatar in order to kill the Peace Pipeline once and for all. According to the paper, "US embassy officials in Pakistan have also been lobbying and holding meetings with stakeholders of the power and energy sector to try to convince [the Pakistanis] that the Iran gas project will not be viable for Pakistan."

If carried out, the Qatari gas would come from a giant field the country shares with Iran, the so-called South Pars/North Field, located in the Persian Gulf. Thanks to Iran's isolation, Qatar is, according to official Iranian estimations, years ahead in exploiting its part of the gas field while Iranian efforts are hampered due to mismanagement and lack of access to capital and technology. This week, the China National Petroleum Corporation pulled out of South Pars citing "unprecedented delays" in the project.

To be fair, not all the obstacles facing the Peace Pipeline can be attributed to U.S. lobbying. The Iranians and Pakistanis have long argued over the price of gas shipments and financing of the project. But U.S. opposition to this and similar strategic projects involving Iran as a stakeholder cannot be denied or underestimated. The fact that Iran is losing $133 million a day in lost crude export revenue -- thanks to sanctions imposed on Tehran for its nuclear program -- made headlines this past week. It is a substantial financial loss, but such loses can still be quickly overturned as soon as the traditional buyers of Iranian crude can return without facing the wrath of the United States. What receives far less attention is the long-term damage and price Iran will pay for having cornered itself -- thanks to its policies -- into a position where it cannot be a stakeholder in regional energy projects despite its strategic location and abundance of energy resources and energy-craving customers nearby.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook


Behind the Curtain | Iranian Social Media Users Challenge Boxer's Disqualification

$
0
0

MazaheriPunchingGomez.jpgMazaheriGomezEntwined.jpg

Images from the bout between Ali Mazaheri (in blue) and José Larduet Gómez (in red).

ArashBlogThumbnail.jpgNegarBlogThumbnail.jpg

Arash Karami is a frequent Tehran Bureau contributor. Negar Mortazavi is an Iranian journalist based in Washington, D.C.
[ blog ] Iranian Internet users took to social media outlets to protest the disqualification of an Iranian boxer at the London Olympics on Wednesday. Ali Mazaheri, one of Iran's main hopes for a medal, was ahead of his Cuban rival, José Larduet Gómez, by two points going in to the second round of their heavyweight bout when the referee disqualified him. The 2007 Asian champion was called for holding Larduet Gómez three separate times in a span of 56 seconds. (See video of the match here.)

After shaking hands with the Cuban coaches, Mazaheri left the ring and did not await the referee's official announcement. He later called the match a "fix" and a "setup" and said that he "could have got a bronze easily if it hadn't been for that." After reviewing the fight, the International Boxing Association (known as the AIBA) suspended German referee Frank Scharmach for five days but did not overturn the decision.

The young boxer's disqualification has sparked an outpouring of reactions from Iranians in social media circles. A popular Facebook page, Marg Bartarinn, has posted an image of Mazaheri from the bout, asking users to protest the result of the fight with a "Like"; over 30,000 users have liked the photo thus far. Thousands of Iranian Facebook users have also attacked the Olympics' official London 2012 Facebook page by posting comments on the photo of another boxing match, writing -- mostly in English -- declarations along the lines of "Ali Mazaheri is the real winner." Some Iranians, however, have criticized Mazaheri for leaving the ring before the official announcement, calling the act unprofessional. The last controversy at the Olympic Games to involve an Iranian boxer occurred in 1992 at Barcelona when Ali Kazemi was disqualified from a light-heavyweight match for failing to bring his gloves.

Less than an hour before the Mazaheri fight, Japan's Satoshi Shimizu lost to Azerbaijan's Magomed Abdulhamidov in a controversial decision. The result of that fight was overturned after Japanese officials filed an appeal and the referee, who is from Turkmenistan, has been expelled from the AIBA.

According to the AIBA's technical and competition rules, a boxer is automatically disqualified after receiving a third warning in a bout. It appears that Mazaheri's departure from the ring before Scharmach's announcement renders him ineligible to appeal the outcome.

Copyright © 2012 Arash Karami and Negar Mortazavi

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Dispatch | The Open Secrets of Ramadan

$
0
0

13910431114236755_PhotoL.jpg "I don't like to go outside anymore. It's not my country."

[ essay ] I arrived in Iran during Ramadan, when it falls on the hottest month of the year. Today the temperature in the city has already risen to a scorching 35 degrees Centigrade and yet according to Islamic law, no adult has been able to eat or drink since 4:30 this morning and won't be able to until 8:30 tonight. The only get-out is a doctor's note for the sick, elderly, or pregnant. I've heard that traffic accidents rise during the Holy Month as hunger makes for frayed tempers and desperate driving, but according to my cousins, very little changes in Iran because so few people are actually fasting.

"Ninety percent of people who say they are fasting are lying," cousin A. tells me. Twenty-four years old and about to be qualified as a doctor, she's taking advanced English language classes while she waits to defend her thesis. According to her, the purpose of Ramazan, as it's called here, is to become a better person. Lying is banned, as is gossip, and all good Muslims should pray more, study the Qur'an, and converse with their God. She tells me the rules are in a book that everyone gets from their mullah.

"You each have a mullah?" I ask.

The answer comes back: "Ninety percent of people who tell you they visit their mullah are lying." She laughs, then explains that when children reach maturity (nine years old for girls, 15 for boys, according to Islamic law) they should be assigned one to assist them with matters of religious observance. More commonly, they're given a book to consult. Why isn't she fasting? "Its toooooo difficult!" she says. She did it once and lost some weight. "Losing weight is the only good thing."

Another cousin, middle-aged S., reckons that at least 50 percent of the country will be fasting; most of the observers, she says, live in the countryside and small towns. City dwellers are the ones likely to be breaking the rules, their religious traditions overwhelmed by busy urban lives.

H. agrees, but thinks there's another reason for the rule breaking. She has returned home from a painting class, where she says no one was fasting. When they discussed why, they all agreed that the regime itself has turned people against their own religion. She grins and produces a half-empty bag of cheese balls, the absent half devoured with her classmates, as if to prove the point.

But this hasn't always been her way; she used to fast. One evening, when we're driving home at dusk, she tunes the radio to the call to prayer. It reminds her of when this time of day felt truly spiritual. She tells me that fasting is all about empathizing with the poor and practicing self-discipline. But now she can't do it, she says, because she's addicted to tea and gets a headache if she doesn't drink it.

I wonder about the punishment for violating the fast. D. and her mom think that it's a whipping, maybe 60 or 80 lashes, with shirt on or off according to the judge's discretion. I ask if such cases are written up in the newspapers. Apparently not. And I'm guessing such punishments are rare. L., who works for a state oil and gas company, tells me that everyone at her office is snacking under their desks and in the bathrooms. They just turn a blind eye to each other. I'm not observing Ramazan, although I probably should try it for a day. No one I've met is either, not my cousins or their friends or my elderly and rather religious uncle or his nurses.

So far for me, Ramazan means watching a lot of TV, which is good because my Persian is very basic. Children's TV is good. Toy Story 3 dubbed into Persian has given me the useful phrases "Bebinim ki injaast!" (look who we have here) and "Hich kasi seda-to nemishnavad" (no one can hear your voice), the latter delivered menacingly by Mr. Potato Head. The cousins find this boring, as apparently the film is repeated so often. Their satellite dish was removed from their apartment block's roof a year ago -- helicopter spotter teams scour the area even as we watch -- and they can't afford to buy another one, so they are stuck, like most people, with just the state-approved TV channels. During Ramazan, they broadcast an endless stream of moral dramas, two- and three-parters by some of Iran's most popular directors that are watched by millions of Iranians during the afternoon and as they breakfast at dusk.

Today we watch three: Goodbye Baby, Hidden Secrets, and Maybe It Happens to You Too. The first is an emotional two-parter about a woman who has a miscarriage, her fourth. As she recovers in her hospital bed wearing a multitoned pink habit known as a maghnaeh (imagine Barbie as a nun), her husband speaks with the doctor in an unlikely gilded waiting room with white satin chairs. He learns that it would endanger her life to conceive again. Distraught, he books an appointment at an adoption clinic. When the couple return home, the husband goes to work and his traumatized wife begins to put the clothes he wore to the hospital in the washing machine. Of course, she discovers the appointment card. Unaware that she can't have children, she calls the clinic and the receptionist helpfully confirms an appointment has been made in her husband's name. The cliffhanger comes when she suggests that maybe the husband has booked the appointment for another woman.

Hidden Secrets also hinges on the dramatic potential of complicated marriages. It features a man with accident-induced amnesia unable to recognize his family. His wife, separated from him before the accident, discovers that he has two other wives. Any sane woman would use his memory loss as a chance to escape, but as polygamy is legal in Iran and does not constitute grounds for divorce, no doubt the drama took another turn. We didn't stick it out.

Our favorite serial by far was Maybe It Happens To You Too. This was about two educated young men looking for work, one with sleepy blue eyes, the other more typically Iranian looking with a neat goatee and glasses. It begins with a montage of Blue Eyes returning home empty-handed day after day over the course of a month. My cousin O. said this was realistic: not only is unemployment high, but all the unemployed are overqualified with bachelor's and master's degrees. O. himself, a recently accredited engineer, has only just found a job after months of looking.

Eventually, the two friends decide to set up a stall selling nutritious stew and soup to Ramazan fasters. But Blue Eyes is on the make. He buys donkey meat instead of mutton, drops a huge rock of salt into their competitor's tureen, and greedily triples their profit margin. Goatee, who has a beautiful and moral girlfriend, Narges Khanom, finds out. Narges makes him return his share of the profits. Blue Eyes departs, riding off into the sunset to sell his stew elsewhere. As he sits on the back of a pickup with his tureens, the driver brakes suddenly to avoid hitting another vehicle. Donkey meat splatters everywhere, and Blue Eyes has to dispense with all his ill-gotten gains to pay off the angry drivers. He returns to his friend's house, lesson learned.

After watching several hours of this morally edifying stuff, I ask A. if she'd like to go for a stroll. I know not to ask my aunt, despite the fact that she too has been watching TV all day. She doesn't like to go outside, preferring to stay home and take care of her family. I'll never forget her simple reply the time I asked her why: "I don't like to go outside anymore. It's not my country. I don't like it."

I knew instantly that "anymore" meant since the Revolution.

It's nearly sunset and the temperature has fallen. Donning our headscarves, A. and I head out. There are just a few people walking on the street. We pass two teenage girls in canary yellow and electric blue scarves chattering on their smartphones. We pass a group of middle-aged ladies sitting for a gossip. We are on the Ekhbatan Estate, a miniature city of repetitive concrete apartment blocks on the western edge of Tehran. As I look up at the windows, I wonder how many women of my aunt's generation, like her, prefer to stay inside -- women who were in their early 20s, their lives just beginning, when the Revolution changed them forever, clinging onto whatever agency they can by staying in the private realm of their homes.

As we turn back toward home, we see a stew and soup stand, just like on the television. As yet, there are no people lined up. The seller is not blue-eyed and looks rather forlorn, no doubt from hunger. I ask if I can take a photo. He says yes, but won't muster a smile. Then my cousin whispers into my ear, "We better not try it, it might be donkey meat!" And we walk off laughing.

Photos: Traditional iftar treats: Ash stew (homepage), a tray of zoolbabamieh (above).

Copyright © 2012

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

News | Barak: Iran Has No Nuclear Arms Program; Panetta Angry with Israel

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

EhudBarak.jpg 11:45 p.m. IRDT, 16 Mordad/August 6 In an interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged that Iran neither has nuclear weapons nor is trying to make them. Blitzer asked Barak, "What does that mean that the ayatollah [Ali Khamenei] has not given the order to build a nuclear bomb?" The defense minister responded,

It's something technical. He did not tell his people start and build it -- a weapon on -- an explodable device. We think that we understand why he does not give this order. He believes that he is penetrated through our intelligence and he strongly feels that if he tries to order, we will know it, we and you and some other intelligence services will know about it and it might end up with a physical action against it. So he prefers to, first of all, make sure that through redundancy, through an accumulation of more lowly enriched uranium, more medium level enriched uranium and more centrifuges and more sites, better protection, that he can reach a point, which I call the zone of immunity, beyond which Israel might not be technically capable of launching a surgical operation.

For the past year, Barak has been referring to a "zone of immunity" -- a stage in Iran's nuclear program beyond which it could survive an Israeli attack, or as he put it recently, "It means they reach a situation where, through redundancies, neither Israel and probably not even America can do anything surgically to block it. Once Khamenei reaches this kind of situation, he can be practically assured that he [has] crossed the point of no return and will end up more like North Korea or Pakistan, rather than like Iraq or Syria."

Now, Barak has admitted an important point that has been widely accepted by U.S. officials and even by many in Israel, which is that Iran has no nuclear weapon program, a point that has been emphasized over the last year by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, CIA Director David Petraeus, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, and National Intelligence Director James Clapper.

The Israeli newspaper Maariv reported that during Panetta's recent trip to Israel, heated words were exchanged behind the scenes. As translated by Richard Silverstein, here is that was reported by Maariv,

In meetings with the defense minister [Barak] and prime minister [Benjamin Netanyahu], they criticize the U.S.' "restrained" policy toward Iran. Israeli sources say: Washington is talking about Israel as being "piggish." Panetta expressed frustration with Barak and Netanyahu's expression of a lack of faith in America's commitment to stopping the Iranian nuclear program. The Americans talk of Israel's ungratefulness for our unceasing support for Israel's security.

Panetta's anger with Israel is apparently due to the fact that Netanyahu virtually endorsed Mitt Romney during the presumptive Republican presidential candidate's recent trip there.

Meanwhile, Ephrim Halevy, the former head of Israel's Mossad intelligence agency, has been reported as saying, "If I were Iranian, I would be very fearful of the next 12 weeks.... If the Iranians continue to play their games in nuclear talks with world powers, they would be underestimating Israel's resolve. Their math is off if they think they have open-ended immunity." Halevy told Israel Radio that Israeli threats of military action had a certain "credibility" and "seriousness."

The Jerusalem Post reported that retired Major General Aharon Farkash, former intelligence chief of the Israeli Defense Forces, is worried that Israel will attack Iran soon. As reported by the newspaper,

Farkash [said] that from what he is reading and hearing a decision is not far off. But, he warns, a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities now would be wrong.

"The timing is not now since, even if it is successful, it will ruin the legitimacy that is needed," he said, suggesting instead that Israel wait six to eight months or even until spring 2013 before deciding on such an attack.

One word that repeats itself throughout the interview with Farkash is "legitimacy," a reference to the required diplomatic support Israel will need after a strike to ensure that the Iranians are not allowed to rebuild their facilities and race toward the bomb -- something he believes they will definitely and immediately do.

"An attack is not a single strike and once it happens we are in a whole other world," he said. "Iran will pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Khamenei and [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad will reunite and it will be clear that they need a bomb now so that we cannot attack them again."

Farkash added that the diplomatic and sanctions process should be allowed to "run its course" so as not to "break the legitimacy." In his view, the maintenance of sanctions is imposing a heavy burden on the economies of countries in both Europe and Asia. "If Israel attacks, we will find ourselves being asked why we attacked when the world was imposing tough economic sanctions and was paying for this and was hurting as a result," he said.

HamidSoorianIRNA.jpgGold medal for Iran at London Olympics

Iran's Hamid Soorian, a Greco-Roman wrestler who competed in the 55-kilogram (121-pound) weight class at the London Olympic Games, was awarded a gold medal after defeating a wrestler from the Republic of Azerbaijan in the final. "I have been waiting for this medal for ten years, and present it to my mother," Soorian said. It was Iran's first gold medal at the London Olympics.

Book mocks Khamenei and Ahmadinejad

A book by the popular religious novelist and storyteller Seyyed Mehdi Shojaei that implicitly but unmistakably criticizes both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad can now be downloaded here. The book was originally allowed to be published in 2009, but when it became clear that it was criticizing the Supreme Leader and president, it was banned and all available copies were confiscated by the Ministry of Intelligence.

The book mocks the two leaders and others for abusing Islamic teachings for their own benefits. For example, a chapter titled "Thievery Is a Sin, Unless It Is Done for a Higher Purpose" mocks all the financial corruption in the Islamic Republic and the justifications given for it. Another chapter, "The King and God Live in the Same Neighborhood," criticizes the absolute power of Velaayat-e Faghih (the doctrine under which the Supreme Leader exercises absolute authority).

Over the years, Khamenei has invoked "the enemy" in order to warn about plots by the foreigners, mostly imaginary, against Iran, without ever naming the perceived enemy. A chapter called "The Enemy Is a Useful Thing; If You Do Not Have One, Make One," criticizes Khamenei (without naming him) and the role that "the enemy" has played during his rule. The book defines "enemy" as an entity "whom you can blame and fault for all of your mistakes and shortcomings...something that you can terrify the people with, so that they can take refuge with you...something that allows you to exaggerate what you have accomplished, and blame him if you have not."

Shojaei is very well known in Iran. Once on good terms with Khamenei, he has increasingly turned against the ayatollah and his supporters. After Ahmadinejad made baseless accusations against Mir Hossein Mousavi in their nationally televised presidential debate in June 2009, Shojaei wrote a strongly worded letter to the president, rebuking him for his attack on Mousavi and expressing his concern about the Iranian youth and what they might learn from Ahmadinejad's manner.

Rafsanjani: Détente with world will solve our problems

After Khamenei spoke recently about a "resistance economy" to counter the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said that "implementing a resistance economy requires competent and honest leaders," suggesting that the present government falls short. "We should not have arrived at this juncture, given the high earnings that we had from oil exports over the past few years. Even now, if we act properly and have détente with the world, we can, using the experience of our officials, pass this difficult period," he told a group of clerics and present and former Majles deputies.

Amir Arjomand: We must force government to hold free elections

Dr. Ardeshir Amir Arjomand, spokesman for the Coordination Council for the Green Path of Hope, the temporary Green Movement leadership council while Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi are under house arrest, said, "The only way out of the present crisis is the release of all the political prisoners, as well as Mousavi, his wife, Dr. Zahra Rahnavard, and Karroubi." "The most honorable way out is the [regime'] admission that their [the Green Movement leaders'] positions are correct. Without national unity, there will be no way out of the present domestic and international crises," He added.

Arjomand said that the regime speaks only of the "enemy," as if having friends is "a great sin," but when it searches for friends, "it ends up with Bashar al-Assad." He continued, "Tying the struggle against Israel and the foreign powers with [the fate of] Assad is a grave strategic mistake," because "it will hurt both Iran's national interests and the struggle against Israel in the long term.... Given the level of incompetence and depth of corruption, foreign powers do not need spies and agents penetrating the government. The ruling elite, through its actions, is in the service of foreign powers."

He added that it is too early to decide about whether to participate in next year's presidential election, declaring, "We must use the opportunity to inject positive energy, expressing our demands, and activating social networks, other social organizations and the people. The only way to have national salvation is to hold fair and free elections."

The "bad-omen triangle"

Akbar Fotoohi, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander for Yazd province said that the reformists, the Green Movement, and the "perverted group" -- the inner circle of Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei -- are "the three vertices of a triangle of bad omens that help the worldwide blasphemy." Addressing a gathering of Basij members, Fotoohi declared that the three groups "must recognize that they have no support within the country, particularly in the province of Yazd."

Embezzlement at charitable foundation

The conservative Khorasan newspaper reports that a case of embezzlement has been discovered in the Martyr Foundation, which aids the families of those who lost their lives for the Islamic Republic. The total embezzled amount has been reported to be 15 billion tomans -- roughly $12 million, according to the official rate of exchange. A long-time foundation manager succeeded in transferring the amount out of control of the foundation. When it was discovered, a bribe of one billion tomans was offered to the government agents, which was turned down.

Meanwhile, Interpol, the international police organization, has turned down Iran's request to arrest Mahmoud Khavari, former governor of Bank Melli, who lives in Canada and has been linked to the largest case of embezzlement in Iranian history, involving nearly $2.6 billion. Four of the people charged with involvement in the embezzlement were recently sentenced to death.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Media Watch | Iranians Abducted in Syria Accused of Revolutionary Guard Ties

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

AlArabiyaAllegedKidnappers.jpg 11:55 p.m. IRDT, 17 Mordad/August 7 On Friday, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported that 48 Iranian pilgrims visiting the Sayyida Zeinab Mosque in Damascus were abducted by "armed terrorist groups" while being bussed through the city. This is not the first time Iranian nationals have been abducted during Syria's internal conflict. Eleven pilgrims were abducted in February, as were seven engineers in January, who were accused of being Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps agents; according to Iranian media reports, some of the latter have been released as a result of Turkish intervention.

Reuters reported on Monday that three of the 48 captives were accidentally killed by a government bombing raid, and that their alleged captors have threatened to execute the remaining abductees in response to the raid. On Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi visited Ankara to seek Turkish assistance in the case, declaring, "Turkey has links with the opposition in Syria, so we think Turkey can play [a] major role in freeing our pilgrims."

According to footage broadcast by the Saudi-owned satellite channel Al Arabyia, the kidnappers are members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and they are holding the pilgrims on the grounds that they are actually part of a Revolutionary Guard reconnaissance team. The following translation of the statement by one of the purported kidnappers is based primarily on BBC Monitoring Middle East's partial transcript of the video, along with reports from other news outlets:

God be praised and with his help, one of the groups of the Al-Bara Brigade has captured 48 of the thugs of Iran who were present in Damascus on a reconnaissance mission in the city. During their interrogation, it became clear that they include a number of Iranian officers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. These are the documents that were with this officer. This is the military identity card of this officer and these are the licenses of carrying weapons. We warn Iran and all those who work with and support this regime and tell them that this regime will inevitably go. We also warn Iran that we will attack all [its] positions in Syria. All the Iranians who work on Syrian territory will have the same fate of these prisoners, [either capture or death], God willing. God be praised.

A Mr. Muhammad Inad told his interviewer after the video statement was shown that "it became clear that they are Iranian fighters from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. This capturing operation is very serious and consequently, it will bring big pressure to bear on the Iranian government."

The operation, he said, "is a very advanced step, which shows that the FSA has a great ability to carry out such qualitative missions." A man claiming to be an FSA brigadier captain, also interviewed by Al Arabiya, asserted that "one of the prisoners who were captured is an officer who has his military identity card and two identity cards on carrying weapons" and "when we interrogated him, we have found some photographs of military operations in Iran in which this officer has participated in."

In the same broadcast, an Iranian media commentator dismissed the alleged documents -- which are shown in the Al Arabiya video by one of the men held under guard and are extremely difficult to read -- as forgeries produced by the FSA. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denies that any of those taken were Revolutionary Guard members and has reportedly asked for Turkey and Qatar to approach the kidnappers to secure the release of the 48, as those governments maintain both public and clandestine ties to Syrian opposition forces.

The details of the report from the "Syrian opposition" side highlight the problematic coverage of the conflict there. Muhammad Inad is described on Al Arabiya as a member of the Syrian National Council, based in Istanbul. The expatriate group is aligned with the Turkish headquarters of the FSA, which claims to have ordered neither Friday's kidnappings nor any like them in recent months. The FSA itself is less an organized military force than the name of the umbrella command nominally in control of several anti-regime militias and army defectors' battalions operating in the country who have adopted the label or are described as the "Free Syrian Army" in news reports. Due to media restrictions imposed by the Syrian government and the ongoing fighting throughout the country's major urban centers, information about the FSA's overall composition and goals has been difficult to come by. As such, no independent verification has been provided for the suspected kidnappers' claims, if the tape on Al Arabiya is indeed authentic.

The Iranian and Syrian governments as well as Hezbollah describe the FSA's fighters as Sunni jihadists backed by the Western powers to overthrow Assad and further isolate Iran. Though the Western powers refute these charges, which have been echoed by the Russian Foreign Ministry, elements of the "Islamic Army in Iraq," an al Qaeda-inspired Sunni combat group that has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Iraq, are widely believed to be operating in Syria. Having apparently betrayed their former Ba'athist handlers in Damascus, their presence in the conflict is drawing growing international attention even though their true strength is unknown. The United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar are known to be supporting the FSA to varying degrees, mostly in the form of intelligence sharing, humanitarian aid, and communications coordination. Advanced weaponry has been promised by the Saudis and Qataris, but at this stage, most of the FSA's weaponry is believed to be captured Syrian Army stocks, or smuggled into the country via Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey from black market dealers and Syrian expatriates.

In the weeks prior to this most recent kidnapping, Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi had proclaimed that "no request for coming back to Iran has been sent to the Foreign Ministry" by any Iranian nationals living in Syria, though in light of the prior kidnappings, state news outlet Press TV noted that Iran had imposed a ban on travel to the country. Iraqi and Iranian media sources have hinted that worsening regional tensions have curtailed commercial contracts to transport pilgrims from Iran to other countries in the region since the "Islamic Army in Iraq" is thought to have orchestrated several attacks on Shia pilgrimages to Iran's neighbor. Official Iranian government-organized pilgrimages to Syria, which thousands of Shia pilgrims visit each year to see such holy sites, have been suspended since the January and February mass abductions were reported.

A Syrian official told the Revolutionary Guard-controlled Fars News Agency that "the terrorists affiliated to the so-called Free Army are in charge of the abduction of the Iranian pilgrims" and that the government's security forces were searching for the perpetrators. The Islamic Republic News Agency reported on Saturday that the pilgrims were all released, but the report was retracted within hours of its publication.

Abductions of religious pilgrims have been increasing in recent months as the Syrian civil war intensifies, and not just Iranians are being targeted. In May, eleven Shia Lebanese citizens returning to Lebanon from Iran by way of Syria were taken in the city of Aleppo by a self-proclaimed rebel organization. According to the Lebanese Daily Star, one of the abductees was put on television to plead for their release, the captors' demanding that Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah renounce his vocal support of Bashar al-Assad. The Lebanese press reported shortly thereafter that another unknown group proclaimed it had kidnapped Syrian opposition leaders in retaliation, and last week families of the abductees staged protests outside of the Lebanese president's residence.

Aleppo is now the location of a fierce battle between Syrian security forces and elements of the FSA. Syrian state television has asserted that the rebels are being routed, though claims of a quick defeat cited in Reuters have been since retracted by the British newswire, as the reports were found to be the work of hackers.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Media Watch | 'Terror Club': Iranian TV's Prime-Time Assassination 'Confessions'

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

ScreenShotIRTV1.jpg 1:10 a.m. IRDT, 19 Mordad/August 9 Terror Club, a 39-minute documentary that aired on IRTV1 this past Sunday, purported to show the confessions of people accused of working for Israel to kill Iranian nuclear scientists. The report apparently featured 12 of the 20 individuals the Tehran Times says were arrested in June on suspicion of espionage and terrorism. This is the second known mass arrest of Iranian nationals accused of working for Israel this year, and the second state television documentary featuring "confessions" from those accused.

Bizarrely, Terror Club seems to have lifted part of its soundtrack from the popular video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. The instrumental choice that brings the show to a close chillingly fits in with the documentary's take: "The Boneyard," which plays in a game level where the protagonist has just been betrayed by his commanding officer and is now on the run from both American and Russian agents, can be heard near the 31:50 mark as the scientists' relatives are being interviewed.

The documentary purports to detail how this "terror cell" carried out its operations in Iran and selected its targets: Masoud Ali Mohammadi, Majid Shahriari, Dariush Rezaeinejad, and Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan Behdast. Earlier this year, independent reports offered confirmation of Iran's claims that Israel's Mossad intelligence agency and the Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organization (MKO) were responsible for the shootings and vehicle bombings that killed the men. A covert campaign between Israel and Iran is now being openly discussed. The debate over a series of arrests of Iranian nationals in several countries charged with attempting to bomb Israeli targets in retaliation for the scientists' murders constitutes the latest chapter in the shadow war. All of these claims and counterclaims have proven extremely difficult to verify, especially since it is not wholly clear why the unnamed Israeli and American officials who are often cited as sources for these stories are apparently leaking information.

Recently, one of Israel's best-known defense correspondents, Yossi Melman, challenged the earlier reports that attributed the scientists' murders to joint Mossad-MKO operations. According to Melman -- who wrote in 2009 that "I would advise Netanyahu to attack Iran" -- it is only Mossad, and not the MKO, whose people carried out the assassinations and possible sabotage operations. In his vivid new accounting of Mossad operations in Iran, he states that "[Majid Jamali] Fashi and the 20 other suspects now being held were not the killers. The methods, communications, transportation, and even the innovative bombs used in the Tehran killings are too sensitive for the Mossad to share with foreign freelancers."

Melman had earlier reported, though, that "it is unlikely these operations could have succeeded without inside support, meaning from individuals or groups ready to help sabotage the ayatollahs' regime." According to several other reports, Mossad is using Iraq and Azerbaijan as clandestine launching pads for covert operations in the Islamic Republic. Officials in all of these countries have categorically denied all such claims that have appeared in the Iranian, American, or European press.

Fashi, who was hanged at Evin Prison this past May for his alleged role in the 2010 killing of Ali Mohammadi, confessed on television to having traveled to Israel to train for the operation. The Iranian Foreign Ministry maintains that all of the killings evidence "the involvement of the Zionist regime [Israel], the US and their allies in Iran." The United States denies that it has had any involvement in the murders, which the Obama administration condemned, or that it has maintained secret ties to MKO operatives.

The claims of the IRTV1 documentary could not be independently verified. If the interviewees -- one of whom said she and the other women on the show were also selling their bodies for access to information -- have indeed been charged with espionage, they could well share Fashi's fate.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Cinema | 'Zendegi-ye Khosoosi': The 'Private Life' of an Iranian Reformist

$
0
0

A tale of a fatal attraction bears a host of ideological implications.

Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi is a doctoral student in modern Middle East studies at Queens College, University of Oxford.
[ society ] A provocative film recently graced Iran's cinemas, albeit for a short time, sparking controversy across the country. The hardline fundamentalist vigilante group Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God) sought to prevent Zendegi-ye Khosoosi (Private Life), directed by Mohammad Hossein Farah Bakhsh, from screening at numerous cinemas across the country after its limited release, and the film ultimately saw its license revoked. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has been heavily criticized by conservatives and fundamentalists for licensing it to begin with. Similarly, its screening at the Fajr Film Festival and the Best Actor award Farhad Aslani won there for his performance has been widely denounced.

Zendegi-ye Khosoosi charts the life of a man who at the outset of the 1979 Revolution is a zealous revolutionary, but who over the decades evolves into a reformist and fervent antagonist of the Islamic Republic's conservative establishment. Ebrahim Kiani (Aslani) is the editor of Mardom-e Emrouz (Today's People), a possible reference to one of the preeminent reformist dailies during the era of Mohammad Khatami's presidency, Sobh-e Emrooz, headed by Saeed Hajjarian and Ali Reza Alavi Tabar.

In this article, I have no pretension to partake in film criticism, something for which I'm totally unqualified; I'm far more interested in some of the political motifs and themes that the film raises and how they relate to the shifting geography of the Iranian political scene. In this respect, Zendegi-ye Khosoosi tells the tale of a onetime zealot who steadily loses faith in the revolution and regime he once so vehemently defended. As time passes, he transforms from an enforcer to a critic from within. This tale has been told many a time, and will no doubt been told again. What is interesting about Bakhsh's film is its vivid illustration of the tale within the context of Iranian popular culture; despite the odd cliché and clumsy turn of phrase, it addresses a complex and deeply controversial set of political issues.

During the twilight of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, a small genre of films emerged that interrogated the Soviet past, in particular examining in critical fashion the excesses of Stalin and the cult of personality that was cultivated around him; Repentance, directed by Tengiz Abuladze, is a notable example. While Zendegi-ye Khosoosi is a far cry from Repentance and comparable films of its genre -- for instance the personality of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Imam, remains well beyond reproach -- it can be seen as a commentary on Iran's revolutionary past and its legacy. It also in a limited way breaks a number of taboos, while also provoking many questions and problems of its own.

The opening scene depicts a bearded Ebrahim in the throes of the Revolution. With a group of fellow zealots, he attacks a cinema and tears down the posters plastered on its walls with various "provocative" scenes. While attacking the cinema, he bellows the obligatory "Allah-o Akbar," pumping his fist in the air. The crowd then proceeds inside the cinema to vandalize everything in sight.

As Ebrahim rallies a band of men who look like members of the Basij paramilitary force, he proclaims, "There is no difference between a badly veiled woman, and a woman without a veil -- they're infidels.... We must not allow this licentious group to trample on the ideals of our revolution. We must smack them in the mouth." One scene graphically depicts Ebrahim and his band of bearded men dead set on terrorizing and hunting down those women who fall short of their prescription for "Islamic modesty." As a terrified, screaming woman finds herself corned, Ebrahim pushes a tack into her forehead for being improperly covered. It has been claimed that this is a reference to Akbar Ganji, who was infamously nicknamed Akbar Poonez (Akbar the Tack) for the manner in which he reportedly confronted "badly veiled" women in the first years after the Revolution.

After Ebrahim leaves the woman writhing in agony, his friend pulls him aside and asks, "What are you doing?" "Executing the command of God," he replies with unwavering conviction. "With what license?" his friend shouts back. "We were only meant to caution [people]." With the unfaltering certainty of which only the "fanatic" is capable, Ebrahim barks back, "No matter the reason, if one doesn't prohibit evil, then one has sinned, you understand?" He turns around and walks off, impervious to his friend's entreaties that he exercise restraint.

While the credits are still rolling, there is a scene of Ebrahim wearing dark shades in a darkened room. While he lights a cigarette, we see a man hanging upside down, screaming in pain as the soles of his feet are lashed. Ebrahim appears to relish the sadistic scene. "Keep hitting him," Ebrahim says, "till he tells everything...monafegh [hypocrite]." "Monafegh" is the name used in Islamic Republic propaganda to designate the Mojahedin-e Khalgh, the Khomeinists' mortal enemy since the early 1980s, when Iran was on the precipice of civil war. The very fact that such a scene was included in the final cut is itself noteworthy, since it is essentially a depiction of officially sanctioned torture, the existence which the regime has always sought to deny, let alone allow attention to be drawn to via a popular medium.

Jumping several years into the future, we see Ebrahim, minus the beard, exiting an official building after having been forced to resign his post due to allegations of corruption, allegations which he hints were the result of political infighting. Responding to a journalist's question in the tone and idiom peculiar to Islamic Republic officialdom, he says, "I'm a small solider for the nezaam [political system], and for the preservation of the values of the nezaam I am prepared to offer my life, namoos [honor], and livelihood...but will in due course reply and break my silence."

Now, in the film's present tense, Ebrahim is a well-known newspaper editor and "radical" reformist critic from within the system. At one point, he is compelled to say an "expedient hello" to a figure almost certainly based on Hossein Shariatmadari, the infamous hardline editor of Kayhan, widely regarded as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's primary voice in the media. Ebrahim and his paper have suffered several public attacks at the hands of their conservative rival, and the conversation quickly breaks down into an acrimonious exchange.

The hardline editor, referred to simply as "Hajj Agha," dresses down Ebrahim, telling him, "The things your newspaper's printing prepare fodder for the enemy.... I can't overlook deviance due to our past together."

Ebrahim firmly rebuts his erstwhile comrade-in-arms. "Anything that isn't compatible with your taste you deem deviant as you draw red lines around us."

The veneer of civility with which they began has disintegrated. Hajj Agha asserts, "Our red line is clear. The preservation of the regime is the most sacred duty of all."

Ebrahim parries with a rhetorical blow that ends the conversation. "These words of yours, do they spring from religion or from a lust for power?... In my newspaper, I write of the people's pain. Do you know as a result of your accusations how many people have gone to jail and families ruined? With the state of things created by you, one generation has lost hope with the Revolution.... It's true you buy political influence for yourself with backing from the Treasury."

The unambiguous nature of this scene and the depiction of an intra-elite argument between Ebrahim and a Shariatmadari-type figure is quite remarkable. Iranians regularly invoke comparable political leitmotifs in the private conversations and debates, and they have even bubbled to the surface of political journalism and commentary, particularly in the late 1990s when the reformist press was at its vibrant peak -- exemplified by the work of investigative journalists Ganji and Emad Baghi on the Chain Murders -- but in popular culture such allusions, and caustic ones at that, have been rare indeed.

After this heated exchange, Ebrahim takes a breather outside, where he encounters a young aspiring writer from London: Parisa Zandi, played by the well-known actress Hanieh Tavassoli. Parisa recognizes "the famous Ebrahim Kiani, editor of Mardom-e Emrooz" right away and expresses her desire to write for his newspaper.

Parisa subsequently submits an "erotic" short story, which he says he can't print because it violates the implicit "red lines" laid down for newspaper editors by the nezaam. In protest, Parisa tells him, "But your newspaper is the vanguard for breaking read lines." He replies, "Yes, political ones...political awareness is one of the people's demands." He adds, however, that Parisa's piece might be construed as "unethical" and if it is to be published in the newspaper it must be "compatible with the culture, customs ,and laws of society." This could be said to reflect the state-reformist focus on matters of procedure in so-called "good governance," relating to the rule of law and accountability of state institutions, at the expense, say critics, of cultural and religious reform and self-criticism, particularly with respect to issues of sexuality and women's liberation.

As mentioned previously, Ebrahim Kiani fits the template of many, if not the overwhelming majority, of state reformists in Iran, who began their political lives as radical revolutionary devotees of Khomeini, with dreams of establishing a utopian-popular Islamic state at home and exporting Islamic revolution abroad. With their progressive exclusion from the political scene during the early 1990s, spearheaded by Khamenei and Akbar Hasemi Rafsanjani, these onetime radicals underwent a period of reflection on the nature and trajectory of the Revolution. Individuals such as Behzad Nabavi, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Hamidreza Jalaeipour, Ali Reza Alavi Tabar, Ebrahim Nabavi, Mohsen Sazagara, Akbar Ganji, Saeed Hajjarian, and Abbas Abdi, who had previously been Islamist radicals favoring a strong state with powerful economic redistributive powers, would emerge as reformists out of a process that for many was long and often painful, culminating, albeit unexpectedly, in the 2 Khordad Movement and Khatami's electoral victory in the 1997 presidential election. It is not clear at times whether Zendegi-ye Khosoosi is parodying these individuals or praising them -- one of the reasons why it is interesting as a popular commentary on the politics of the time.

At a ski resort, Parisa quizzes Ebrahim on his past and motivations. "I am confused and don't know if you are the same person you are now, or those things that I have heard.... I heard that what you're doing today differs 180 degrees with your past; before you were a Sepahi-ye nezaami [Sepah is a common abbreviation for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and now you oppose your old friends because your post and office were taken from you." Ebrahim nonchalantly, though with a bit of a grimace, replies as if he's heard the same story many times. "These days the atmosphere is one of firing off accusations. Everyone is accused in some way. One of subversion, one of being a hypocrite, one is a deviant, one is a mercenary; the fight is one of power, and we're in the game."

In an earlier scene over dinner, Ebrahim didactically tells Parisa, "The pursuit of truth was always attractive for me. I believe consciousness must be given to the people. We must dispatch the demands of the people to those in power." In this way, we see a contradictory mixture of power, pragmatism, and idealism, all three of which Ebrahim and the reformist elite could be said to embody, with the gargantuan task of reconciling those contradictions proving endlessly difficult, if not altogether impossible.

Befitting the moment, and echoing the audience's own skepticism, Parisa replies, "Don't your words have a whiff of sloganeering about them?" She adds, "I was thinking about how much you differ from what I had envisaged."

He asks, "What idea of me did you have in your mind? A 'chain murderer'?" (Supposedly "rogue" Intelligence Ministry operatives led by Saeed Emami were held responsible for those killings of a slew of intellectuals between 1988 and 1998.)

"No," she counters. "I thought you would be a dogmatic religious type."

As if picking from among his bag of ready-made answers and in stark contrast to his onetime practice of accosting women deemed "badly veiled," he states, "I believe there have been different interpretations of Islam" -- a refrain often heard from Iranian reformists and "religious intellectuals" (roshanfekran-e dini) such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari. He continues, "Islam isn't a religion of violence at all. I personally believe that Islam must be at one with the present."

That evening, they return to Parisa's home. When Ebrahim's wife phones, he claims he is at a late meeting. Ultimately, at Ebrahim's suggestion, he and Parisa enter into a "temporary marriage" (sigheh). This is a paramarital contract in Shia Islam that allows a man and woman to engage in "religiously permissible" relations for anything from a couple of hours to several decades. The man is usually supposed to solicit the permission of his first wife, but Ebrahim dispenses with this "formality." Despite being a modern and putatively Westernized Iranian woman from London, Parisa agrees and Ebrahim recites the relevant prayer to "sanctify" their union.

This may be interpreted as a reference to Atoallah Mohajerani, who as a minister of culture and Islamic guidance during the Khatami era was considered a liberal thorn in the side of the conservative establishment, providing the reformist press with licenses to publish their newspapers, journals, and books. Mohajerani was accused by the Revolutionary Guard-controlled Fars News Agency -- which is well known for fabricating "news" whole cloth for ideological purposes (e.g., a fictionalized version of Asghar Farhadi's speech accepting the Oscar for A Separation, a purported interview with Egyptian president-elect Mohamed Morsi) -- of polygamy and having entered into a temporary marriage with a younger woman. Whether this is a not-so-subtle swipe at the former culture minister, who made a famous defense of free speech in Islamic terms tothe Fifth Majles, one can only speculate. But it is certainly curious that the film uses charges leveled against high-profile reformists and critics of the regime by the conservative and Guard-affiliated press to circuitously impugn the latter's credibility. Farah Bakhsh was most probably trying to grope his way across the veritable minefield laid down by government censors and perhaps even placate them.

It is at points like this that the question arises of whether Zendegi-ye Khosoosi is also a critique of the Islamic Republic's reformists' perceived moral inconsistencies and failure to act on their rhetoric. While the view that they have been morally inconsistent can be found in the smear campaigns of the conservative Iranian press, and to a lesser extent the diaspora, the idea that the reformists failed to live up their rhetoric appears to be more boradly held. It was definitely seen in the University of Tehran student body's unenthused, even hostile reception of Khatami in December 2003, and Zendegi-ye Khosoosi certainly seems to be giving voice to such a sentiment.

In a scene set at the newspaper's offices, Ebrahim dismisses a proposed front-page byline on the basis that his enemies will accuse him of following the "BBC's line." He is, of course, referring to BBC Persian. In the next scene, ironically, Ebrahim watches BBC Persian's reportage criticizing the Islamic Republic.

It is easy to read this scene as a jab at the reformists, implying they engage in doublespeak -- radical in private, while publicly staying within the bounds laid down by the nezaam for purposes of political and economic expediency. It also implies that Iranian political personalities might themselves often rely on BBC Persian because of the dearth of journalism with a critical edge produced inside the country.

In another important scene, Ebrahim visits a former Revolutionary Guard commander who headed an important battalion in the Iran-Iraq War and lost two sons in the conflict. Attempting to persuade the former commander to give an interview on the state of the country, Ebrahim insists, "I am your servant, my newspaper is at your disposal."

We see the pictures of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei that adorn the veteran's office walls. Ebrahim presses on. "Hajji, the people should understand why the commander of Khaybar is in the corner of some factory.... The people of this country are in your debt."

"We are in debt to the next generation, not the likes of us."

"When I think of the past, I get distraught, how good and ideal it all was," says Ebrahim.

The veteran replies, "It could have been far better than this if we hadn't forgotten our ideals."

"Hajji, why did it end up like this? How did we come to this point?"

"I doubt it matters to you...I know your past," says the former commander. He continues,

You may listen, but you go your own way. You were always the same.... Do you really want to know? We staged a revolution for religion to rule, but the problems started when we forgot that Islam is also a religion of ethics; we clung to ahkam [Islamic law]. We put ethics on the shelf and forgot about it.... Imam Sadegh has a definition of "religion," Mr. Ebrahim: it's not merely a matter of the length of one's rising and prostration in prayer, but being trustworthy and faithful to one's promises. What have we done with the trust invested in us by these children?... From Islamic law, we learned only to send two cars into the street and cause the bodies of our youth to tremble.... From Islamic law, we learned that if two strands of a woman's hair are visible to plunge tacks into her forehead.... This is what happened to lead us to this juncture.... The perversion of the Revolution began with the likes of you, Ebrahim.... I heard you wrote in your newspaper that Imam Askari didn't have a son [a reference to the 12th Imam].... Ebrahim, I'm worried for you.

The reference to Ebrahim's denial of the existence of the 12th Imam is a clear reference to Akbar Ganji, who in numerous articles he has written since leaving Iran in 2006 has endeavored to popularize the writing and research of individuals such as Hossein Modarressi, professor of Islamic Studies at Princeton University, whose book Maktab dar Farayand-e Takamol (first published in English in 1993 as Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi'ite Islam) proved most controversial, and Iranian researcher and polemicist Haydar Ali Qalamdaran, who advocated a puritanical brand of Islam during the 1950s and 1960s, and denied the validity of the Shia belief in Imamate and the special status accorded to the 12 Imams.

Because of the former commander's emphasis on ethics as opposed to legalism, the hardline Jahan News even took to linking the film to the writings of Soroush's well-known protégé Arash Naraghi, currently assistant professor of religion and philosophy at Moravian College in Pennsylvania. Naraghi has penned an interesting essay, "An Ethical Critique of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult," which has provoked the ire of supporters of Iran's theocratic system. Since Naraghi is identified with the Green Movement, Jahan News, of course, also determined that the film was a machination of the "deviant current."

While the former commander concludes that young radicals like Ebrahim, who were distinguished from their ideological rivals by their fervent advocacy on behalf of the radical clergy, were responsible for the Revolution's "deviation," at the same time he rebukes the newfound radicalism of individuals like Ganji, who attack the foundations of Shia belief such as the occultation of the 12th Imam.

After Parisa phones Ebrahim's home, fueling his wife's suspicion that he is unfaithful, he meets with Parisa to end their affair once and for all. "What do you want me to say? I fucked up," he declares. "When I look in my wife's eyes, I feel guilty." Parisa then tells Ebrahim she has fallen pregnant. In disbelief, all he can muster is, "I'm not the kind to be a coward. I'll try to help you, I'll get a good doctor. Parisa, the quicker you get rid of it, the smaller the sin." Despite his earlier professions of progressive religiosity, Ebrahim chracterizes "sin" in the crudest of terms.

Though Ebrahim repeatedly rejects the possibility that they can have the life together she desires, Parisa refuses to abort the child. Visibly perturbed, he tells her, "You've gone mad."

She angrily shouts back, "Why, because I don't let you make my decisions for me? For a lifetime, I've been hurt by men like you. Before my divorce, I was pregnant and that bastard forced me to abort the child.... Ebrahim, I'm going to keep this child whether you're around or not."

"What do you want from me?" asks Ebrahim.

Parisa replies, "Nothing, just a birth certificate for my child." Ebrahim storms off as Parisa calls out, "Where are you going?"

"Hell," he replies.

After dodging her calls for several days, Ebrahim comes home to an empty house and to his great surprise finds Parisa and his wife, Forough, sipping tea together in the garden. Oblivious to Parisa and Ebrahim's connection, Forough retells how after going shopping she realized two of her tires were punctured and she had no way to pick up their son, Meisam, from school. Parisa, whom Forough calls an "angel," "luckily" appeared on the scene and shuttled Forough around on her errands before dropping her home. This is just one of many instances in which the film predictably slides into a stale, sanitized rehash of the popular 1987 film Fatal Attraction, starring Michael Douglas and Glenn Close, albeit with an Iranian twist, where female jouissance poses a potentially explosive threat beyond the control of law and order.

Here the film problematically blurs the lines between two issues: the case of a woman and her basic right to choose whether she has an abortion or not is conflated with that of a woman who threatens not merely Ebrahim's marriage, but his family's safety as well. Toward the end of the film, Parisa dowses Ebrahim's car in gasoline and sets it alight, and stalks both him and his wife and son. After admitting to have destroyed his car, Parisa tells Ebrahim, "I'll shame you and get mine and my child's rights."

In a fundamentally asymmetrical and discriminatory legal system, the problems faced by Iranian women regarding the defense of the rights over their bodies and with respect to their children are persistent and all too real. Their daily struggles, which for the most part go publicly undiscussed, are metaphorically minimized by the manner in which Parisa's "erratic" behavior is represented alongside her demand that Ebrahim properly recognize her and their unborn child.

Despite claims to the contrary that the women who partake in sigheh possess a clearly demarcated legal status, in practice, they often find themselves with few if any rights at all, especially when the contract is privately concluded and only the involved parties are aware of it. In the case of Ebrahim and Parisa, she has no legal status or rights whatsoever, and for protesting this debased status is depicted as "mentally unstable" and "deranged."

In other words, the only "liberated" or "independent" woman in Ebrahim's life turns out to be a hysterical stalker, and thus the film in many ways perpetuates the typology of femininity propagated by the Islamic Republic that a "free," "independent" woman must be in some respect "abnormal" or a "problem," "incapable of keeping a husband," or even potentially "dangerous."

The archetype of the "hysterical woman" is at the same time complemented by the doting housewife (shir-berenj), who is for the most part none the wiser to her husband's transgressions. In this way, it could be argued the film undermines the very real fight and struggle of many women, both religious and secular, to retake possession of their bodies, even if at the same time it takes aim at reformists' lip service to women's rights. It is, for instance, abundantly clear that Ebrahim, even as a "radical reformist" and supposed "progressive voice" within the system, is unprepared to let this "hysterical," "crazy" woman disturb his cocoon of marital stability and dry conventionality.

Realizing that Parisa is not going to abort the child as he wishes or leave him and his family in peace, he lures her into a car, claiming he has changed his mind and decided to take responsibility for both her and the still unborn child.

As he drives, a relieved Parisa chats away about how she felt it necessary to put a scare into Ebrahim in order for him to assume responsibility and how she "would rather die than live alone and in fear." All of a sudden, while still driving, Ebrahim pulls out a gun and shoots her point-blank in the head. He then dumps her body and sets it alight at the side of the road.

An imaginary or perhaps even hallucinated dialogue then takes place before Ebrahim as he sits behind the steering wheel sobbing, apparently at the enormity of the crime he has committed.

Parisa: "Are you now at peace? Don't you feel guilty?"

Ebrahim: "When it happens, people come to terms with their sin. It would have been a bigger sin to allow you to destroy my credibility and bring shame to my life."

Parisa: "What about my child? It hadn't sinned, but you killed it."

Ebrahim: "Yes, my child was innocent, but sacrificed for a bigger cause."

Parisa: "You will pay for what you have done."

Ebrahim: "You're wrong.... This world is much filthier than we think. I'm not afraid, because I don't believe in justice."

In this way, just as Ebrahim says earlier in the film about the political realm that "khodi-ha [insiders] and gheir-e khodi [outsiders] have gotten all mixed up," we are shown that "right" and "wrong," "good" and "evil" are intertwined and yet inseparable, as the reformed zealot commits murder in order to "preserve his honor." In the name of preserving the "integrity" of his political career and family life, he comes face to face with his sinister side and casually brushes aside the most sacred of the Abrahamic commandments, "Thou shalt not kill." Not only does he murder the woman to whom he made a "sacred," albeit temporary vow, but an innocent child as well, snuffed out before it even had the chance to enter and see the world. One might contend that the child symbolizes the future generation, thwarted before it even had an opportunity to bloom, destroyed by brutal calculations of personal interest and political gain.

The circle of misogyny that began with the young Ebrahim pushing tacks into "badly veiled" women's foreheads ends with him torching the corpse of his temporary (pregnant) wife. And despite the retired commander's admonitions about the paramount importance of ethics, Ebrahim once again resorts to a Machiavellian mantra of the end justifying the means. Despite appearances, Ebrahim hasn't come all that far from his ignominious origins.

Whether intentionally or not, Zendegi-ye Khosoosi highlights the moral ambiguity of many high-profile Iranian reformists, by way of metaphor, inadvertently stating that even the most progressive among them have blood on their hands and that the political elite as a whole are rotten to the core. The extent of this assertion and its veracity will be clarified not by film directors or actors and actresses, but by historians and researchers, but what is interesting is that Farah Bakhsh's film gives vent to a familiar refrain of Iranians both inside Iran and among the diaspora -- all the more familiar after the controversies and unprecedented protests of the 2009 election and the ambivalent reception by some of Mir Hossein Mousavi's leadership.

The morally convoluted nature of political leadership with a past in the revolutionary order is both inescapable and seemingly indicative of its predestined failure. "Moral clarity" and "clean hands," if they can exist at all in the world of politics, are desperately sought after by many, but, at least according to Zendegi-ye Khosoosi and those likeminded, might be found only among the Revolution's so-called "burnt generation" (nasl-e sookhteh), that which rose from the ashes of 2009, namely, the generation to come.

by the same author | The Flexibility of Khamenei's So-Called 'Nuclear Fatwa' | Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki -- Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force' | Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki -- Part 2: Debunking Conspiracy Theory | Man Friday: Khatami's Vote and the Question of 'Reformism'

related reading | Howl in Farsi

Copyright © 2012

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Comment | Iran Bullies Its Own Scholars into Avoiding Istanbul Conference

$
0
0

iranian-studies-conference-in-istanbul-L-ona8mX.jpg

State media claims academic assembly a plot by "Baha'is and royalists."

Dr. Eden Naby is the author of The Assyrian Experience (with Michael E. Hopper) and Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (with Ralph Magnus).
[ opinion ] This past week, the Ninth Biennial Iranian Studies Conference was held in Istanbul. Founded by the North American-based International Society for Iranian Studies, this year's five-day meeting was copresented by London's Iran Heritage Foundation. The focus this time around was historical relations between Turkey and Iran, though many other topics were covered, both ancient and medieval.

The scheduled program of 125 panels brought Iranian scholars from around the world. Special care was taken to include scholars who live and teach in Iran; to assure their ability to participate, Istanbul seemed a natural choice, as Iranians do not need visas to enter Turkey. Alongside English, Persian was promoted as an official presentation language to offer further incentive to Iranian-based scholars. Yet at least 13 panels had to be cancelled, and at least 20 others were truncated due to the absence of Iranian scholars.

How was an event geared to include scholars from Iran sabotaged in this way? Intimidation by Tehran's cultural henchmen is the answer.

Iran's Kayhan newspaper, which operates under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader's office, carried an article last month that claimed the conference was a tool of Baha'is and royalists. As a consequence, potential participants naturally anticipated that they would be accused of collusion with those regarded as Tehran's enemies if they attended. Fearing that they would lose their jobs and pensions or even be sent to prison -- as happened to investigative journalist Akbar Ganji after he attended a Berlin conference in 2000 funded by the respected Heinrich Boll Foundation -- a number of scholars backed out.

Two days prior to the start of the conference, a broadcast on Iranian state television repeated the claims about the Istanbul meeting. As a result, another group of potential participants withdrew. Others arrived in Istanbul from Iran but, learning that so many had withdrawn, left the venue as fast as they could.

Such brazen attacks on scholarship speak to the intensity of the cultural and social intimidation now at work within Iran. Even beyond the nation's borders, self-censorship and intellectual compromise among scholars and experts of Iranian origin living and working in the West is a natural outcome for those who hope to travel to Iran, have family or retain property there, or even fear for their lives. Indeed, several Iranian intellectuals and their associates at home and in the West have violently lost their lives in circumstances that were suspicious or directly tied to the regime, including Ahmad Tafazzoli, Kasra Vafadari, and Manouchehr Farhangi.

For years, academics in both Iran and the West have criticized the U.S. Department of State for refusing visas to Iranian-based scholars, severely restricting their ability to participate in the free exchange of ideas with colleagues outside the country.

The amount of U.S. bashing that has occurred over the decades in Iranian academic settings and intellectual circles has fed the anti-American bias already prevalent among scholars in the country, who often project the legacy of colonial prejudice onto American-Iranian relations. But now they must acknowledge the regime in Tehran as the culprit in the stifling of the rights of academics. There can hardly be a question that Iran uses fascist techniques to prop up its theocratic rule. The Islamic Republic intimidated its leading scholars of Iranian studies from going even to Turkey on a baseless pretext.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook


News | Tajzadeh to Foreign Sec'y Salehi: Tell Ayatollah Khamenei the Reality

$
0
0

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

MostafaTajzadehISNA.jpg 9:50 p.m. IRDT, 21 Mordad/August 11 Mostafa Tajzadeh, one of Iran's most outspoken reformists, has written a letter from prison to Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, asking him to tell Ayatollah Ali Khamenei the truth about the multiple crises the nation faces. The letter was apparently prompted by a recent speech of Khamenei's in which he warned senior officials that the "enemy" was spreading falsehoods about Iran and claimed that the Islamic Republic was on the verge of "victory."

As deputy interior minister during Mohammad Khatami's first term as president, Tajzadeh supervised two of the freest elections in Iran's history, the voting in fall 1998 for city councils around the country and the elections for the Sixth Majles in March 2000. Tajzadeh was arrested following the disputed election of 2009; he has been incarcerated ever since, most of the time in solitary confinement. In a letter he wrote from prison in June 2010, he declared that the reformists should ask the nation for forgiveness.

In the letter made public this week, Tajzadeh explains that he chose to write to Salehi because the foreign minister has always tried to present a moderate and moral image. He invites Salehi to carefully examine what is happening in the country:

When, unlike the past, the military and security forces no longer issue statements about "engineering the elections," it is clear that they have been told behind the scenes to stop issuing the statements because they are clear indications of the superficial nature of the superficial show of "Sultan's elections" [a reference to Khamenei]. When, at the top of the news program, they claim with superficial and laughable excitement that a large number of oil tankers are sailing toward Iranian ports to pick up Iran's oil for international markets, I can see clearly that those resolutions [by the United Nations Security Council] that were not worth the paper on which they were printed [as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared] have unfortunately been effective.

Or, when a reporter for the Voice and Visage of the Islamic Republic [the state-controlled television and radio network] is more enthusiastic than the Ba'athist Syrian reporters to find some "happy" Syrian citizens in Damascus to interview to show how calm Damascus is, it is clear that the stubborn and revengeful rule of Bashar al-Assad and his violent crackdown on the opposition and critics have pushed Syria toward a civil war, and Iran's current rulers are also being too stubborn to acknowledge their strategic mistake in supporting the Syrian regime against its people.

Or, when pragmatism and idealism are both emphasized [a reference to Khamenei's speech], I can see what the slogan of loyalty to the ideals of the Revolution has done to the nation and how the oceans' storms have shown the reality to Xerxes [likening Khamenei to an absolute monarch] in such a way that even the loyal followers are terrified and concerned, and thus the base must be energized and reassured that "we are aware of the facts" and told that the high cost of living, inflation, unemployment, zero rate of economic growth, poverty, corruption, discrimination, and isolation in the world are all illusions of the "enemy" that it tries to present to the nation as fact, but that the truth is that the "enemy" is trapped in a snow avalanche and we are reaching the summit.

Tajzadeh reminds Salehi of the contradictions in what the Islamic Republic preaches:

The Islamic Republic clearly wishes to resolve the dispute over its nuclear program through diplomacy. Iran's chief nuclear negotiator [Saeed Jalili] has stated clearly that Iran has accepted the step-by-step approach, and has asked that for every step that Iran takes in giving up Iran's rights or addressing the other side's demands, the Europeans and Americans also take a minimum step toward addressing Iran's demands. Thus, I ask,

Why is it that negotiations with foreign powers and accepting step-by-step agreements are acceptable, but the same [type of] negotiations with Iranian citizens that would strengthen the nation against foreign powers are impossible? Should we use the language of dialogue with the Europeans and Americans, but the language of prison with our own citizen critics?

Is it possible to condemn the discriminations of Bahrain's ruling group against its Shiites, but at the same time crack down violently on the critics and protestors [in Iran], incarcerate them, and deny them even the most elementary rights, such as the right to work? Is the blood of Bahrain's Shiites redder than the Iranian Shiites'?

How can a regime that does not allow its Sunni citizens to have their own mosque in the capital to worship, or does not allow citizens to hold Friday prayers at home [a reference to the arrest of nationalist-religious figures in Isfahan two years ago], condemn the Saudi Arabia regime's discrimination against its Shia citizens? [...]

Is extracting a confession from a prisoner under physical and psychological pressure illegal everywhere, or does it depend on the country where it is done?... I ask, can a regime use repression, violent crackdowns, and the extraction of confessions by torture against a reformist group that was able to compel, using rational language, the American officials to confess to their mistakes regarding Iran [a reference to the speech by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in April 2000 in which she admitted the U.S. role in the CIA-engineered coup of 1953 and in supporting Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War], but also speak of having a dialogue and discourse with the same American officials?

Tajzadeh then discusses the Khatami administration's other foreign policy achievements, in particular the détente that was established with Europe, which effectively prevented President George W. Bush from taking aggressive action against Iran. Describing the damage done by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric, he points out that President Barack Obama does not need to invoke Bush's "axis of evil" nor even the defense of "U.S. national security," but can instead present himself as the defender of worldwide peace against the Iranian "threat." Tajzadeh concludes,

Instead of ignoring such contradictions, winking at foreign powers, and holding a fire sale of Iran's interests and resources with the baseless hope of convincing the foreign powers to end their pressure, threats, and sanctions, it is better for you to devote part of your efforts to presenting the international realities to the [Supreme] Leader and convincing him to reconsider his rule, because as long as there is no change internally, neither the nightly nightmares nor the rapacity of foreigners will end.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

The IRGC Strategic Brain Trust | Part 2: Ahmadian, Hejazi, and Jafari

$
0
0

2_8911270814_L600.jpg 4_8911270814_L600.jpg

Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of Southern California, is a columnist for Tehran Bureau and contributes regularly to other Internet and print media.

Part 1: Ghasem Soleimani and Ahmad Vahidi

Shaping the Guards' strategy, from asymmetric warfare to the Mosaic Doctrine.

[ series ] The preceding article in this two-part series offered a look at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' two most influential strategists, Major General Ghasem Soleimani and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi. The core of the Guards' strategic brain trust includes three other high-ranking officers: Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Brigadier General Seyyed Mohammad Hejazi, followed by Guard chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari.

Ali Akbar Ahmadian

25bcaed9-0208-4eb7-8b76-0639d03c68d4_0.gif While other senior officers such as Soleimani, Vahidi, and Jafari have been the focus of attention in the West, one of Iran's most talented military strategists is the relatively unknown Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian. He was born in 1961 in the town of Babak in Kerman province. An outstanding student, he graduated from high school in Kerman and was admitted to the University of Tehran's medical school in 1979. When the Iran-Iraq War broke out the following September, he left the university and joined the Guards and the Basij militia. After his training, he fought at the front in Khuzestan province.

In 1981, a leftist guerrilla group led by Ashraf Dehghani -- a key member of the communist guerrillas who fought the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi -- began to attack government buildings in Bandar Abbas, Iran's main port during the war. Ahmadian and two other Guard officers were dispatched to Bandar Abbas, where they led a successful effort against Dehghani's group. In March 1982, the Iranian Army and the Guards launched the Fath ol-Mobin operation in Khuzestan. Ahmadian took part in the operation, which liberated almost 1,000 square miles that had been occupied by Iraqi forces and essentially eliminated the possibility that Iraq could again attack the strategic towns of Dezful, Shush (Susa), and Andimeshk. After the operation, Guard chief Mohsen Rezaei made Ahmadian a member of the corps' command council and put him in charge of coordinating Guard forces in the provinces of Hormozgan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchistan. He was subsequently promoted to chief of staff of the Guard forces in the southeast. The forces under his command took part in several important operations against Iraq.

In 1984, the Guards created five military districts around Iran; Ahmadian was appointed commander of District 4 and the Nooh (Noah) base in Bandar Abbas. The vast district included the provinces of Fars, Bushehr, Kerman, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Hormozgan, and Yazd. The next year, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ordered the Guards to form their own naval and air force wings, and Ahmadian was put in charge of the Guards' maritime forces. After the war ended in July 1988, he was commissioned as a naval officer and appointed deputy chief of the Iranian Navy, then under the command of Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani. He also returned to the University of Tehran and graduated as a dentist (he is often accorded the salutation Rear Admiral Dr.). He also received an M.S. in defense sciences from the National Defense University.

In July 2000, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed Ahmadian chief of staff of the Guards' forces (a position just below that of the Guards' top commander), replacing Brigadier General Hossein Alaei, a popular war hero. (In an article published this January, Alaei implicitly compared Khamenei to the Shah and the present state of affairs to the era immediately before the 1979 Revolution. He was criticized by some hardline Guard officers, including Mohammad Hejazi, and later claimed that his article had been misinterpreted.) Ahmadian was credited as chief of staff with modernizing the Guards' organization and streamlining its operations. For two years, he was also the commander of Imam Hossein University, a Guard-controlled institution that instills ideological "purity" in the Guards' officer corps. After Jafari was appointed Guard chief in September 2007, Khamenei named Ahmadian to head the Guards' Strategic Center, a post he still holds.

Ahmadian is credited as one of the very first senior officers to institutionalize the strategy of asymmetric warfare in Iran's military doctrine. It was under his command that the Guards' navy developed its asymmetric warfare strategy to counter the Bahrain-based U.S. Fifth Fleet. Lessons were learned when the U.S. Navy, together with NATO forces, intervened in the Iran-Iraq War, saying it was protecting Arab nations' oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. They destroyed roughly one quarter of Iran's large warships in just one day, April 18, 1988. The Guards' naval command consequently decided to rely on fast "swarming" boats, of which it now has over 1,500, and land-based missiles on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The effectiveness of Iran's asymmetric warfare strategy has already been amply demonstrated in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and particularly in the conflict between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in summer 2006. Indeed, the June 28 Pentagon report referenced in part 1 states, "Iran's unconventional forces are trained according to its asymmetric warfare doctrine and would present a formidable force while defending Iranian territory."

Like Soleimani, Ahmadian does not often speak publicly. But he is known to be a hardliner who believes that the Guards are justified in intervening in all aspects of national affairs to "protect the Revolution." He has stated this many times, most recently on July 17. He has also said that while the threat of what he calls "soft power" has been recognized by the Islamic Republic's leadership, not much attention has been paid to what he calls the "soft threat" -- presumably that of Western culture and, more generally, the Internet and social media networks. A collection of some of the many lectures he has given on the subject has been published.

Seyyed Mohammad Hejazi

23_8512130524_L600.jpgBrigadier General Seyyed Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi, known as Seyyed Mohammad Hejazi, was born in 1956 in Isfahan. After completing high school there, he was admitted to the University of Tehran. He joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps almost immediately after it was founded in May 1979.

Shortly after the Revolution, Kurdish dissident groups -- most prominently the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the communist Revolutionary Organization of Kurdish Toilers (Komalah) -- clashed with central government forces in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces. In spring 1980, by order of President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the Army and the Guards dispatched additional forces to the region, of which Hejazi was a part. Intense fighting broke out, killing a large number of combatants on both sides, as well as many civilians.

When the war with Iraq began in September 1980, Hejazi was in charge of dispatching militia forces to the southern front in Khuzestan. He then worked at the headquarters of the Guards' District 2, encompassing the west and southwest. He subsequently served in three successive deputy command positions: of District 4, of the Salman base, and of the Quds Force base.

After the war, Hejazi was commissioned as a Guard officer and became deputy commander of the Basij forces, in charge of coordination. After Mohammad Khatami's victory in the presidential election of May 1997, Khamenei made extensive changes in the military's command structure; Hejazi was appointed commander of the Basij militia in March 1998, a post he held for more than nine years.

During his tenure as Basij commander, Hejazi played a key role in opposing Khatami's reform program. He consistently criticized the reformists, and the Basij forces under his command -- as well as other paramilitary forces receiving direct or indirect Basij support, such as the vigilante group Ansaar-e Hezbollah -- actively resisted reform around the country. Basij and Ansaar-e Hezbollah members were responsible, for instance, for assaults on Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ataollah Mohajerani on September 4, 1998, and the violent attack on students at the University of Tehran dormitory in July 1999.

Under Hejazi's command, the Basij also played a key role in the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2005. It is widely believed that Khamenei suggested to the Guard and the Basij commanders, including Hejazi, that they order their members to vote for Ahmadinejad in the election's second round and to bring to the voting stations as many family members and friends as possible. (The first round's tally had already been manipulated to enable Ahmadinejad to surpass Mehdi Karroubi as the number-two vote getter after Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, placing him in the runoff.) In a historic letter he wrote to Khamenei after the election, Karroubi complained about the intervention by Basij forces.

In September 2007, Khamenei appointed Hejazi to replace Ahmadian as Guard chief of staff. The following spring, Hejazi was appointed as chief deputy to Jafari, the top Guard commander, replacing Brigadier General Morteza Rezaei (no relation to Mohsen Rezaei). In October 2009, Hejazi was appointed deputy chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, a post that he still holds.

Hejazi has never been shy about intervening in politics. He has made it clear that he is an ultra-hardliner and has never missed a chance to criticize the opposition and democratic groups, leveling all sorts of accusations against them. He has frquently used his influence to help like-minded comrades and played a major part in the violent suppression of the Green Movement in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. In the campaign for the Ninth Majles elections that were held a few months ago, he supported Jebheh Paaydaari Enghelab-e Eslami, a hardline group led by the reactionary cleric Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi.

Mohammad Ali Jafari

156579_675.jpg I have previously profiled the Guards' chief, Major General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari. My sources in Tehran tell me that he is not very popular among the Guards' rank and file, and even among some senior officers. Some believe that he was appointed Guard chief in September 2007 over more deserving officers because he would kiss Khamenei's feet whenever they were in a meeting.

However, Jafari is also credited with several strategic innovations that are now part of Iran's military doctrine, as well as the thinking of its political leaders. After his 2005 appointment as director of the Guards' Center for Strategic Studies, Jafari ordered research carried out into the so-called colored revolutions that had taken place in the former Soviet sphere. The Islamic Republic was worried that the West might trigger a similar revolution in Iran, a threat brought home by regional events in early 2005: Lebanon's Cedar Revolution, which lasted from February to April, and the Blue Revolution in Kuwait, which in March saw large demonstrations in support of women's suffrage. Jafari accused the United States of pursuing a policy of soft regime change in Iran after it had failed to overthrow the Islamic Republic through more aggressive means -- a theme now echoed by the hardliners. He argued that the most important danger to the Islamic Republic was posed by the "internal enemy," referring to the reform movement. The studies led the Guards to establish the Al-Zahra and Ashura brigades, which serve as anti-riot units within the organizational structure of the Basij force.

Together with Ahmadian, Jafari also led the successful effort to have the Guards adopt asymmetric warfare as their core strategy. Three days after he was appointed Guard chief on September 1, 2007, Jafari said,

Given the enemy's numerical or technological superiority, Sepah [the Guards] will use asymmetric warfare capabilities, such as those used by Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel in Lebanon. Iranian strategy will also reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As soon as he assumed the top Guard post, Jafari focused on the "internal enemy" by reorganizing the corps. He took two major initiatives: absorbing the Basij, making it one of the Guards' five branches, along with its ground, air, and naval wings and the Quds Force; and decentralizing the Guards' command structure by creating 31 districts and local command centers, 29 in provincial capitals and two in Tehran. This is now known as the Mosaic Doctrine. The idea is to give greater flexibility to Guard commanders in handling riots and demonstrations, and to enable the Guards to better survive a surgical attack by the United States or Israel aimed at decapitating their command structure. The net effect of the initiatives has been to increase the Guards' power to intervene in the political process.

***

The five strategists surveyed in this series are generally considered loyal to Khamenei. But as I have been emphasizing for years (see here and here, for example) and as well-informed sources in Tehran have recently confirmed to me, many of the hardline Guard commanders have their own agenda and the collaboration between the military and religious establishments will survive only so long as the clerics are useful to that agenda. I will soon write about one aspect of the military hardliners' agenda that differs from Khamenei's wishes -- the elimination of the post of president.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

News | Death Toll at 250, Over 2,000 Injured in East Azerbaijan Earthquakes

$
0
0

EarthquakeSurvivorsISNA.jpgEarthquakeRuinsMehr.jpg

EarthquakeOverheadFars.jpgEarthquakeHandISNA.jpg

Press Roundup provides a selected summary of news from the Farsi and Arabic press and excerpts where the source is in English. Tehran Bureau has not verified these stories and does not vouch for their accuracy. Any views expressed are the authors' own. Please refer to the Media Guide to help put the stories in perspective. You can follow breaking news stories on our Twitter feed.

10:25 a.m. IRDT, 22 Mordad/August 12 Tehran Bureau contributor Ali Chenar (pen name) files the following report:


Sunday morning, many Iranians woke up to the news of the devastating earthquakes in East Azerbaijan province. While many rush to donate blood, cash, and necessities, some have decided to travel to the region to get news from their families and loved ones. Telecommunications are down in Varzagan County and there appears to be an acute shortage of medical assistance in the quake-stricken area.

Amid this national disaster many Iranians, independent of their political affiliations, are highly critical of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). It did not interrupt its scheduled programs marking the holy nights of Qadr during Ramadan to report the news of the earthquakes; when it finally did cover the mounting disaster, it did not do so as breaking news, but downplayed its size and significance, reporting only "a few casualties."

The state broadcaster's response to the earthquakes has sparked angry reactions from many quarters. According to a statement on the conservative Tabnak news website, "Since no one cares to announce an official mourning, we at Tabnak announce that we are in mourning for the victims of the recent earthquakes." The website invited comments from its readers, a large number of whom state that they learned of the earthquake not from IRIB but rather from BBC Persian TV. The reformist Digarban website observed that this is the first time IRIB has downplayed a national disaster in such a manner. For many of the victims of the earthquake and their extended families, this means that they have to rely largely on the rumor mill and foreign news coverage for reports on their home towns and villages.

A 12th major aftershock, of magnitude 4.0, was recorded by the U.S. Geological Survey at 8:55 a.m. local time approximately 17 miles south-southwest of Ahar. Unlike the two primary temblors and the 11 preceding major aftershocks, all of which took place at depths between 9.7 and 10 kilometers below the earth's surface, Sunday morning's quake occurred at an estimated depth of only 5.2 kilometers.

EarthquakeHome.jpgEarthquakeVictimsIRNA.jpg

9:10 a.m. IRDT, 22 Mordad/August 12 According to Press TV, the English-language subsidiary of the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting network, 250 people are now reported to have been killed as a consequence of the earthquakes that struck northwestern Iran on Saturday. Over 2,000 people are said to be injured. In addition to the webpages linked at the bottom of this item, more images of the damage caused by the quakes and the ongoing rescue operations are available here, here, here, and here.

5:00 a.m. IRDT, 22 Mordad/August 12 At least 182 people have been killed and 1,500 injured by two large earthquakes that struck northwestern Iran Saturday afternoon. The quakes, measured at 6.4 and 6.3 on the Richter scale according to the United States Geological Survey, struck 36 and 30 miles, respectively, northeast of Tabriz, the capital of East Azerbaijan province; Ahar, a city of 95,000 people, is located just 14 miles northeast of the first quake's epicenter.

The first quake occurred at 4:53 p.m. local time; the second, 11 minutes later. As of this item's publication, the U.S. Geological Survey had recorded 11 powerful aftershocks of magnitude 4.0 or greater, the most intense taking place ten hours after the initial quake and registering at 5.1. The Geophysics Center of the University of Tehran recorded dozens of smaller aftershocks. Reports indicate that while Tabriz did not sustain significant damage, Ahar and the villages and small towns in the earthquake-stricken zone around the two cities have been devastated. Most of the casualties so far have been recorded in two towns near the quakes' epicenters, Varzagan and Haris.

Khalil Saei, head of East Azerbaijan's crisis management center, told the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) that the structures in six villages around Ahar have been completely destroyed and 50-70 percent of 60 additional villages are in ruins, encompassing about 25,000 people. The roads to at least four villages have been damaged so badly that they cannot be reached by land vehicles. As of 2 a.m. local time, rescue services had still not reached at least ten villages near the heart of the affected region.

Several natural gas pipelines have exploded in Ahar, causing further damage, and the supply of gas has been cut off to approximately 70 villages in the surrounding area. All communication lines, including phones, with Varzagan have been severed as a result of the earthquakes. Tabriz lost almost all electrical power, but it has been restored.

According to Seyyed Hossein Saberi, governor-general of neighboring Ardabil province, several earthquakes shook various parts of Ardabil, injuring about 50 people. The town of Astara in Gilan province, near the borders of Ardabil and the Republic of Azerbaijan, was reportedly hit by a sizable quake. And there were reports that the cities of Salmas, Mahabad, and Miandoab in West Azerbaijan were also shaken by tremors.

Mahmoud Mozaffar, head of the Red Crescent Society of Ahar, told ISNA that 210 people had been rescued there and in Varzagan. Fifteen teams of rescue dogs were searching for survivors, while three helicopters aided the rescue operations. Police have called on citizens not to use the Ahar-Tabriz highway, so that rescue teams can reach the stricken areas more swiftly. It also urged people not to spend Saturday night at home, but to stay in open areas in the event of further strong aftershocks. Dr. Mohammad Gheytanchi, director of earthquake research at the University of Tehran's Geophysics Center, warned that aftershocks may be expected for up to 48 hours after the first major temblor. He added that it is not yet clear precisely which geological fault produced the earthquakes.

Over the past four decades, the closest major earthquake was one of 5.5 magnitude that occurred approximately 65 miles to the east in Ardabil on February 28, 1997; 850 people were killed and 2,600 people were injured in that event. Pictures of the devastation caused by Saturday's quakes and of the ongoing rescue operations are available here, here, here, here, and here.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Behind the Curtain | Social Media Fills In for Muted State Media after Earthquakes

$
0
0

EarthquakeTentCityLaptopFars.jpgStandsWithFistPoster.jpg

Many residents of Ahar spent Saturday night outside in tents (Fars News Agency). A visual appeal for aid (Stands with Fist).

ArashBlogThumbnail.jpgNegarBlogThumbnail.jpg

Arash Karami, a frequent Tehran Bureau contributor, tweets as @thekarami. Negar Mortazavi, an Iranian journalist in Washington, D.C., tweets as @negarmortazavi.
[ blog ] The Islamic Republic's state TV network and other media outlets have been widely criticized for not adequately covering the earthquakes Saturday that killed over 300 people and injured thousands. The state-controlled newspapers Kayhan and Resalat, the former commonly known as the Supreme Leader's voice, have so far made no reference to the quakes according to Digarban. (On the other hand, the semiofficial Iranian Labor News Agency and Fars News Agency were among the first to cover the story.) The Tabnak website, which is often critical of the Ahmadinejad administration, ran an op-ed that rebuked those who "laid dormant while the country shook" and declared "public mourning for our fellow countrymen in Azerbaijan who lost their lives."

From the first hours after the initial quakes, social media users have taken an active role in sharing news and information about how to provide assistance. Many have shared the link to a website for news regarding blood donation centers on their Facebook pages. Many Facebook users have also either shared or changed their profile pictures to an image created by the art group Stands with Fist (see above). It depicts Iran with the word "Azerbaijan" written between the borders; the dot over the Persian alphabet's equivalent of "n" -- in the northwest, where the quakes occurred -- has been replaced by a drop of blood. 



Many people have also shared Mana Neyestani's cartoon commenting on the weak coverage of the disaster by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. An IRIB anchor announces, "Important news: The West's new scenario -- creating instability along Syria's borders. The death of one person from poverty in France. Zionists concerned by the meeting of..." The corner of the television screen on which he appears is peeled back, revealing a dead child and wailing mother. A sign amid the surrounding rubble reads "Azerbaijan."

The earthquake has also raised the issue of sanctions. Most international banks are now effectively forbidden from working with Iranian banks; as a result, members of the Iranian diaspora have been unable to send cash donations to their countrymen.

After the devastating earthquake in Bam in 2003, the Bush administration issued a temporary general license that allowed U.S. residents to send relief donations into Iran for 90 days, a move welcomed by then President Mohammad Khatami's government. However, that license has long since expired, and it has not been replaced. Advocates of sanctions place the blame on the Revolutionary Guards, accusing them of having misused charity organizations as a cover for their activities.


Thomas Erdbink of the New York Times reported from Tehran that night rescue missions were suspended because international sanctions make it effectively impossible for Iran to purchase night-vision equipment, which has potential military applications.

Opposition groups, however, have laid the primary blame for what is widely seen as an inadequate response to the quakes at the feet of the Iranian government for what they call its poor disaster planning and management. British-based journalist Masih Alinejad interviewed a former member of parliament from East Azerbaijan who directly criticized the state TV network for not covering the earthquake properly and therefore not attracting enough attention to the importance of contributing to relief efforts. He added that locals were expecting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to come to the stricken region, since he travels to so many impoverished areas for other purposes, or at least that Majles Speaker Ali Larijani or one of his deputies would show up to attract more news coverage. He concluded that the event was simply not taken seriously enough by the government.

Copyright © 2012 Arash Karami and Negar Mortazavi

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Analysis | Israeli Media Abuzz over Looming 'Iran Decision'

$
0
0

A game of leaks with potentially historic consequences.

74594.jpg

Paul Mutter is a graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a fellow at Truthout, an independent online magazine.
[ analysis ] Following Yedioth Ahronoth's report at the end of July that the heads of the Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli Air Force, and Israel's foreign and military intelligence agencies have voiced opposition to a strike on Iran, the Israeli press is awash with reports suggesting concerted campaigns among the country's national security decision makers to either promote or block a preemptive military operation against the Islamic Republic.

The string of front-page Israeli news reports on Iran this past week also evidences the strains in the U.S.-Israeli special relationship caused by the deep mistrust with which the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu views the Obama administration. Israel's Channel 2 reports that Netanyahu is a hair's breadth from ordering an attack on Iran before the end of November. According to a transcript of the report provided by BBC, the Israeli leader is telling his cabinet and generals that Iran "may intend to use nuclear weapons" against Israel and that while he "would prefer the United States to do the job," he does not trust President Barack Obama to take action, so it falls to him to do so. The prime minister's office has so far refused to comment on the veracity of the Channel 2 report, which also claimed that "the prime minister and the defense minister maintain that an Israeli attack against Iran will not lead to a regional war."

In contrast to Channel 2's assessment that Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are breathing down their generals' necks, Yedioth Ahronoth now reports that "not a single state official or military official or even the president [Shimon Peres] supports an Israeli attack in Iran." Cited in the original Hebrew version (though not the English translation) of the report as opposing an attack are the same officials whom Tehran Bureau has previously identified as the main Israeli opponents of an attack. To their number has been added Yoram Cohen, head of Shin Bet, Israel's domestic intelligence agency. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, Netanyahu and Barak are increasingly determined to launch an attack on Iran before the U.S. presidential election in November (and the onset of winter weather). Yedioth Ahronoth has previously suggested that such considerations weigh heavily on Israeli officials, as have reports in papers ranging from the liberal Haaretz to the center-right Maariv to the pro-Nentayahu broadsheet Israel Hayom, the highest-circulation newspaper in the country.

Unsurprisingly, Israel Hayom's general editorial stance has diverged from those of Haaretz -- where most of the commentators openly oppose war and have even been censored for reporting on defense-related matters in which Netanyahu was involved -- and Maariv, where dissatisfaction with Netanyhau's handling of the matter in international forums has been voiced even by those who prefer a military option. By contrast, Israel Hayom's editorials are suggestive of the kind of support the prime minister has among his more militant allies in both Israel and the United States (the paper was founded in 2007 by GOP mega-donor Sheldon Adelson). Its editorial page has consistently supported the prime minister's arguments against Iran in international forums and backed the concept of a preemptive Israeli strike on Iran. In response to the Yedioth Ahronoth reports, the paper ran an editorial accusing its counterpart of "sabotaging the Israeli consensus" by passing on "propaganda" originating in the White House.

This is a common criticism of the Obama administration, one often advanced by Netanyahu's allies. In their view, the White House and Pentagon are leaking information -- or looking the other way from leaks -- whose publication is intended to force the Israelis to back off from certain aspects of their war plans, even though the Netanyahu government quickly moves to deny the veracity of the reports. Certainly, the charge that leaks are not being patched up is difficult to dispute. The Obama administration's seeming inability to keep "senior U.S. officials" from discussing such sensitive subjects as the MKO's role in intelligence gathering, cyber-warfare sabotage, and Persian Gulf deployments with major media outlets is quite noticeable when compared to the administration's aggressive pursuit of whistleblowers -- especially when the leaked information presents an assertive, military-minded American agenda toward Iran.

The splits within the Israeli establishment are also not easy to determine, but Yedioth Aronoth's report also asserts that Barak has been calling out his subordinates in the past few weeks over their opposition to his claims that Israel will be able to weather Iran's response to an attack on its nuclear sites. Criticizing their collective opposition, he is said to be berating them for being more afraid of a post-war inquiry than a war itself and unsubtly making "it clear that everyone against an attack is free to resign" ahead of it. A mass resignation would perhaps free the defense minister to deal with more pliant replacements, but the resulting scandal would seriously damage the government's credibility at home and abroad. However, in a move that his office denies is at all related to the "Iran decision," Israel National News reports that Netanyahu's 25-member cabinet has awarded him greater procedural powers that may effectively allow him to govern by emergency fiat in the event of a war.

Barak, Netanyahu's main backer in all of this, is now apparently stepping deeper into the political fray over Iran's nuclear program, which has so far been dominated by the prime minister's strong rhetoric. Barak's statements on CNN this past week that Iran is not officially pursuing a weaponization program -- but rather, creating infrastructure that would guarantee redundancy in the event such a step is taken -- are not the first such remarks he has made at odds with those of the prime minister (as well as some others of his own). Despite his strong praise of U.S. defense ties, Israeli media watchers now believe that Barak is pushing hard in favor of a preemptive attack via anonymous interviews with Israeli journalists, most notably to Haaretz, where it appears that the defense minister is the interviewee dubbed "The Decision-Maker".

More significantly, Barak may have deliberately leaked information about a classified U.S. intelligence estimate on Iran -- first reported by Haaretz -- that, if its findings square with the claims made about it, would suggest that U.S. analysts have abandoned the judgement reached in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran gave up weaponization efforts in 2003 and was not as close to being able to build a bomb as previously thought. Though no subsequent NIEs have been publicized as the 2007 version was, Reuters reports that the Obama administration has not revised its "central assessment." Some U.S. media pundits and former government officials argue that the 2007 findings were wrong and that the NIEs are being manipulated for political purposes.

Haaretz reports that a new NIE had been passed on to the Israelis and that, in Barak's description, "it brings the American assessment much closer to ours," which is that Iran is extremely close to being able to build a bomb and is prepared to take the final step and order one to be built. However, following the defense minister's "confirmation" of the report, the United States refused to comment on the veracity of Haaretz's account. Barak subsequently played down the initial claim that this top-secret report was an NIE.

If it were an NIE, it would constitute an extremely significant development in the push toward preemption. Such an analysis carries significantly more weight than other U.S. intelligence estimates because it synthesizes the findings of over a dozen federal agencies, effectively giving it their seals of approval before it goes to the Oval Office. Former President George W. Bush says that though he questioned the 2007 NIE's findings, they stayed his hand from an Iran strike. He rhetorically asks readers of his memoirs, Decision Points, "How could I possibly explain using the military to destroy the nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear weapons program?" Israel and Saudi Arabia were, according to Bush's account, "furious" over his decision to accept the findings.

With respect to this latest controversy surrounding an intelligence report, Haaretz's correspondents have apparently not seen the report themselves; their sources are military officials who say they have seen it and are distilling its essence. And once again, there is speculation in the Israeli press as to whether those sources -- or, rather, the sole source -- is Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

Copyright © 2012 Tehran Bureau

@TehranBureau | TB on Facebook

Viewing all 492 articles
Browse latest View live